Boudreaux v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 981787-CA.,981787-CA.
• Parties: Larry Joe BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

989 P.2d 1103

1999 UT App 310

Larry Joe BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 981787-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

October 28, 1999.

Andrew B. Berry, Jr., Moroni, for Appellant.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., and Mark E. Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, P.J., BILLINGS, and JACKSON, JJ.

OPINION

JACKSON, Judge:

¶ 1 Larry Joe Boudreaux (Boudreaux) appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State of Kentucky requested Boudreaux's extradition as a nonfugitive, and in response the governor of Utah ordered Boudreaux's arrest. We affirm the trial court's denial of Boudreaux's petition and authorize his immediate extradition to Kentucky.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This is Kentucky's third attempt to extradite Boudreaux. Kentucky first tried to extradite Boudreaux in 1993 for the crime of flagrant nonsupport, a class D felony. See Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 530.050 (Michie 1990). Boudreaux was charged with failing to pay child support for his daughter, a Kentucky resident. The extradition request sought Boudreaux as a fugitive from Kentucky. Boudreaux then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted his request because Boudreaux had been in Kentucky only once, before the child was born, and thus was not a fugitive as charged in the extradition request. In 1994, Kentucky again tried to extradite Boudreaux. Because the charging papers still alleged that Boudreaux was a fugitive, the trial court also granted his second petition for habeas corpus.

¶ 3 On June 5, 1996, a Kentucky grand jury indicted Boudreaux for flagrant nonsupport for a third time. This time, though, the charge was premised on Boudreaux having committed acts in Utah which resulted in a crime being committed in Kentucky. The governor of Kentucky, Paul E. Patten, executed a demand to the State of Utah on August 5, 1998, alleging that Boudreaux had committed the crime referenced in the indictment, and requesting his extradition as a nonfugitive. Governor Patten forwarded the extradition demand, the indictment, and a requisition packet to Governor Michael O. Leavitt of Utah.

¶ 4 Governor Leavitt then issued an arrest warrant and exercised his discretionary power under section 77-30-6 to surrender Boudreaux to Kentucky. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-6 (1999). Boudreaux was arrested soon after, and again filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After hearing argument, the trial court denied Boudreaux's petition, and Boudreaux filed this appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 On appeal, Boudreaux presents thirty-six issues. However, the State argued—and Boudreaux conceded at oral argument—that Boudreaux has presented only five genuine issues. We agree. Boudreaux argues he should have been allowed to present evidence of his alleged innocence of the Kentucky charges at the hearing on his habeas corpus petition. He also argues that the two prior habeas proceedings, which were dismissed with prejudice, are res judicata and thus bar this extradition attempt. Boudreaux asserts that he has, in fact, paid child support, and that Utah—not Kentucky—has jurisdiction over the dispute about child support. Boudreaux further argues his due process rights have been violated by the proceedings in Kentucky and Utah. Finally, Boudreaux argues the trial court erred in not releasing him from jail or admitting him to bail.

¶ 6 On review of a petition for habeas corpus, we evaluate the record in a "`"light most favorable to the findings and judgment."'" Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). We will not reverse if reasonable grounds support the trial court's decision to deny the petition. See id. As in other contexts, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. See id.; Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1998)

.

DISCUSSION

Governing Law

¶ 7 Both parties to this case, at the habeas hearing and on appeal, have relied on case law dealing with the extradition of fugitives. In that context, the law is clear and well developed. However, Boudreaux was charged as a nonfugitive, and no Utah statutes or case law articulate what standards should be applied to such a case. Accordingly, we must determine what law should be applied to the extradition of a nonfugitive. We first discuss the law as it applies to fugitives.

