Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, Civil Action No. 04-30107-KPN.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-30107-KPN. |
| Citation | 445 F.Supp.2d 106 |
| Parties | Alan BOURBEAU, Plaintiff v. CITY OF CHICOPEE and David Theroux, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Alan J. Black, Attorney at Law, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.
William J. O'Grady, Parker & O'Grady, Southampton, MA, for City of Chicopee, defendant.
John A. Cvejanovich, O'Connell, Flaherty & Attmore, Springfield, MA, for David Theroux, defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Document Nos. 28 and 31)
The City of Chicopee ("Chicopee") and David Theroux ("Theroux") (together "Defendants") have each moved for summary judgment with respect to Alan Bourbeau ("Plaintiff')'s multi-faceted employment discrimination complaint. The complaint raises a variety of claims, to wit, sexual harassment, gender discrimination, emotional distress, a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), disability discrimination, and retaliation. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons which follow, Defendants' motions will be allowed in part and denied in part.
For summary judgment purposes, the following facts are undisputed and stated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. See Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting Co., 399 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2005). Indeed, most of the facts are taken directly from Plaintiff's complaint which Defendants have incorporated into their summary judgment motions, minus any "legal conclusions or assertions." (See Document No. 29 (Theroux's Facts) ¶ 1; Document No. 33 (Chicopee's Facts) ¶ 1.) Further facts are fleshed out in the court's discussion below.
On June 27, 2000, Plaintiff, a long-time Chicopee employee, was hired as Assistant Supervisor of Maintenance at the Central Maintenance Garage (hereinafter "the garage"). (Complaint ¶¶ 4, 44.) Plaintiffs work was overseen by Theroux, who held the title of garage Supervisor. (Id. ¶ 5.) During his initial interview, Plaintiff told Theroux that working near smokers exacerbated a pre-existing seizure disorder and that he would need a smoke-free workplace. (Id. ¶ 6.)
After about a year of sharing a small office with two smokers, Plaintiff complained that their smoking was, in fact, exacerbating his seizure disorder and causing him constant throat and lung irritation. (Id. ¶ 6.) Still, Theroux allowed the smoking to continue. (Id. ¶ 7.)
On December 6, 2001, Plaintiff's doctor insisted that he change jobs due to the smoking and stress he was experiencing at work. (Id. ¶ 8.) By January of 2002, however, employees continued to smoke and leave cigarettes lit. (Id. ¶ 9.) When Plaintiff complained, his working relationship with these employees deteriorated. (Id. ¶ 10.) As examples, Plaintiff claims that he was left out of important meetings and information necessary to his job was withheld from him. (Id. ¶ 11.)
On March 15, 2002, Plaintiff again informed Theroux that the continued smoking was affecting his health, i.e., he was experiencing serious lung and throat problems which were keeping him awake at nights, and his seizure disorder was becoming worse with the stress and lack of sleep. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) In response, Theroux said he would speak to one particular employee whom Plaintiff supervised, Debra Cardin ("Cardin"), and then meet with Plaintiff the following week. (Id. ¶ 15.) At the scheduled time, however, Theroux was "unavailable" and told Plaintiff that Cardin was "hard to get along with" and Plaintiff "would not be able to change her now." (Id. ¶ 16.)
On March 29, 2002, Plaintiff directly asked Cardin to stop smoking. (Id. ¶ 17.) She goaded Plaintiff to "go ahead and write [her] up" because "Theroux would back [her]." (Id.) Theroux did just that: on April 2, 2002, Plaintiff approached Theroux who "became very violent, yelling[,] screaming and actually physically advancing toward" Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 18.) Another argument occurred later in the day which exacerbated Plaintiffs seizure disorder. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff became so stressed from these encounters that he began experiencing involuntary tremors of his right hand and jaw. (Id. ¶ 20.) As a result, Plaintiffs doctor wrote a note excusing him from work between April 3 and 8, 2002. (Id. ¶ 21.)
During the course of these events, Plaintiff had been witnessing that Theroux and Cardin were having an intimate relationship. (Id. ¶ 23.) For example, the two engaged in "heavy kissing and touching in an intimate fashion . . . in the open where [Plaintiff] and others would see" and "grabb[ed] each other below the counter while other employees were in the room." (Id. ¶ 27, 33, 34.) Plaintiff's exact allegations from his deposition are discussed below. For present purposes, however, it is undisputed that Plaintiff told Theroux and Cardin that their conduct made him feel "uncomfortable." (Id. ¶ 32.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims, the relationship between Theroux and Cardin resulted in Plaintiff being excluded from interacting with either of them, in Cardin not performing her duties well and spending an unwarranted amount of time in Theroux's office, in Cardin being given preferential treatment, and in Plaintiff's supervisory control over Cardin being undermined. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 33.)
