Bowen v. Ives
| Decision Date | 22 June 1976 |
| Citation | 171 Conn. 231,368 A.2d 82 |
| Parties | Eugene V. BOWEN et al. v. Howard S. IVES, Highway Commissioner. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Clement J. Kichuk, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty, Gen., for the appellant (defendant).
Paul E. Pollock, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was James L. Galluzzo, Bridgeport, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.
The defendant highway commissioner condemned a portion of the plaintiffs' property located in Bridgeport and assessed damages at $6600. Claiming that the award was inadequate, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court where the matter was referred to a state referee, who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, fixed the damages for the taking at $21,240. From the judgment rendered the defendant has appealed to this court, assigning error in the court's finding of facts without evidence, in the refusal to find material facts claimed to be admitted or undisputed, in the admission of certain evidence, in the overruling of claims of law, and in the conclusions reached.
The salient facts may be summarized as follows: In 1969, the plaintiffs owned residential property located at the southeast corner of the intersection of East Main Street and Broadbridge Road in Bridgeport. The lot was approximately 12,500 square feet in size and had upon it an attractive two-story brick house with a built-in two-car garage. The house faced west on East Main Street and was set back therefrom a distance of forty-five feet. It stood eight feet above street grade and had a commanding view of Beardsley Park across the street. Along the driveway and along the East Main Street frontage was a granite retaining wall.
On March 28, 1969, in connection with the relocation of routes 25 and 8, the defendant condemned 2178 square feet of the plaintiffs' East Main Street frontage, varying in depth from seventeen to twenty-five feet. Most of the retaining wall was located in that area. The setback of the house was reduced to twenty-five feet. Also taken was an easement to slope an area of ninety-six square feet on the easterly side of the northerly end of the taking line in order to provide a site-line down East Main Street from Broadbridge Road.
The first hearing on the appeal was held on October 16, 1969. The plaintiffs presented testimony that prior to the taking their property had a value of $47,600; that, after the taking it had a value of $36,900; and that, therefore, by application of the 'before and after rule,' the damages totaled $10,700. The defendant offered evidence that the 'before' value of the property was $31,200 and that the 'after' value was $24,600, resulting in damages of $6600. At that time, no construction work had yet been started in the area and, consequently, the court was unable to visualize the effect the partial taking would have on the plaintiffs' remaining land. The case was therefore continued until after completion of the project.
A second hearing was held on September 17, 1973, at which the plaintiff Eugene Bowen testified to various expenses which he had incurred or would incur in the future as a result of the partial taking. Those expenses related to the construction of a driveway, sidewalk, and retaining wall, the plainting and cleaning of portions of the house, and the removal of trees and shrubs.
During the four years between hearings, the court viewed the construction work in progress on several occasions. On the day of the second hearing, and in the company of all counsel, the court again viewed the premises. The memorandum of decision reveals that on June 3, 1974, prior to rendering judgment, the court viewed the property once more. The memorandum of decision also states that the results of the construction were disastrous, and that the transformation of the plaintiffs' property could not have been worse. During construction, the plaintiffs' lawn was covered with debris and dust. Grass grew wild and could not be mowed by the plaintiffs owing to increased steepness in the slope. East Main Street had been widened, traffic lights had been installed at the intersection, and the traffic on both Broadbridge Road and East Main Street had increased significantly. The plaintiffs found it necessary to replace a lamppost, reseed and reloam their lawn, repaint portions of the house and remove dust which had infiltrated the dwelling and had impaired its habitability. 1
The court concluded that in determining a fair price for the property remaining after the taking, a prospective purchaser would consider all of the elements which would legitimately affect its value, including the loss of trees and shrubs, the elimination of the granite retaining wall, the creation of a slope on the East Main Street frontage which is too steep to mow, the need to replace the lamppost, the need to reseed and reloam the lawn, and the need to repaint portions of the exterior and remove dust from the interior of the house. He found the market value of the property before the taking to be $45,840, its market value just after the taking to be $24,600, and a proper assessment of damages, therefore, to be $21,240.
The defendant's initial claim is that the plaintiff Eugene V. Bowen's testimony concerning expenses incurred as a result of the taking was inadmissible because it had no bearing on the damages recoverable, and that the court's consideration of that testimony resulted in its duplicating compensation for several items of damage.
When, as in the present case, only a part of a tract of land is taken for the public use, 'just compensation' includes recovery for the part taken and recovery for any damages visited upon the remainder which result from the taking. See, e.g., Meriden v. Highway Commissioner, 169 Conn. 655, 659, 363 A.2d 1094. In such a situation, damages are measured by determining the difference between the market value of the whole tract as it lay prior to the taking and the marker value of what remained thereafter. Andrews v. Cox, 129 Conn. 475, 478, 29 A.2d 587; Lefebvre v. Cox, 129 Conn. 262, 265, 28 A.2d 5. See Meriden v. Highway Commissioner, supra. In determining the market value of a remainder after a partial taking, it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price a prospective purchaser would pay for the land. Budney v. Ives, 156 Conn. 83, 88, 239 A.2d 482; Holley v. Torrington, 63 Conn. 426, 433, 28 A. 613. (A)ny expenses which are reasonably necessary to adapt the remaining land to use in view of changes to be made in the land taken may properly enter into the damages to be awarded. . . . The more accurate statement is, however, that such expenses are not recoverable as such but are evidence of elements in the decrease of market value, of which they may be an accurate measure.' Andrews v. Cox, 127 Conn. 455, 459-60, 17 A.2d 507, 510; see DelVecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 147 Conn. 362, 161 A.2d 190.
In the present case, Bowen's testimony tended to show a decrease in the market value of the remainder of the subject property which was attributable to the taking. While the costs to correct the specific injuries to the property may not have been equivalent to the amount by which the market value of the property was thereby decreased, those costs would legitimately affect the price a prospective purchaser would pay for the land. The evidence of those costs, therefore, was relevant in determining the extent of any decrease in market value. The court did not err in admitting that testimony.
Moreover, the defendant's assertion that the court awarded 'double damages,' by treating the expenses testified to as separate items of damage in addition to considering the potential effect that the necessity of those expenses would have on a prospective purchaser of the property at the time of the taking, is not supported by the finding. It is expressly stated in the finding that the injuries to the plaintiffs' property were considered by the court only insofar as they affected the market...
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