Bowen v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 16 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 3330.,3330.
• Citation: 345 S.C. 243,547 S.E.2d 877
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ann B. BOWEN, Respondent, v. Richard W. BOWEN, Appellant.

345 S.C. 243

547 S.E.2d 877

Ann B. BOWEN, Respondent, v. Richard W. BOWEN, Appellant.

No. 3330.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard November 7, 2000.

Decided April 16, 2001.

Rehearing Denied July 2, 2001.

Morris D. Rosen and Donald B. Clark, both of Rosen, Goodstein & Hagood, of Charleston, for appellant.

Peter L. Fuge, of Beaufort, for respondent.

STILWELL, Judge:

In this declaratory judgment action, Ann B. Bowen (Wife) asked the circuit court to declare her the owner of an undivided one-half interest in four parcels of real estate or the proceeds resulting from their sale. Richard W. Bowen (Husband) appeals the order of the trial court granting Wife's requested relief and denying Husband a resulting trust over the property or the proceeds thereof. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The parties were married in May 1985. Prior to their marriage, they entered into an extensive antenuptial agreement in an attempt to predetermine the financial consequences of any later separation, divorce, or death, and basically preserve each party's separate property. Insofar as this action is concerned, the most pertinent language is contained in paragraphs three through six of their agreement, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

3. All property owned or income earned or accumulated by either of the parties at the time of their marriage or which the parties may acquire, earn or accumulate hereafter, or during their marriage, from any source whatever shall be the separate property of the respective party now owning, earning, accumulating or hereafter acquiring such property, free and clear of any rights, interest, claims or demands of the other. ...

5. [E]ach party specifically waives any and all right of [sic] claim that such party may at any time have to take any share of the property of the other party under any circumstances whatsoever, with the same force and effect as though single persons before any marriage.

During the marriage, Husband purchased four parcels of real estate, admittedly using nonmarital funds. At Husband's direction, all four lots were titled in the names of Richard W. Bowen and Ann B. Bowen. Two of the deeds granted title to the Bowens as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and the two remaining deeds titled the property to the Bowens "as tenants by the entirety, with the right of survivorship."

In July 1992, Wife commenced an action against Husband seeking, among other things, a divorce and equitable apportionment of marital property. In a September 1994 order, the family court determined the agreement was enforceable and, applying the plain language of the agreement, found the four parcels of property in dispute were nonmarital in nature. Nevertheless, the family court determined Wife owned a one-half interest in the properties.

On appeal, this court vacated the family court's determination as to the parties' respective interests in the disputed properties, holding:

Once the family court determined the properties were nonmarital, it had no jurisdiction to address their ownership or deal with them in any way. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp.1996) ("The [family] court does not have jurisdiction or authority to apportion nonmarital property."). The parties' respective interests in the real estate in question must be handled as if the parties were not married. Therefore, that determination must be left for another day.

Bowen v. Bowen, 327 S.C. 561, 566, 490 S.E.2d 271, 273 (Ct.App.1997).

Thereafter, Wife filed this declaratory judgment action. Husband answered and counterclaimed, denying any intention to make a gift to Wife by jointly titling the property and essentially arguing that the facts and circumstances of the transactions created a resulting trust entitling Husband to ownership of all the properties or the proceeds from their sale. In a March 1999 order, the trial court found Wife was entitled to a one-half interest in the net proceeds from the four disputed properties.¹ In so finding, the trial court reasoned that while Husband purchased the properties with nonmarital funds, he made a gift to Wife of one-half interest in the properties. The parties' agreement did not alter this result, the court reasoned, since "[n]othing in the antenuptial agreement prevent[ed] [Husband] from being more generous than he contracted to be."

Husband moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the trial court failed to make an express finding on the issue of whether "the prenuptial agreement operated to reverse the usual presumption of a gift where a husband supplies all the consideration but causes real estate being acquired to be titled jointly between himself and his wife, the theory being that the Defendant had no duty to support the Plaintiff outside of the contractual obligation set forth in the prenuptial agreement and such finding should be made."

In the order on reconsideration, the trial court found as follows:

I did not expressly make the suggested finding. I do not believe the suggested finding is necessary in order for the findings I made to support the conclusions I reached, but I, upon reconsideration find that, if it is necessary for me to expressly deal with the presumption, I find the testimony supports my conclusion of a gift in that I find the credible evidence overcomes any such presumption.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable, but is determined by the nature of the underlying issue." Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991). This action was commenced to determine the parties' respective rights in certain real property in view of their antenuptial agreement. In the final analysis, therefore, this is an action to interpret the parties' written agreement, or contract, and when a contract is clear and unambiguous, the construction thereof is a question of law for the court. Pearson v. Church of God, 325 S.C. 45, 53-54, 478 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1996); Moser v. Gosnell, 334 S.C. 425, 430, 513 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ct.App.1999). When construing a contract's terms, the foremost rule is that the court must give effect to the intentions of the parties by examining the language of the contract. Moser, 334 S.C. at 430,513 S.E.2d at 125 (stating that if the language is clear, explicit, and unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract's force and effect, and the court must construe it according to its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Husband contends that although the disputed properties were titled in both parties' names, he furnished all the consideration for their purchase and did not intend to make a gift of the properties to Wife; therefore, the trial court erred in not...