Boulder Valley School Dist. R-2 v. Price

• Citation: 805 P.2d 1085
• Decision Date: 28 January 1991
• Docket Number: R-2,No. 89SC406,89SC406
• Parties: , 65 Ed. Law Rep. 1252 BOULDER VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and David Zeckser, Petitioners, v. Gary D. PRICE, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

Page 1085

805 P.2d 1085

59 USLW 2485, 65 Ed. Law Rep. 1252

BOULDER VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT R-2, and David Zeckser, Petitioners, v. Gary D. PRICE, Respondent.

No. 89SC406.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Jan. 28, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1991.

Caplan and Earnest, Gerald A. Caplan, Alan J. Canner, Boulder, for petitioners.

William P. Bethke, Denver, for respondent.

Chief Justice ROVIRA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This case involves a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 ed.) brought by respondent Gary D. Price against the Boulder Valley School District and David Zeckser, the principal at Casey Junior High School. Price alleged that he was constructively discharged from his tenured teaching position without the opportunity for a hearing in violation of section 1983. After the jury returned a verdict in his favor, the trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). In Price v. Boulder Valley School District R-2, 782 P.2d 821 (Colo.App.1989), the court of appeals reversed the grant of JNOV, remanded the case to modify the judgment, and ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I

Price began teaching school in the Boulder school district in 1967 and was granted tenure in 1970. From that time until 1975, his performance was satisfactory. Starting in 1975, Price began to encounter personal difficulties. Price took a leave of absence from teaching for the 1977-1978 school year. In 1978, he returned to teach at Platt High School, but his personal problems significantly affected his work performance. In addition to failing to assign and post grades, Price failed to turn in a student-grade book and some keys at the end of the school term.

The following school year, Price began teaching at Casey Junior High School, under the supervision of Zeckser. His performance did not improve. Price failed to comply with various rules that all teachers were required to follow, including grading papers and posting grades, taking attendance and posting absent lists, submitting lesson plans and course outlines, and staying minimum hours at school. In late August 1979, Zeckser orally instructed Price to turn in the keys and the grade books from his previous teaching assignment and to meet the other requirements. Price failed to correct the problems. On October 2, 1979, Zeckser met with Price to discuss the situation. Price informed Zeckser of certain personal problems and Zeckser reminded Price of the requirements of his job and the possibility of discipline if there were no improvements. Zeckser outlined this meeting in a memorandum dated October 12, 1979, to which Price responded with a letter expressing his thoughts about leaving teaching. Zeckser and Price may have had other informal discussions prior to Price's resignation.

On either October 19, or October 23, 1979, Price signed a letter of resignation. On either date, or perhaps both, Zeckser entered Price's classroom, placed a typewritten letter of resignation on his desk, and discussed the possibility of his resigning. Price was told that if he did not sign the letter there would be a hearing. Price signed the resignation letter. The Boulder Valley School District (the District) accepted the resignation, and his employment was subsequently terminated.

Price brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ¹ against Zeckser and the District, alleging that he had been constructively discharged without a hearing in violation of his due process rights. The case was tried before a jury. The jury instructions stated that punitive damages could be assessed against Zeckser if the jury found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that he acted in reckless disregard of Price's rights. The jury returned two verdicts, one finding against the District in the amount of $60,000 and the other against Zeckser for $0. The jury did not award punitive damages.

The trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of JNOV; remanded the case to modify the judgment to reflect joint and several liability; and ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, requiring the use of a "preponderance of the evidence" standard.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals engaged in fact finding and found facts that were not supported in the record, whether the burden of proof for awarding punitive damages in a section 1983 action in Colorado is "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "by a preponderance of the evidence," and whether the court of appeals erred in directing the trial court to amend the verdict to reflect that the defendants were jointly and severally liable. We affirm the court of appeals on the first issue, reverse on the second and third issues, and remand for a new trial.

II

The petitioners contend that the court of appeals based its decision to reverse the JNOV upon certain facts that were without support in the record. We find it unnecessary to review this issue because, based on our reading of the record, the trial court's grant of JNOV was in error.

A JNOV may be entered only if a reasonable person could not reach the same conclusion as the jury, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. Alzado v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 752 P.2d 544, 552 (Colo.1988). Every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Durango School Dist. No. 9-R v. Thorpe, 200 Colo. 268, 273, 614 P.2d 880, 884 (1980).

Price was required to show evidence of constructive discharge. Constructive discharge may occur without a formal firing, but the words or actions by the employer must "logically lead a prudent person to believe his tenure had been terminated." Civil Rights Comm'n v. Colorado, 30 Colo.App. 10, 16, 488 P.2d 83, 86 (1971) (quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., 327 F.2d 841, 843 (8th Cir.1964) (quoting Putnam v. Lower, 236 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir.1956))). "The determination of whether the actions of an employer amount to a constructive discharge depends upon whether a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances would view the new working conditions as intolerable, and not upon the subjective view of the individual employee." Wilson v. Board of County Comm'n, 703 P.2d 1257, 1259, 1260 (Colo.1985); see also Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir.1982); Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1982); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.1981). "To prove a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence establishing deliberate action on the part of an employer which makes or allows an employee's working conditions to become so difficult or intolerable that the employee has no other choice but to resign." Wilson, 703 P.2d at 1259 (Colo.1985); see also Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir.1981). In Civil Rights Commission v. Colorado, 30 Colo.App. 10, 488 P.2d 83 (1971), the court found a constructive discharge, but no discriminatory purpose, where a teacher signed a letter of resignation based on her superior's refusal to recommend her for rehiring. There was no duress or coercion to have the teacher sign the letter of resignation, but there was evidence that the teacher would not have resigned had she been able to receive a favorable recommendation.

The trial court's basis for granting JNOV was that a reasonable jury could not have found that Zeckser took deliberate action to make the working conditions intolerable as required for a constructive discharge. The court of appeals reversed, stating that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Zeckser's actions were deliberate and calculated to deprive Price of his employment without resort to the hearing to which he was entitled.

The evidence is in conflict as to whether Zeckser deliberately acted in such a way that Price would reasonably believe that his tenure had been terminated, and to what extent he knew about Price's psychological difficulties. The evidence also conflicts on the issue of whether the discussions between Price and Zeckser created working conditions so difficult or intolerable that Price had no other choice but to resign. Price stated that he felt he had no choice but to resign. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Price, a reasonable jury could find that Price had been constructively discharged. Therefore, the reversal of the JNOV is affirmed, but the verdict is not reinstated for the reasons set out in Part IV.

III

The trial court instructed the jurors that they could assess punitive damages against Zeckser ² if they found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that his actions were in reckless disregard of, or callous indifference to Price's constitutional rights. Based on this charge, the jury awarded no punitive damages.

The court of appeals ordered a new trial on punitive damages against Zeckser, citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983), for the proposition that claims for punitive damage based on section 1983 require that the jury find that the misconduct of the defendant be proven only "by a preponderance of the evidence." We disagree.

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court did not address whether the plaintiff must show the occurrence of the misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, Smith examined the type of misconduct that is sufficient for punitive damage awards. Smith held that reckless or callous, rather than intentional, disregard for the plaintiff's rights is the proper standard in determining whether punitive damages are merited. ³ "The focus is on the character of the tortfeasor's conduct--whether it is of the sort that calls for deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory awards." Id. at...