Del Vecchio v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency

• Decision Date: 24 May 1960
• Citation: 161 A.2d 190,147 Conn. 362
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Frank DEL VECCHIO v. NEW HAVEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 190

161 A.2d 190

147 Conn. 362

Frank DEL VECCHIO v. NEW HAVEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 24, 1960.

William L. F. Felstiner, with whom, on the brief, was Walter G. Farr, Jr., New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Robert I. Berdon, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff had owned property and operated a bakery on Lafayette Street in New Haven for twenty-three years. The defendant condemned the property and on October 10, 1958, allowed $52,200 damages. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court and the case was referred to a state referee, who found the fair and reasonable value of the property at the time of the taking to be $64,400. In the alternative, he found that if, as a matter of law, the cost of moving the machinery used in the plaintiff's business 'should be taken into consideration in determining the fair market value of the property taken,' the fair and reasonable value of the property would be $66,945. Practice Book, § 169. He pointed out that on February 28, 1959, the plaintiff sold his business, including the machinery and good will. Under the terms of the sale, the plaintiff paid the cost of moving the machinery and reassembling it at its new location. This cost was $2545. The trial court concluded that the cost of moving the machinery properly entered into a determination of the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff and rendered judgment for $66,945, or $14,745 in addition to the $52,200 allowed by the defendant. In its appeal to this court, the defendant raises the single question whether the cost of moving the machinery was a proper consideration in the determination of damages.

When the property of the plaintiff was taken, he had an immediate right to just compensation. General Statutes, § 8-129. '[J]ust compensation means a fair equivalent in money for the property taken as nearly as its nature will permit.' Town of Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 114, 26 A.2d 592, 596; Moss v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 146 Conn. 421, 425, 151 A.2d 693. In the case at bar, fair market value is the proper measure. Winchester, Town of v. Cox, supra; Campbell v. City of New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 181, 125 A. 650. Fair market value is a price which, in fair negotiations, a willing buyer and a willing seller could probably agree upon. Portland Silk Co. v. City of Middletown, 125 Conn. 172, 174, 4 A.2d 422; Andrews v. Cox, 127 Conn. 455, 457, 17 A.2d 507; Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Town of Stratford, 139 Conn. 388, 397, 94 A.2d 1. In the awarding of damages for land taken, it is proper to consider all the elements which an owner and prospective purchaser could reasonably urge as factors influencing the price of the land and which legitimately affect value. Humphrey v. Argraves, 145 Conn. 350, 353, 143 A.2d 432; Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Tersana Acres, Inc., 144 Conn. 509, 513, 134 A.2d 253; Altman v. Hill, 144 Conn. 233, 240, 129 A.2d 358; Housing Authority of City of Bridgeport v. Lustig, 139 Conn. 73, 76, 90 A.2d 169; Andrews v. Cox, supra, 127 Conn. 458, 17 A.2d 509.

In the instant case, the referee's alternative award was based on a consideration of the cost of moving the machinery, not as a separate and distinct item of damages, but as evidence bearing upon fair market value. There is no attack on the referee's report. The trial court thus properly held that in the alternative award the cost of removal was treated by the referee in accordance with the rule laid down in Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn. 686, 689, 67 A.2d 851. See Humphrey v. Argraves, supra. The defendant urges that we overrule the Harvey case because it fails 'to examine both sides of the sales equation, * * * to consider that the seller's moving expenses are of no benefit to the buyer.' See 1 Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain (2d Ed.) p. 315. The defendant argues that the rule fails to consider the prospective...