Bourdeaux v. Gilbert Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1945
• Docket Number: No. 33994.,33994.
• Citation: 220 Minn. 538,20 N.W.2d 393
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: BOURDEAUX v. GILBERT MOTOR CO. et al.

20 N.W.2d 393

220 Minn. 538

BOURDEAUX v. GILBERT MOTOR CO. et al.

No. 33994.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 2, 1945.

Certiorari to Industrial Commission.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Carleton K. Bourdeaux, claimant, against New Brighton Ice Company and Gilbert Motor Company employers, and Employers Mutual Liability Company, insurer, and others, wherein claimant petitioned for an award of penalty, attorney's fees and interest on his claim against the New Brighton Ice Company, as to the principal of which liability was adjudicated by the referee and no appeal was taken. To review an order denying the petition as to interest, claimant brings certiorari.

Reversed.

John A. Goldie and Samuel I. Sigal, both of Minneapolis, for relator.

Reynolds & McLeod, of Minneapolis, for respondents.

YOUNGDAHL, Justice.

Under certiorari to the Industrial Commission, there is here presented for review the question whether relator is entitled to interest on an award of compensation. Only relator and his employer, New Brighton Ice Company, and the insurer, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company, are involved.

On December 8, 1932, relator sustained an accidental injury to his back arising out of and in the course of his employment with the New Brighton Ice Company. Employer conceded liability under the act and paid compensation to March 14, 1933, when it discontinued payments. On April 17, 1933, it filed with the commission a notice of "Proposed Discontinuance of Compensation Payments," accompanied by medical reports, which indicated that disability would cease on March 14, 1933. The commission notified relator on April 19, 1933, of the filing of this notice and advised him that, absent a reply or objection from him, it would close its file. Relator made no reply to this notice. He did not sign a final receipt for compensation.

On July 19, 1943, about ten and one-half years after the accident, relator was injured while working for another employer. It was found by the commission, and it is not here in dispute, that "on investigating this claim it was discovered by counsel that the employe had suffered a partial disability" from the prior accident of December 8, 1932, "which continued for a long period after the cessation of compensation payments." On October 28, 1943, a claim petition was filed in which the employers of 1943, 1932, and an earlier one of 1931 were joined as respondents. As stated by Commissioner Stewart "On June 7, 1944, Referee Hatch made findings and an award, in which he found that as a result of the accident of December 8, 1932, the employe was totally disabled for a period of about two weeks longer than the period for which he had been paid and that thereafter he continued to be partially disabled and sustained wage losses which, during the 300-week period fixed by law, amounted to over $700.00. The 300-week period terminated September 9, 1938. No appeal was taken from the decision."

On August 15, 1944, relator petitioned the Industrial Commission for an award of penalty, attorneys' fees (not here involved), and interest. The commission (one commissioner dissenting) denied the petition.

Relator asserted before the commission, and contends here, that interest should be computed from the dates on which instalments of compensation became due. Respondents (the employer and its insurer) contend that interest should not be computed for a period prior to the date of the filing of the claim, because there was laches in prosecuting the claim and it is discretionary with the commission to deny interest in such an event. In response to this, it is the position of relator that he is entitled to interest as a matter of right, and that in any event there was no laches, and, even if there was laches, respondents are estopped from asserting it. The commission held that interest was not allowable as a matter of right, and, because relator was guilty of laches in presenting his claim, he is not entitled to it. Thus there is squarely presented the issue whether an employe is entitled to interest as a matter of right, without regard to laches, where it has been found that the employer has improperly discontinued payments of compensation, or whether it is discretionary with the commission to grant or deny it according to the circumstances.

Although the Compensation Act makes no mention of interest in case of delay of compensation payments, we have held that the general interest statute, Minn. St. 1941, § 334.01, Mason St. 1927, § 7036, which imposes interest at six percent for failure to pay a debt when due, applies to such a situation. Brown v. City of Pipestone, 186 Minn. 540, 245 N.W. 145.

It is the claim of respondents that the Brown case, supra, is not stare decisis as to this case, because the issue of laches was not there involved, and that the decision is not inconsistent with the theory that it is discretionary with the commission to determine according to the facts whether interest should be paid. The sole question raised in that case was (186 Minn. 541, 245 N.W. 145) "whether or not unpaid installments of compensation bear interest at the legal rate from the date when under the provisions of the Compensation Act they should have been paid." We there held: "* * * Compensation in this state is a liability arising out of the contract of employment, and the Compensation Act becomes a part of every contract of employment." We there further stated: "Here was a contract debt due at the times when the compensation installments should have been paid under the provisions of the act, and we see no reason why it should not, like any other debt, bear interest at the legal rate when it is subsequently decided that the debt existed."

The majority of the commission and respondents rely upon the rule announced in Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron Co. 110 U.S. 174, 176, 3 S.Ct. 570, 572, 28 L.Ed. 109, 110, as follows: "Interest is given on money demands as damages for delay in payment, being just compensation to the plaintiff for a default on the part of his debtor. Where it is reserved expressly in the contract, or is implied by the nature of the promise, it becomes part of the debt, and is recoverable as of right; but when it is given as damages, it is often matter of discretion."

While it may be true that, where interest is given as damages, there may be cases where laches may bar recovery such as in Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron Co. supra, and Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U.S. 694, 11 S.Ct. 683, 35 L.Ed. 310, this is not such a case. These cases involved situations wholly...