¶ 8 The authority for one state (the asylum state) to extradite a fugitive to another state (the demanding state) is found in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.¹ This provision is implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970).² "Federal law governs extradition, and State regulation merely supplements it." People ex rel. Schank v. Gerace, 231 A.D.2d 380, 661 N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (1997); see also Prefatory Note, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.L.A.). Most states have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), codified in Utah at Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-30-1 to -28 (1999), which establishes uniform procedures for handling interstate extradition.³

¶ 9 Interstate rendition of fugitives is a mandatory proceeding, compelled by the United States Constitution. See New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 154, 118 S.Ct. 1860, 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 131 (1998) (per curiam)

. In other words, once presented with authentic documents from a demanding state, the asylum state's governor must issue an extradition warrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-2 (1999) (stating "it is the duty of the governor" to extradite fugitive upon proper demand).

¶ 10 In contrast, the United States Constitution does not explicitly authorize interstate extradition of nonfugitives. This is provided for in section six of UCEA. Nonfugitive extradition is a discretionary function, based on principles of comity. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-6 (stating governor "may. . . surrender" nonfugitive upon proper demand); see also Prefatory Note, UCEA (stating "the effectiveness of Section 6 . . . depends upon comity between the states, rather than upon the mandatory effect of the Constitution").

¶ 11 Whether the law that has developed in the area of fugitive extradition also applies to nonfugitives is an issue of first impression in Utah. Although most of UCEA explicitly covers the extradition of fugitives, the provisions of UCEA "not otherwise inconsistent" apply fully to nonfugitive extradition. Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-6 (1999).⁴

¶ 12 In addition, we have an explicit statutory mandate to "interpret[] and construe[] [UCEA] as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-27 (1999). Accordingly, "judicial decisions from other states interpreting their codification of [UCEA] are `particularly persuasive.'" Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698, 702 n. 8 (1995) (citation omitted).

¶ 13 The majority of courts that have considered this issue have applied fugitive-specific case law to nonfugitive situations. See, e.g., Kennon v. Hill, 44 F.3d 904, 907-08 (10th Cir.1995)

(applying Kansas law); Whelan v. Noelle, 966 F.Supp. 992, 998 n. 4 (D.Or.1997); Allen v. Leach, 626 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Colo.1981); Hill v. Blake, 186 Conn. 404, 441 A.2d 841, 844 (1982); Jenkins, 453 S.E.2d at 704; In re Mahler, 177 N.J.Super. 337, 426 A.2d 1021, 1030 (Ct.App.Div.1981); State v. Hershey, 31 Wash.App. 366, 641 P.2d 1201, 1203-04 (1982). These courts have seen no reason to vary the procedural protections afforded fugitives when addressing a nonfugitive extradition case. Moreover, treating fugitive and nonfugitive extraditions alike promotes uniformity of the laws and furthers comity between the states.

¶ 14 We agree with the reasoning of our sister states, and we will thus apply, by analogy, fugitive extradition law to cases in which extradition is sought under the nonfugitive statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-6 (1999).

Presentation of Evidence

¶ 15 We turn now to the question of what evidence Boudreaux should have been allowed to present at the hearing on his habeas corpus petition. Boudreaux argues the trial court erred in not allowing him to present

evidence, testimony [sic] and documentary, upon the allegations of his petition wherein he asserted that he was denied due process of law[,] . . . evidence that he was not served with nor provided notice of any arraignment in Kentucky, that the affidavits. . . in support of the rendition were false, and that he had not "taken refuge in the State of Utah," as asserted in the Warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah [and] evidence upon the two (2), prior attempts to extradite him by the State of Kentucky upon identical claims and the granting by the trial court of his two (2), prior habeas corpus petitions which blocked both of Kentucky's attempts at extradition.

Boudreaux concedes that under UCEA, as it is applied to fugitives, he would not be allowed to present such evidence.⁵

¶ 16 In the case of fugitive extradition, the United States Supreme Court has clearly delineated the scope of judicial review of a habeas corpus petition. Once the asylum state's governor has granted the demanding state's extradition request,

a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable.

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). Because "[i]nterstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding . . . [, t]he [Extradition] Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and...