Bowden v. State

Decision Date12 September 1991
Docket NumberNo. 74438,74438
Citation588 So.2d 225
PartiesRoosevelt BOWDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 588 So.2d 225, 16 Fla. L. Week. S614
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Candance M. Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Roosevelt Bowden appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm both the conviction and sentence.

Bowden was convicted of the 1988 first-degree murder of Charles Littlefield. According to testimony at trial, Bowden had been staying off and on and eating meals at the victim's apartment. Littlefield's wife and sister-in-law, who also lived in the apartment and who were present the night of the murder, testified at trial.

According to Littlefield's wife's testimony, on the night of the murder, Bowden went to Littlefield's apartment with a friend, the friend's wife and daughter. Bowden and his friends then left the apartment to go out for dinner. When Bowden returned to the apartment to freshen up around 11 p.m., he and Littlefield got into an argument and Littlefield began throwing things. The argument began upstairs and continued downstairs, until Bowden restrained Littlefield by grabbing him by the throat and holding him down on the couch. When Littlefield slapped Bowden, Bowden let him go. Once released, Littlefield began throwing things again, so Bowden picked him up by the chin and held him against the wall with his feet off the floor. When Littlefield's wife, Rita, told Bowden not to hurt Littlefield, Bowden put him down.

Littlefield, who had been drinking, then grabbed another beer from the refrigerator and left the apartment through the kitchen door. Bowden left the apartment soon after Littlefield, to allegedly find him and calm him down. According to Littlefield's sister-in-law, Bowden returned to the apartment within twenty minutes. Upon his return, Bowden told Rita that Littlefield had At 2:30 a.m. Bowden and Rita went to look for Littlefield. Rita wanted to look near a smashed up abandoned truck in a wooded area not far from the apartment; but Bowden discouraged her from going into the area by telling her that there were "drugs over thataway." After looking several places, they were unable to find Littlefield and returned to the apartment. According to Rita's sister, after they returned Bowden told Rita that he would take care of her if her husband did not return. Bowden stayed at the apartment until he left for work the next morning.

                said, " 'F--k you all,' " and left, throwing his keys behind him.   Bowden also told the sisters he had looked for Littlefield in a couple of clubs but had been unable to find him.   According to the sisters, there was no blood on Bowden when he returned and he did not take a shower or change clothes at the apartment.   However, he did make statements about a dead body, such as it weighs a lot and the skin feels like leather
                

Around noon the next day, Littlefield's body was found in a vacant lot near the wooded area Bowden had discouraged Rita from entering the night before. According to the medical examiner, Littlefield died some time between midnight and 2 a.m. Littlefield had been beaten in the head repeatedly. Although the murder weapon was never found, the medical examiner testified that the victim's wounds were consistent with having been caused by a steel rod known as a "rebar." She also testified that the body was covered with drying blood and there were defensive wounds on the arms and hands. According to her testimony, the first attack had occurred in a parking lot near the vacant lot where the body was found. Littlefield was then dragged by the shoulders to a wooded area near the edge of the parking lot, beaten again, and then dragged by the feet to the location where the body was found. The medical examiner also testified that blood was splattered in the two areas where the beatings occurred and the assailant also would have been splattered with blood.

After speaking to the victim's wife and sister-in-law, the police arrested Bowden and charged him with the murder. Bowden made several statements to police but denied killing Littlefield. Three butane lighters later identified as belonging to the victim and entered into evidence were taken from Bowden's property at the jail. There was also testimony from Rita and her sister that Littlefield left the apartment with fourteen dollars and Bowden had that amount on him after he returned from looking for Littlefield.

Two of Bowden's cellmate's testified at trial. The first testified Bowden told him that he had a fight with a white guy. The white guy ran out of the house, and Bowden ran after him. Bowden caught up with him in the parking lot and they argued. The white guy told Bowden "f--k you." Bowden also told the cellmate that the police were a "dumb set of cops" who would never find out who committed the murder or what the murder weapon was. The second cellmate testified Bowden told him that he had a fight with this guy he was living with. After the fight, the guy left the house and Bowden followed him and beat him using a "rebar" and took $1,100.

Prior to Bowden's statement to his cellmate that he used a rebar to beat the victim, the medical examiner had been unable to ascertain the nature of the murder weapon. However, the medical examiner testified that once she was given a rebar to examine, she determined that a rebar slightly different than the one she had been shown and the one entered into evidence was consistent with having caused the victim's wounds.

Bowden, who testified during both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, denied catching up with Littlefield in the parking lot, denied killing him, denied discussing the murder with his cellmates, and denied making statements about a dead body. During the guilt phase, Bowden also presented the testimony of an expert in forensic serology that the expert had examined a number of items taken from Bowden, including the shirt Bowden was wearing the night of the murder, but failed to detect the presence of blood on any of the items.

During the penalty phase of the trial, Bowden testified concerning his background, explaining his deprived childhood and adolescence. He also acknowledged a 1978 Connecticut manslaughter conviction for the stabbing of his twenty-two month old daughter and explained the circumstances surrounding that killing. After the state completed its penalty phase cross-examination of Bowden, he was allowed to address the jury. Bowden again denied killing Littlefield and told the jury that he had been prejudiced by his past manslaughter conviction.

The jury found Bowden guilty and recommended that he be sentenced to death. Prior to sentencing by the trial court, Bowden was allowed to address the court. Bowden stated for the first time that he in fact had witnessed Littlefield's murder. The court found this claim to be "totally unbelievable" in light of the fact that Bowden testified at length in his own defense during the course of the trial without ever mentioning the fact that he actually witnessed the murder.

The trial court found in aggravation that Bowden had previously been convicted of a violent felony and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court accepted as a nonstatutory mitigating factor the fact that Bowden was "the product of a terrible childhood and adolescence." Consistent with the jury's recommendation, Bowden was sentenced to death.

Bowden appeals his conviction and sentence. He raises seven claims 1 in this appeal, five of which merit brief discussion.

GUILT PHASE

As his first claim, Bowden, who is black, maintains that the state was allowed to peremptorily strike the sole black venire member available for service on his jury without first giving legitimate, race-neutral, record-supported, reasons for the challenge, as required by this Court's decisions in State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), clarified, State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla.1986), and clarified, State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988). When the prospective juror in question was challenged, defense counsel pointed out that the juror was "the only black that's up there" and requested a Neil inquiry into the state's reasons for the challenge. The court responded by noting that "no kind of pattern has been established at this point. [However,] I think it would be safer, for the purposes of the record, if the State would make an announcement as to what the basis would be." The prosecutor gave as reasons for the challenge that the juror was young, she was a woman, and she had "indicated that a relative or family member was accused of a crime." The trial court ruled that at that time there was "no basis ... to find it's a racially motivated challenge."

It is clear that a pattern of striking black venire members need not be demonstrated before a trial court's duty to conduct an inquiry into the State's reasons for the excusal of a minority member is triggered. Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991). Bowden is correct that by pointing out that the only black venire member had been excused and requesting a Neil inquiry the defense met its initial burden of establishing a strong likelihood that Although the fact that a juror has a relative who has been charged with a crime is a race-neutral reason for excusing that juror, Bowden complains that this reason is not supported by the record. The state counters that the information concerning the juror's relative was gleaned from the jury questionnaire. We are unable to determine whether such information was contained in the questionnaire because the jury questionnaires...

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