Bound Brook Educ. Ass'n v. Bound Brook Bd. of Educ.
Decision Date | 23 May 2019 |
Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-4611-17T3 |
Parties | BOUND BROOK EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOUND BROOK BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Koblitz, Currier, and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0337-18.
Sanford R. Oxfeld argued the cause for appellant (Oxfeld Cohen, PC, attorneys; William P. Hannan, II, of counsel and on the brief).
Robert J. Merryman argued the cause for respondent (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, PC, attorneys; Robert J. Merryman, of counsel and on the brief; Boris Shapiro, on the brief).
Plaintiff Bound Brook Education Association appeals from the May 2, 2018 order, denying its order to show cause to vacate an arbitration award, and dismissing its complaint. Because plaintiff has not demonstrated any of the limited statutory grounds under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 to vacate an arbitration award, we affirm.
Plaintiff is an association that represents the Bound Brook school teachers. The collective negotiated agreement (CNA) between the parties, in effect at the time of these events, contained the following provision:
The workday for elementary school teachers began at 8:00 a.m. and ended at 3:15 p.m. The students arrived at 8:10 a.m. and were dismissed at 2:40 p.m.
In September 2016, defendant Bound Brook Board of Education (the BOE) implemented mandatory weekly team planning meetings for elementary school teachers on Tuesdays from 2:45 p.m. to 3:15 p.m.
Because plaintiff considered these weekly meetings to be an assignment or duty, and, therefore, a violation of the CNA, it presented the superintendent of schools with a written grievance, which was subsequently submitted to arbitration as required under CNA Article 4(C).
The parties agreed that the issue before the arbitrator was whether
Following a hearing before the arbitrator, the parties submitted supplemental briefs. Thereafter, the arbitrator issued a comprehensive written decision, concluding that the mandatory meetings did not violate the CNA.
In reaching this determination, the arbitrator noted the meeting requirement did not extend the teachers' workday, did not increase the teachers' pupil contact time, and did not reduce the teachers' contractual preparation time.In addressing the last sentence of Article 12(D)(5), the arbitrator noted the reference was to a full staff meeting, not the smaller weekly planning meetings at issue. In addition, that final clause did "not give any indication that meetings are addressed as a duty or an assignment."
To ascertain the definition of "duty or assignment," the arbitrator examined other provisions within the CNA. He noted specifically Article 12(A)(3) ( ); Article 12(B)(1)(a) ( ); Article 12(B)(1)(f) ( ); Article 12(C)(1) ( ); and Article 12(B)(1)(g) ( ).
After reviewing these provisions, the arbitrator found "the team planning meetings [did] not constitute an assignment or a duty within the plain meaning of the contract," reasoning that "the contractual context" of assignments and duties all "involve[d] teacher-pupil contact time" with "instructional or non-instructional supervision." He viewed the "teacher-student contact time" as a "key factor" in determining the intent of the parties. In reading the entirety of Article 12(D)(5), the arbitrator found the statement "[s]taff may . . . choose touse this time for extra student help," was significant as it reflected "the time was not designated as teacher-student contact time." Because "[t]he contract language itself strongly support[ed] the interpretation that the team planning meetings [were] not assignments or duties as contemplated by Article 12, D(5)" the arbitrator found defendant did not violate the CNA.
Consequently, plaintiff presented a verified complaint and an order to show cause, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated. After oral argument, the trial judge denied plaintiff's application. The judge explained that under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, arbitration awards are only vacated in limited circumstances, such as when an award is "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means." The judge stated "the arbitrator . . . took the time . . . to really analyze the terms of the contract . . . as negotiated and came up with a decision that was well reasoned." Thus, she found no reason to vacate the arbitration decision. The oral decision was memorialized in a May 2, 2018 order.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts the trial court erred because: 1) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in finding the meetings did not violate the CNA as Article 12(D)(5) is clear and unambiguous; and 2) the arbitrator's award is contrary to other decisions of the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC or Commission). We are not persuaded by these contentions and affirm.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion to vacate an arbitration award de novo. See Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 136 (App. Div. 2013)). However, "[j]udicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "The public policy of this [s]tate favors arbitration as a means of settling disputes that otherwise would be litigated in a court." Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 556 (2015) (citing Cty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass'n v. Cty. Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390 (1985)). "[T]o ensure finality, as well as to secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature, there exists a strong preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards." Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
We apply "an extremely deferential review when a party to a collective bargaining agreement has sought to vacate an arbitrator's award." Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Local No. 11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422, 428 (2011). "In the public sector, an arbitrator's award will be confirmed 'so long as the award is reasonably debatable.'" Linden Bd. of Educ., 202 N.J. at 276 (quotingMiddletown Twp. PBA Local 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 11 (2007)). An award is "reasonably debatable" if it is "justifiable" or "fully supportable in the record." Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 205 N.J. at 431 (quoting Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 223-24 (1979)).
Under this standard, we "may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court's view of the correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation." Linden Bd. of Educ., 202 N.J. at 277 (quoting N.J. Transit Bus Operations, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 187 N.J. 546, 554 (2006)).
Plaintiff argues the arbitrator's award was contrary to PERC precedent. We note...
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