Boundy v. Arnold Haviland Co.
Decision Date | 04 September 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 4-85-6,4-85-6 |
Citation | 514 N.E.2d 931,33 Ohio App.3d 156 |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Parties | BOUNDY, Appellant, v. ARNOLD HAVILAND COMPANY, Appellee. * |
Syllabus by the Court
While employment relationships are generally presumed to be employment-at-will relationships, this presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the terms of the employment contract manifest the parties' intention to bind each other for a specified term.
Cook & Troth and Norman E. Cook, Paulding, for appellant.
Weaner, Zimmerman, Bacon & Yoder, Karl H. Weaner and Stephen F. Hubbard, Defiance, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Mitchell Boundy, from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Defiance County overruling the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting the defendant's motion in an action for damages resulting from the breach of an employment contract.
On March 19, 1959, the defendant, Arnold Haviland Co., an Ohio corporation, first hired the plaintiff. The plaintiff worked for the defendant as an office employee without a written contract until February 1, 1966 when the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written employment agreement. On February 17, 1976, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a second written contract of employment which expressly modified the first agreement and was made retroactive to February 1, 1966. The plaintiff was discharged on February 18, 1983. On May 15, 1984, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant alleging breach of the terms of the employment contract. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and a hearing on the motions was held on February 11, 1985.
Upon consideration of the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, written memoranda, and arguments of counsel, the trial court overruled plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
The plaintiff timely appealed from this judgment, asserting two assignments of error as follows:
The appellant does not separately argue each assignment of error in his brief, but instead, presents a single argument, contrary to Local Rule 7. We will consider the appellant's argument to be applicable to both assignments of error. Furthermore, because the assignments of error raise similar issues, we will consider them together.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The issue raised by this appeal becomes the application of the law governing contract interpretation to those facts to determine whether or not the employment was for a definite term. There being no genuine issue of material fact, it must be determined in accordance with Civ.R. 56(C), whether or not the trial court correctly concluded that the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the court. Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 7 O.O.3d 403, 374 N.E.2d 146.
The appellant contends that the employment contract was for a definite term. The trial court concluded that the contract purported to be one for "permanent" or "life" employment and was thus terminable at will since the appellant did not provide any additional consideration for the contract.
The relevant provisions of the employment contract state:
By its terms, the employment contract was to terminate upon the occurrence of one of the following conditions:
(1) the appellant's sixty-fifth birthday;
(2) by agreement of the appellee and appellant on a date after the appellant reached age sixty-five;
(3) a physical or mental disability prevented the appellant from performing his duties; or
(4) thirty days after the appellee mailed written notice to the appellant of his discharge for failure to perform his duties.
The contract was supported by adequate consideration with the appellant agreeing to devote his time and attention to the performance of his business duties and with the appellee agreeing to compensate the appellant accordingly.
The evidence shows that on February 18, 1983, when the appellant was discharged, he had not yet reached age sixty-five, he was not suffering from any mental or...
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