On May 7, 2002, Theroux returned from vacation and screamed at Plaintiff to "go home and leave." (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff immediately went to his doctor who ordered Plaintiff out of work until June 10, 2002, due to his cough and increased seizure activity exacerbated by a stressful work environment. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41, 43.) Plaintiff notified Theroux of this on May 15, 2002. (Id. ¶ 42.)
On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff met with Richard Merchant ("Merchant"), a human resources representative, to try to resolve the issues he was experiencing at work. (Id. ¶ 36.) Although the two discussed the filing of a complaint (id. ¶ 37), it does not appear that Plaintiff took any formal action at the time. Two days later, the locks of the garage were changed (it is not clear by whom), effectively preventing Plaintiff from coming to work. (Id. ¶ 38.)
While Plaintiff was out of work, "Chicopee" (the parties never say through whom) decided that Plaintiff's job would be "deleted" and informed him of this by letter dated June 6, 2002. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46.) A second letter to Plaintiff, dated June 17, 2002, indicated that Plaintiff's job would be terminated as of July 1, 2002. (Id. ¶ 46.) Neither letter has been provided to the court.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff has been suffering Posttraumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") ever since the incidents at work, causing him to experience "distressing dreams [and] . . . psychological distress at exposure to events that resemble the traumatic event, diminished interest in activities, feelings of detachment from others, difficulty falling asleep, irritability[,] difficulty concentrating and hyper vigilance." (Id. ¶ 52.) It is also undisputed that Plaintiff has seen both a psychologist and a psychiatrist and has been prescribed medication. (Id. ¶ 53.)
On August 6, 2002, Plaintiff filed a claim of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). (Theroux's Facts ¶ 2.) Although the MCAD initially found insufficient evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff administratively appealed that ruling and thereafter withdrew his claim to pursue this lawsuit. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed the present action on June 4, 2004. His complaint asserts twelve counts against both Defendants: sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B ("chapter 151B") (Counts I and II); disparate treatment "sexual" (i.e., gender) discrimination in violation of Title VII and chapter 151B (Counts III and IV); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); an FMLA violation (Count VII); disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") (Counts VIII and IX) and chapter 151B (Counts X and XI); and retaliation in violation of both Title VII and chapter 151B (Count XII).1
Presently before the court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment on all counts. Theroux's motion was filed first and is the most comprehensive. Chicopee, for its part, has "incorporate[d] .. . by reference" the issues Theroux raised "that are identical for both Defendants" and, in addition, has addressed several issues that are "unique" to it. (Document No. 32 (Chicopee's Brief) at 1-2.) The court heard oral argument on July 6, 2006.
"Summary judgment is warranted `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Uncle Henry's, 399 F.3d at 41 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)). "An issue is `genuine' for purposes of summary judgment if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a `material fact' is one which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir.2005) ().
Following the parties' lead, the court, after first discussing Theroux's individual liability, will address Plaintiff's counts in the order they appear in the complaint. In the end, the court will allow Theroux's motion for summary judgment in large measure—i.e., with respect to Counts I through IV, VI through IX and XII (insofar as it alleges Title VII retaliation)—but not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bolduc v. Town of Webster
...VII. See, e.g., Booker v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health, 527 F.Supp.2d 216, 229 n. 19 (D.Mass.2007); Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, 445 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (D.Mass.2006); Homey v. Westfield Gage Co., 95 F.Supp.2d 29, 33-36 (D.Mass.2000) (noting that "every [] circuit court which has ad......
-
Mason v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
...27 F.Supp.2d 288, 291 (D.Mass.1998) (finding a district attorney individually liable under the FMLA), and Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, 445 F.Supp.2d 106, 111 (D.Mass.2006) (finding a garage supervisor individually liable under the FMLA), with Zayas, 2007 WL 7126530, at *15, 2007 U.S. Dist.......
- Maldonado v. Rosa
-
Thirkield v. Neary & Hunter OB/GYN, LLC
...Plaintiff correctly notes that the showing required under Title VII is “essentially analogous” to that of 151B.1 Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, 445 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.Mass.2006). Plaintiff's claims against Neary & Hunter OB/GYN, brought under the theory of hostile work environment,2 can succee......
-
Retaliation in the wake of Burlington Northern: making the case for an updated standard for proving an adverse action in Massachusetts under Chapter 151B.
...(Mass. 2004) (describing elements of prima facie case of retaliation under Chapter 151B); see also Bourbeau v. City of Chicopee, 445 F. Supp. 2d 106, 122-23 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting elements of prima facie case essentially same under Title VII and Chapter 151B). But see Billings v. Town of G......