Bourne v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corporation
| Decision Date | 12 January 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 20781.,20781. |
| Parties | BOURNE v. PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION OF MISSOURI. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Paul A. Buzard, Judge.
"Not to be published in State Reports."
Suit by Arthur B. Bourne against Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corporation of Missouri, a corporation, for damages for alleged failure of defendant as employer to furnish a letter of dismissal truly stating for what reason plaintiff quit defendant's service as employee. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
H. M. Langworthy, Clyde J. Linde, and Robert B. Langworthy, all of Kansas City, for appellant.
Walter W. Calvin and Bert S. Kimbrell, both of Kansas City, for respondent.
BOYER, Commissioner.
Authur B. Bourne instituted suit against Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Corporation of Missouri to recover both actual and punitive damages for the alleged failure of the defendant as a corporate employer to furnish a letter of dismissal truly stating for what reason he quit its service as provided by Sec. 5064, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo.R.S.A. The petition charges that the defendant is a corporation; that for more than one year prior to March 31, 1944, plaintiff was continuously in the service and employment of the defendant, but on said date the defendant terminated his employment with it and discharged him from its service; that thereafter plaintiff requested the defendant, in writing, to give him a service letter and that in response thereto, he received the following:
The petition then charges that "the defendant's aforesaid purported letter wholly fails to comply with Section 5064, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, Mo.R.S.A.; and does not constitute a service letter, within the purview and meaning thereof, in that it fails to, and does not truly state for what cause, if any, he was discharged from the defendant's service and employment; that owing to the defendant's failure to truly state for what cause, if any, he was discharged from its service and employment, and owing to the falsity of its aforesaid statement with respect thereto, its aforesaid service letter is prejudicially harmful to him and will, and would, if presented by him to any prospective employer, materially interfere with, and prevent his securing employment from, or by, such prospective employer." Plaintiff further states that in truth and in fact, he was during all the time he was employed by the defendant fully and in every way competent to perform any and all tasks to which he was or might have been assigned by the defendant, and that there was never any task or work assigned to him by the defendant, during the entire time of his employment, that he was not suited to perform faithfully and fully. The petition concludes: "That, by reason of the premises, and the defendant's failure to furnish or issue to him a service letter of the character and purport required by the aforesaid statute, the defendant has intentionally, wrongfully, and unlawfully, willfully, wantonly and maliciously failed and refused to issue to him a proper service letter, or a letter of dismissal, as provided for and required by Section 5064, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, Mo.R.S.A., and by reason of the defendant's said intentional, wrongful and unlawful, willful, wanton and malicious failure and refusal to issue and deliver to him a service letter, or a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the provisions and requirements of the aforesaid statute, he has sustained actual damages in and to the sum of $1500.00; and, by further reason of the premises, he ought to recover of and from the defendant, as exemplary or punitive damages, the further sum of $1500.00"; for all of which he prayed judgment.
The answer of defendant admits it is a corporation; that plaintiff was in its employ from on or about January 16, 1943, to on or about March 31, 1944; that his services were terminated on or about the latter date; that plaintiff requested, in writing, a letter of dismissal of defendant; that plaintiff was furnished a letter of dismissal, and that a true copy of same appears in plaintiff's petition. Further answering, defendant avers that it did issue to plaintiff a letter duly signed by a proper officer of defendant, setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by plaintiff to the defendant and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause the plaintiff had quit such service; and denies all other allegations of the petition.
The case was tried before the court and a jury and on the 12th day of December, 1945, resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1500 actual damages and $1500 punitive damages. Judgment was entered accordingly, but upon motion of defendant for new trial the court required a remittitur of all the actual damages except one dollar, as a condition of overruling defendant's motion. The remittitur was made and a new judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant for one dollar actual damages, and for $1500 punitive damages, being a total amount of $1501.
The defendant in due time and manner has perfected its appeal and assigns error on the part of the trial court in overruling its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, and that the court erred in giving instructions on behalf of plaintiff and in rejecting instructions proffered by defendant.
Appellant first contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor at the close of all the evidence because there was no evidence that the service letter did not truly state for what cause plaintiff quit defendant's service, and that the evidence conclusively showed that the letter truly stated the actual cause for the termination as it existed at that time in the mind of the official who effected the termination. This assignment of error on the part of appellant calls for a search of the entire transcript of the evidence with a view of ascertaining whether there was any issuable fact under the pleadings and the evidence which would justify submission to the jury for its determination, and in particular whether or not the court, under the evidence, would have been authorized to submit to the jury the question of whether the service letter did or did not truly state for what cause plaintiff quit defendant's service.
Plaintiff testified in his own behalf, and upon his direct examination testified that he had been born in England and had become a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1927; that at the time of the trial he was 46 years of age; that he was experienced in designing tools and had made special preparation for that work in England, at Cooper Union in New York, and at other places; that he was employed by the defendant in the capacity of supervisor of tool control, which was a term embracing various departments such as Guage Standards, Gear Laboratory, and Inspection and Office Procurement; that it was part of his duties to originate and install labor saving devices and equipment to speed up production; that he had spent many years in preparation for doing that kind of work and had gained practical experience with other companies; that he did and could design such tools and equipment as might be desired; that prior to coming to Kansas City, he had been employed by Siewek Engineering Company of Ferndale, Michigan, which through its branch office at Hartford, Connecticut, had been doing work for defendant there; that the work in which he was engaged there in the Pratt & Whitney plant was making special machinery, labor saving devices, better type of tools, etc.; that while he was there he had become acquainted with Charles F. Toren, who was then assistant chief inspector for the defendant; that about January 15, 1943, he was employed by Toren to work for the defendant at its Hartford plant and thereafter, at Toren's request, he made trips to Kansas City to set up the office here and to get tools ordered, and set up the different departments; that while he was on defendant's payroll on January 15, 1943, he did not go to work for defendant here until May, 1943; that during his employment by the defendant, Mr. Toren was his immediate supervisor; that while Toren would direct him as to what to do and lend a helping hand when necessary, plaintiff was supposed to know enough to get along, and that until March, 1944, he had performed his services and was never told by Toren, or by anyone, that his work was not satisfactory or that he was not competent to do the work.
He testified that on March 10, 1944, he was called to the office of Mr. Toren, who was then chief inspector, and was discharged; that he had not theretofore received any indication or intimation thereof and had no idea of any such thing; that Mr. Toren gave him a termination slip and he knew he was being discharged; that he said goodbye to Mr. Toren and told him it was nice working for him. Plaintiff said that he did not know, and never knew, any reason for his being discharged; that Mr. Toren was the only man with whom he dealt on business. Plaintiff said he had made hundreds of appliances to be...
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