Bouknight v. Lester
| Decision Date | 04 November 1921 |
| Docket Number | 10747. |
| Citation | 112 S.E. 274,119 S.C. 466 |
| Parties | BOUKNIGHT v. LESTER (TWO CASES). |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County Court; M. S. Whaley, Judge.
Separate actions by Alma G. Bouknight and J. T. Bouknight against L T. Lester. From a judgment for both plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Judgment for plaintiff Alma G. Bouknight affirmed and judgment for J. T. Bouknight reversed.
Thomas & Lumpkin, of Columbia, for appellant.
J. S Verner, A. W. Holman, and A. F. Spigner, all of Columbia, for respondents.
This is an appeal from judgments entered in county court for Richland county. The two cases were tried together, and the jury rendered a verdict in each case for $500 actual damages. At the close of the evidence a motion was made for a directed verdict by the defendant, which was refused. After verdicts were rendered a motion for a new trial was made, which was refused.
The exceptions are 11. The first 7 exceptions complain of error in not directing a verdict in favor of the defendant on the whole case. These exceptions are overruled. There was sufficient evidence to carry the cases to the jury. His honor in his charge was more favorable to the defendant than defendant was entitled to have charged. His honor charged that the rule made by the defendant was a reasonable one, that a ticket presented on the day other than called for on the ticket was bad, and that the holder was not entitled to have it honored.
The defendant had the right to make any reasonable rule for the governance of his business, but when he was dealing with the public it was his duty to call the attention of the public to any special rule or regulation that he had adopted in order to bind them. When he sold the ticket to Bouknight, it was the duty of the seller to call the buyer's attention to a special rule or regulation adopted; otherwise the buyer could use the ticket at any time, unless refunded.
But the jury was bound to take the law as charged by his honor. He charged the jury that one ticket was bad and the other good. It was one transaction, the plaintiffs were husband and wife, the husband purchased the tickets, and it must be presumed he was in possession of the tickets when they entered and he delivered them to the doorkeeper. In his honor's charge, that one ticket was good and the other bad, the jury was not justified in finding a verdict for each for $500. Under his honor's charge one was there on a void ticket, unlawfully there subject to being asked to get out. We do not see that the exceptions should be sustained, but we do think his honor was in error in not setting aside one verdict, for it was not in accordance with his charge, and it is the duty of the jury to take the law as charged by the judge.
Inasmuch as the record discloses that the husband purchased and handled the tickets, the judgment obtained by him is reversed, and the judgment rendered in favor of Alma G. Bouknight is affirmed .
FRASER, J., concurs in the result under Mills v. Charleston Theater Co., 105 S.C. 19, 89 S.E. 389.
J. T. Bouknight and Alma G. Bouknight, husband and wife, brought separate actions against the defendant, L. T. Lester, the proprietor of a moving picture theater, for $2,500 damages in each case, by reason of the alleged negligent and willful conduct of the defendant in ejecting them from the theater. The two cases were tried together in the county court of Richland county, and resulted in verdicts of $500 each in favor of the plaintiffs.
The circumstances of the ejection were as follows: On September 4, 1920, the plaintiff, J. T. Bouknight, bought a ticket which entitled him to enter the defendant's theater. For some reason he did not use the ticket on the day of its purchase. A week later, on September 11, 1920, he escorted his wife to the theater, and at the ticket booth bought another ticket. He presented both tickets to the ticket taker at the door. He testified that the ticket taker, a small boy, took up both tickets and allowed them to enter the theater. Mrs. Bouknight testifies that the boy told them: "Your tickets are not dated right; they are not any good." They paid no attention to the protest, and entered the theater, taking seats towards the rear. The boy with the tickets hunted up the manager, a Mr. Moore, and, not finding him, went a few doors below to another theater under the defendant's management and related the circumstances to the manager of that theater, a Mr. Mott. Mott and the boy returned to the theater, and Mott asked that the plaintiff be pointed out, which the boy did. Mott approached Bouknight where he and his wife were seated. It is not contended by either of the plaintiffs that Mott did anything more than assert that the tickets were not good, and that they must buy new ones or leave the theater. It is hardly probable that with the two tickets in his hand, one bad and the other perfectly good, he would have stated that both were bad, but such is the testimony of both of the plaintiffs, and so far as the motion for a directed verdict is concerned must be assumed as true. Mott made no effort physically to eject the plaintiffs, but turned and went out; the plaintiffs followed. The defendant claimed that his rule was not to honor a ticket presented upon a later day after its purchase, and that he had issued such instructions to the employees.
