Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark

• Decision Date: 08 June 2018
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A–1343–16T4
• Citation: 455 N.J.Super. 136,188 A.3d 359
• Parties: Leonard YARBOROUGH, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. STATE OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NEWARK, Essex County, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

455 N.J.Super. 136

188 A.3d 359

Leonard YARBOROUGH, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.STATE OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NEWARK, Essex County, Defendant–Respondent.

DOCKET NO. A–1343–16T4

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued February 27, 2018

Decided June 8, 2018

Charles I. Auffant argued the cause for appellant (Stuart Ball, LLC, attorneys; Charles I. Auffant, on the brief).

Ramon E. Rivera argued the cause for respondent (Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Ramon E. Rivera, of counsel; Shana T. Don, on the brief).

Before Judges Fisher, Sumners¹ and Moynihan.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MOYNIHAN, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).

Leonard Yarborough, a third-grade teacher for the State Operated School District of the City of Newark, Essex County (District), appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to vacate, effectively confirming that portion of an arbitration award and decision imposing a 120–day suspension without pay after the arbitrator found Yarborough culpable of a conduct-unbecoming tenure charge for inflicting corporal punishment on two students in contravention of N.J.S.A. 18A:6–1.

Yarborough contends the trial court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award because the court: misinterpreted the entire controversy doctrine (ECD) which should have precluded the District from prosecuting the tenure charge; failed to consider "fundamental legal principles" such as the doctrines of industrial double jeopardy, estoppel, laches, waiver and unclean hands; and failed to find the arbitration award was procured by undue means, N.J.S.A. 2A:24–8, because, "[e]ven if the charge of conduct unbecoming was properly before the [a]rbitrator, the [a]ward is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence standard."

We are not persuaded that the ECD precludes the prosecution of the conduct-unbecoming charge; nor are we persuaded that the arbitrator's award was procured by undue means and affirm.

"Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11, 153 A.3d 931 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276, 997 A.2d 185 (2010) ). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Ibid. (quoting Kearny PBA Local # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221, 405 A.2d 393 (1979) ).

In reviewing the award confirmation, we owe no special deference to the trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from the established facts. Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 92, 67 A.3d 601 (2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) ). We thus review the trial court's decision on a motion to vacate an arbitration award de novo. Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 136, 77 A.3d 1189 (App. Div. 2013).

The court may vacate an arbitration award "[w]here the award was procured by ... undue means." N.J.S.A. 2A:24–8(a). " ‘[U]ndue means’ ordinarily encompasses a situation in which the arbitrator has made an acknowledged mistake of fact or law or a mistake that is apparent on the face of the record." Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 203, 61 A.3d 941 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Office of Emp. Relations v. Commc'ns Workers, 154 N.J. 98, 111, 711 A.2d 300 (1998) ). We perceive neither a mistake of law nor a mistake of fact in the record.

We turn first to the issue of whether the ECD precludes the District from bringing the conduct-unbecoming charge. The ECD is equitably rooted; its applicability is left to judicial discretion based on the particular circumstances in a given case. Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, PC, 142 N.J. 310, 322–23, 662 A.2d 523 (1995) ; DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 275, 662 A.2d 494 (1995). In Kavanaugh v. Quigley, 63 N.J. Super. 153, 158, 164 A.2d 179 (App. Div. 1960) (citations omitted), we held:

It is well settled that discretion means legal discretion, in the exercise of which the trial judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly .... [I]f the trial judge misconceives the applicable law, or misapplies it to the factual complex, in total effect the exercise of the legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act, however conscientious may have been the judge in the performance of it. When this occurs it is the duty of the reviewing court to adjudicate the controversy in the light of the applicable law in order that a manifest denial of justice be avoided.

As he did before the arbitrator and the trial court, Yarborough contends the District's conduct-unbecoming charge is precluded under the ECD because the precipitating events—the corporal punishment of the students on October 21, 2013 and February 28, 2014—predated prior tenure actions instituted against him on October 9, 2014 and January 26, 2015, during which the present charge should have been brought. We reject Yarborough's proposed application of the ECD as overextended.

We previously synopsized the recognized rationale for the ECD:

Our Supreme Court has stated that the entire controversy doctrine "seeks to further the judicial goals of fairness and efficiency by requiring, whenever possible, ‘that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court.’ " Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, PC, 142 N.J. 280, 289, 662 A.2d 509 (1995) (quoting Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989) ). The objectives behind the doctrine were outlined in DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 267, 662 A.2d 494 [,] as follows: "(1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay."

[ Hynes v. Clarke, 297 N.J. Super. 44, 55, 687 A.2d 771 (App. Div. 1997).]

Yarborough seeks to relate our holding that "under the proper circumstances the [ECD] is correctly applied to arbitration proceedings," Shoremount v. APS Corp., 368 N.J. Super. 252, 255, 845 A.2d 729 (App. Div. 2004), but fails to relate our tempering language that the ECD should not be "imported wholesale into [those] proceedings," id. at 256, 845 A.2d 729. We previously noted that arbitration—with its ordinarily narrow-framed issues—"does not provide a forum conducive to extensive issue ... joinder." Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 257 N.J. Super. 6, 14, 607 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992). Especially with regard to limited-issue arbitration, we warned "[t]he preclusionary consequences of the [ECD] must consequently be cautiously applied to litigation involving" those arbitrations. Id. at 14–15, 607 A.2d 1314.

The prior tenure arbitrations against Yarborough were based solely on his alleged inefficiency. The arbitrator found the inefficiency charges brought in the January 26, 2015 matter made

the same factual allegations as those stated in the original charges [filed on October 9, 2014]. It was specifically alleged that Yarborough demonstrated an inability to completely and responsibly execute his duties as a teacher and enumerated failures to implement curricular goals and objectives, design coherent instruction, access student learning, create an environment of respect and rapport, manage student behavior, etcetera. It was further alleged that [Yarborough] received an Ineffective rating for the 2012–2013 school year in an Annual Summative Evaluation and received a Partially Effective rating for the 2013–2014 school year in an [A]nnual Summative Evaluation.

The limited scope of both arbitrations militates against application of the ECD.

We note the Legislature provided special procedures for the arbitration of inefficiency charges under N.J.S.A. 18A:6–117 to –129—the Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey (TEACHNJ) Act. N.J.S.A. 18A:6–17.1 to –17.3. The provisions include a limited scope of issue-review, N.J.S.A. 18A:6–17.2(a), (b) and (c) ; a specified burden of proof imposed on a board of education, N.J.S.A. 18A:6–17.2(d) ; and a specified time frame for hearing and...