Bowen v. Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' Intern. Union of America, 16837

• Decision Date: 25 February 1954
• Docket Number: No. 16837,16837
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: BOWEN v. BRICKLAYERS, MASONS & PLASTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA et al. BANNISTER v. BRICKLAYERS, MASONS & PLASTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA et al.

Page 343

80 S.E.2d 343

225 S.C. 29

BOWEN v. BRICKLAYERS, MASONS & PLASTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

AMERICA et al.

BANNISTER v. BRICKLAYERS, MASONS & PLASTERERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

AMERICA et al.

No. 16837.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 25, 1954.

E. Abrams, Sol., and John Bolt Culbertson, Greenville, for appellants.

Harris & Harris, Anderson, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The above stated cases involve identical issues and were briefed in this court as one. Bowen's case will be hereinafter discussed but our disposition of the appeal in it will also be applicable to the appeal of the defendants in the Bannister case.

It was alleged in the complaint that plaintiff was formerly, but not then, a member of the defendant Unions; for approximately twenty years he had been engaged as a bricklayer and in other masonry work in and about the City of Anderson whereby he had earned a livelihood for himself and his family; about March 30, 1953, he had a contract with Cromer & Sullivan, a building contractor of Anderson, for the laying of brick on a rather large project for which he was paid, in accord with the contract, $35 per thousand brick laid and tweleve cents each for concrete blocks, from which he earned about $25 per day. Cromer & Sullivan employs many brickmasons in the repair and erection of buildings throughout the upper part of the State, using brick, stone, cement blocks, lumber and other materials. The personal defendants are members and agents of the Union defendants and as such, and with the Unions, conspired to oust plaintiff from his work and from continuing his contract of employment, pursuant to which they demanded of Cromer & Sullivan that plaintiff be discharged from his contract and employment or else all of the members of the Unions would boycott the contractor and discontinue working on its present and future contracts, for the completion of which the contractor required the services of many masons. The contractor was thereby forced to discharge plaintiff, which it did in breach of its contract with him. Plaintiff has since been without employment during much of the time and has suffered other specified elements of damage. Defendants' actions were prompted by unlawful malice and determination to injure plaintiff because he had resigned from the Unions and worked more hours and days per week, and by contract, against the rules, etc., of the Unions. Actual and punitive damages were demanded against all of the defendants.

The defendants demurred to the jurisdiction of the court upon the ground that it appears from the facts alleged in the complaint that the only remedy of plaintiff arises under sections 8(b)(1) and 8(b)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act of Congress, 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(1) and (2), which are provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. The demurrer was overruled...