At the close of all of the testimony the defendant moved for a directed verdict in each case substantially upon the following grounds: (1) That the defendant exercised his legal right before the plaintiffs entered the theater, and after they had entered and taken their seats, to revoke the license evidenced by the tickets, in a proper manner; (2) that the revocation was unaccompanied by word or act on the part of the defendant, calculated in law to humiliate or embarrass, and in the absence of bodily injury constituted no basis for damages. The motion was refused.
The trial judge charged the jury, in substance, that the proprietor of a theater, operating a private business, has the right to adopt such regulations as he may deem reasonable for the conduct of his business; that he can allow or refuse admission to any one; that after the sale of a ticket he has the right to revoke the license evidenced by it, even when the ticket is valid and contravenes no regulation of his, up to the time that the purchaser presents himself for admission; that that is the point where the right of revocation ends; that the purchaser is bound to respect the revocation, and has no claim for damages beyond the price of the ticket as upon a breach of the contract, but that, if the proprietor allows a person with a void ticket to enter the theater and take his seat, he would thereby waive the right of revocation and be under obligation to allow the person so entering to remain unmolested; that the only conclusion to be drawn from the testimony was that the defendant did not intend at the door to revoke the ticket that was bought that night; that the person holding that ticket had the right to enter and enjoy the performance without humiliation or embarrassment, and if such person was led to believe by the negligence of the defendant that that ticket was revoked, and on account thereof left the theater, such person would be entitled to actual damages resulting from any humiliation or embarrassment resulting therefrom; the question of punitive damages was eliminated; that the ticket purchased on September 4th, not having been used on that day, was void, as opposed to the reasonable regulation of the defendant; that the jury must decide which one of the plaintiffs was entitled to use the good ticket. The jury rendered a verdict in each case for the plaintiff for $500 actual damages, and from the judgments entered thereon the defendant has appealed.
The exceptions present the following questions for determination:
(1) Has the proprietor of a theater the absolute right to refuse admission to one holding a valid ticket issued to him for value by the proprietor?
(2) Has the proprietor of a theater the right to refuse admission to one holding a ticket issued to him for value, the recognition of which, however, will violate a reasonable regulation of the proprietor?
(3) Has the proprietor of a theater the absolute right to eject one who has surrendered a valid ticket issued to him for value by the proprietor and taken his seat in the theater?
(4) If a person should be wrongfully excluded or ejected from a theater, in a peaceable and quiet manner, without circumstances of insult or oppression, or invasion of his personal rights causing personal injury, is he entitled to actual damages by reason of the consequent humiliation and embarrassment?
(5) Is a person who claims damages for humiliation and embarrassment allowed to state the individual effect of the wrong complained of upon himself?
The first question: I concede that the great weight of authority including the Supreme Court of the United States (in the case of Marrone v. Club, 227 U.S. 633, 33 S.Ct. 401, 57 L.Ed. 679, 43 L. R. A. [N. S.] 961), is in favor of the proposition that a ticket to a theater is a revocable license, and that the proprietor has the right, without cause, to exclude the holder or eject him after he has been allowed to enter and take a seat. A thorough investigation and study of possibly 50 cases sustaining this doctrine has increased the shock experienced upon the suggestion of the proposition. I rise from it with the conviction that it does not appeal or conform to my common sense, conscience, or conception of the law, and, in the absence of controlling authority in this state, I...
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