Bouldin v. Colvin, 12 C 06779

• Decision Date: 20 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 06779,12 C 06779
• Parties: LINDA J. BOULDIN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

LINDA J. BOULDIN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,¹ Defendant.

No. 12 C 06779

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

January 20, 2015

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Linda J. Bouldin filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1381 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To recover SSI, a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 976-77 (N.D. Ill.2001).² A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:

1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?

2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?

3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?

4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?

5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.909, 416.920; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for SSI on November 30, 2009, alleging that she became disabled on January 2, 2008, due to chest pain, right arm nerve damage, right lower extremity discomfort, asthma, high blood pressure, and rheumatoid arthritis. (R. at 28, 119, 384). The application was denied initially on May 13, 2010 (R. at 115), and upon reconsideration on August 31, 2010. (R. at 120). Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing and on April 1, 2011, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (R. at 28). The ALJ also heard testimony from Richard T. Fisher, a vocational expert (VE). (R. at 28).

The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on July 19, 2011. (R. at 28-39). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one, that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 30, 2009, the application date. (R. at 30). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's asthma, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, inflammatory arthritis, neuropathy of the right upper extremity, and vision loss were severe impairments. (R. at 30). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (R. at 30-31).

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)³ and determined that she retained a light level residual functional capacity (R. at 32) and could perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b),

involving occasional pushing and pulling with the right side; frequent operation of foot controls with the right side; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional balancing stooping, and crouching; no kneeling or crawling; frequent reaching and overhead reaching with the right side; occasional gross manipulation with the right side; frequent fine manipulation with the right side; not even moderate exposure to environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases; not even moderate exposure to environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases; not even moderate exposure to poorly ventilated areas and chemicals; no concentrated exposure to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights; less than occasional night vision; and occasional far acuity.

(R. at 32).

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (R. at 38). At step five, based on Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, work experience, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including cashier and mail clerk. (R. at 38-39). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a disability as defined by the Act. (R. at 39).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 29, 2012. (R. at 1-6). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We will uphold the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "This deferential standard of review isweighted in favor of upholding the ALJ's decision, but it does not mean that we scour the record for supportive evidence or rack our brains for reasons to uphold the ALJ's decision. Rather, the ALJ must identify the relevant evidence and build a 'logical bridge' between that evidence and the ultimate determination." Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court must critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ has built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Young, 362 F.3d at 1002. Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

IV. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

On November 15, 2009, Plaintiff was admitted to John H. Stroger Hospital for shortness of breath, and was diagnosed with acute asthma exacerbation. (R. at 221, 318). On November 16, 2009, Plaintiff had a breathing test, EKG heart test, and X-ray chest test performed. (R. at 223). Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for three days of progressively worsening shortness of breath, wheezing, and chest tightness/pain. (R. at 35, 349). She experienced substernal chest pain during the attack. (R. at 321). The notes indicate she had no similar prior episodes.

In January 2010, Plaintiff filled out a Disability Report. (R. at 218-225). Plaintiff stated that she was limited by her impairments relating to chest pain, right arm nerve damage, right lower extremity discomfort, acute asthma, high blood pressure, and rheumatoid arthritis. (R. at 219).

On February 24, 2010, Plaintiff was admitted to Resurrection Hospital after she was found unresponsive by her family. (R. at 367). Her blood sugars were low. Swelling was noted on her right forearm. (R. at 370). Notes from that visit record shortness of breath from asthma and upper extremity nerve damage. (R. at 371). Treatment notes from Stroger Hospital indicated the following: February 28, 2010-asthma exacerbation with chest pain (R. at 411); June 22, 2010-numbness and shooting pain in both feet over the prior month (R. at 426); September 21, 2010-pain and numbness in her right upper and both lower extremities (R. at 441); October 8, 2010-vision worsening (R. at 449); and November 8, 2010-right knee pain, likely degenerative joint disease (R. at 451).

On January 16, 2011, Plaintiff was admitted, through the emergency room, and kept for observation for three days at Stroger Hospital. The records indicate she suffered from wheezing and...