Bowen v. Korell

Decision Date15 December 1978
Docket NumberNo. 4905,4905
Citation587 P.2d 653
PartiesJoe BOWEN and Robert Bowen, Appellants (Defendants below), v. Wayne C. KORELL and Gary Korell, Appellees (Plaintiffs below).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, for appellants.

Stanley K. Hathaway and Blair J. Trautwein of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.

ROSE, Justice.

This appeal concerns certain aspects of a judgment for damages alleged to have been sustained by the lessees, under a farm lease agreement, by reason of the lessors' breach and wrongful termination of the lease. The appellants-lessors do not challenge the underlying basis for the judgment, nor do they challenge the damages awarded for corn silage or for the newly planted hay fields. They do, however, challenge the evidentiary basis for the award of damages for hay fields in production at the time the lease was executed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the award, and the court's award of $10,000.00 for liquidated damages is questioned on the ground that it is inconsistent with the law applicable to such matters. We will affirm the award with regard to the existing hay fields, but will reverse the liquidated-damages award.

On April 16, 1976, the Bowens, appellants-lessors, entered into a written agreement with the Korells, appellees-lessees, under which the lessees were to farm the lessors' land for three years. Provisions for first-year compensation were formulated, which included the production of corn silage, the breaking out of sod for new alfalfa fields, and production on new and existing alfalfa and hay fields. The lessees were to be paid $115.00 per acre for "those acres now in hay production." The lease also provided that the lessees would be paid $10,000.00 if the lessors sold the land and the purchasers elected to terminate the lease. Second and third-year compensation for crops was to be negotiated at the end of the first year, with the lease to then terminate if a fair consideration could not be mutually agreed upon.

On October 19, 1976, the lessors gave notice that they were terminating the lease because of an alleged failure of the lessees to farm the land in a good and husbandlike manner. Subsequently, the lessees filed suit seeking damages under the lease caused in part by the alleged failure of the lessors to provide a timely supply of irrigation water, and seeking recovery of $10,000.00 as the agreed value of their leasehold tenancy or, in the alternative, a continuation of the leasehold.

HAYFIELD DAMAGE AWARD

At trial, lessee-Wayne Korell testified that there were two hay fields from which there had been production. Three cuttings had been taken from a 26-acre hay field near the farm house, and one cutting had been taken from another 20-acre field. Lessee-Gary Korell testified that both areas were established hay fields. On appeal, the lessors seek to emphasize the cross-examination testimony of Wayne Korell. When asked if he knew why an irrigation ditch was removed on the 20-acre tract, he responded:

"I would. I know why it was removed. There was no intent of irrigating the field. It makes a better weed patch than it does alfalfa down there, with the near impossibility of irrigating it. The stand is very light in there. There was no intention of harvesting hay off of that. It was never proposed for us to harvest the hay off it." (Emphasis supplied)

Reasoning that the lessees are bound by this testimony, the lessors argue that the parties did not intend that hay from the 20-acre field would be produced and, therefore, the court should not have awarded lessees $115.00 per acre for those 20 acres.

While it is apparent that this testimony is damaging to the lessees' position in the fact-finding sense of the word, it is to be also observed that Wayne Korell further testified that he did sign the lease to harvest hay off of the 20-acre field. He presented, thereby, inconsistent indications of his intention with respect to raising alfalfa on the aforesaid 20-acre field. Coupling Wayne Korell's inconsistent statements with the other testimony, indicating that the 20-acre field was an established hay field from which there had been minimal production, we are unable to say as a matter of law that the trial court had insufficient evidence upon which to make this award. When there is evidence to sustain a trial court's finding, this court will not interfere with that finding unless it is clearly erroneous or so totally against the evidence or great weight thereof as to be manifestly wrong. Alexander v. Kadolph, Wyo., 562 P.2d 313, 314 (1977).

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

The lessors attack the liquidated-damages award with the contention that the provision of the lease which contemplated the $10,000.00 payment was applicable only in the event of a sale of the property and was not intended as a liquidated-damages clause. Lessees argue, and the trial court agreed, that $10,000.00 was an agreed-upon value for their leasehold interest and, therefore, should be enforced as a liquidated-damages clause even though the contingency named was not the cause of the loss. In support of this position, the lessees rely on our decision in Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, Wyo., 390 P.2d 607 (1964).

In Ray v....

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    ...of law. The meaning of the instrument is to be deduced only from its language if the terms are plain and unambiguous. Bowen v. Korell, Wyo., 587 P.2d 653, 656 (1978); Shepard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730, 732 (1977); Mauch v. Ballou, Wyo., 499 P.2d 591, 593-594 (1972); C......
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