Bowerman v. Press

• Decision Date: 29 April 1937
• Docket Number: No. 31.,31.
• Citation: 279 Mich. 480,272 N.W. 876
• Parties: BOWERMAN v. DETROIT FREE PRESS et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

279 Mich. 480

272 N.W. 876

BOWERMAN

v.DETROIT FREE PRESS et al.

No. 31.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 29, 1937.

Action by Onalee Bowerman against the Detroit Free Press and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded. Appeal from Circuit Court, Lapeer County; Louis C. Cramton, Judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except POTTER, J.

Robert M. Brownson, Kenneth Murray, and Paul Marco, all of Detroit, for appellants.

George W. DesJardins and John G. Libbers, both of Lapeer, for appellee.

NORTH, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff herein was a witness for the prosecution in a criminal proceedings against Dr. James Edward Roy Smith wherein he was charged with having performed an illegal operation on plaintiff. In publishing a news report of the trial, the defendant Detroit Free Press printed in its paper and caused to be circulated an article which in part read as follows:

‘Lapeer, Mich., June 8-Charges by Mrs. Fred Bowerman that she was the unwilling subject of an illegal operation brought Dr. James Edward Roy Smith, prominent Imlay City surgeon, into circuit court here Monday.

‘Taking the witness stand, Mrs. Bowerman, 34 years old, testified that her husband, jealous of an imagined affair with another man, forced her to go with him to the Imlay City Hospital where she was placed under ether.’

In this libel suit Mrs. Bowerman charges that the italicized portion of the above-quoted news item was falsely and maliciously published of and concerning her by the Detroit Free Press; contending, as the record conclusively shows, that she did not so testify, and that such portion of the publication is wholly untrue. Instead, the record shows that whatever compulsion there was on the part of plaintiff's husband arose from his opposition to having a child born to himself and plaintiff. On trial by jury plaintiff had verdict and judgment for a substantial amount against the Detroit Free Press and for 6 cents damages against defendant Roy Stiles, who was joined as defendant on the ground that he had charge of the circulation of the Free Press in Lapeer. The defendants have appealed. Unless otherwise indicated, the Detroit Free Press, a Michigan corporation, will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant and appellant.

Appellant's first contention is that the words concerning which plaintiff complains are not libelous at all, or at least they are not libelous per se. Notwithstanding apellee claims that the words used were libelous per se, there is included in her declaration an allegation of innuendo referring to the italicized words published, which allegation we quote:

‘That by the said words used in said article, the said defendants were meant and understood to mean:

‘(a) That said plaintiff had been unfaithful to her marital obligations.

‘(b) That plaintiff's husband had reason to believe that plaintiff had been unduly intimate with other men.

‘(c) That plaintiff's husband had reason to believe that plaintiff had committed the crime of adultery.’

Appellant contends that the published words are not libelous at all because appellee was accused only of an imaginary affair, and that the use of the word ‘imagine’ effectively renders the existence of an actual affair impossible. However, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the claim of appellee is wholly untenable, when it is contended in her behalf that a fair reading of the article published might convey to the ordinary mind that she was guilty of adulterous relations with some man under such conditions as caused her husband to ‘imagine,’ think, or believe that she was unfaithful to her marital obligations. Testimony of witnesses was taken who ascribed such a meaning to the article.

Witness Elva Stewart testified:

‘Q. What was the effect upon you of Exhibit A (the published article)? A. Why, didn't have any effect, only just believed it and took it for a fact.’

William Thompson testified:

‘Q. What effect did the reading of that article have upon you? A. Well, I believed it. * * *

‘Q. You were satisfied to let your mind be made up that Mrs. Bowerman was guilty of an imagined affair with another man? A. Certainly.’

If to ordinary minds the article charge plaintiff with adultery, its publication was libelous per se, and furnishes ground for recovery without the allegation of special damages. It is so provided by statute:

‘Words imputing to any female a want of chastity shall be deemed to be actionable in themselves, and shall subject the person who shall utter and publish such words, to an action on the case for slander, in the same manner as the uttering and publishing of words imputing the commission of a criminal offense.’ 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 14470.

Under the circumstances presented by this record, it was not error to submit the issue to the jury as to whether the published article falsely charged plaintiff with adulterous misconduct.

‘The chief contention is whether these words so uttered by defendant are actionable per se. The trial court was of the opinion that they were ambiguous, and under the rule left the question to the jury. * * * Ordinarily this question is for the court to determine. Hay v. Reid, 85 Mich. 296, 48 N.W. 507;Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526, 80 N.W. 575,46 L.R.A. 397, 80 Am.St.Rep. 527. But where the language complained of is ambiguous or is open to a double construction, the question may be submitted to a jury. 25 Cyc. 543; Loranger v. Loranger, 115 Mich. 681, 74 N.W. 228.’ Maciejewski v. Rychart, 192 Mich. 530, 159 N.W. 479.

Another ground of appeal is stated as follows:

‘No special damages have been pleaded or proved by plaintiff and the words sued upon being merely actionable per quod (if at all) her declaration is, under the authorities, fatally defective and does not plead a cause of action.’

This contention cannot be sustained because the jury found the publication libelous per se. The publication being so found to be libelous per se, plaintiff was not required to allege or prove special damages.

‘In actions for slander, where the words are not actionable per se, the plaintiff must both allege and prove that by reason of the words he has sustained some damages of a pecuniary nature. In such actions, where the words are actionable in themselves, no special damages need be alleged or proved, and the jury are warranted in giving such damages as shall compensate the plaintiff for the wrong and injury done.’ Newman v. Stein, 75 Mich. 402, 406, 42 N.W. 956, 957,13 Am.St.Rep. 447.

See, also, Burt v. McBain, 29 Mich. 260;Burr's Damascus Tool Works v. Peninsular Tool Mfg. Co., 142 Mich. 417, 105 N.W. 858. In the instant case plaintiff, without having alleged special damages, recovered on the theory that the published article was libelous per se in that it imputed to her a want of chastity. Such a recovery is sustainable under the above-quoted statute.

Dr. Gilbert C. Bishop testified as a witness for plaintiff. Appellant contends that testimony given by the doctor on direct examination to which we call attention below was prejudicial to defendant and denial of defendant's motion to strike the testimony was reversible error. While the criminal case against Dr. Smith in which plaintiff herein was an important witness was being tried, Dr. Bishop was called to attend plaintiff. As to her condition, Dr. Bishop testified:

‘I found her greatly agitated and crying and very nervous.

‘Q. Did you take a history to determine the cause? A. She had read the article which appeared in the morning Free Press that morning and (it) seemed to have a bad effect on her. * * *

‘Q. Had you seen her the previous day? A. Yes, I had.

‘Q. You may compare her condition after reading that article with her condition before she had read it, as to what effect it had upon her. A. She was considerably more agitated the next day after reading this article; felt it was unfair to her.’

Thereupon defendant's counsel interposed the following:

‘I object to this and move to strike it out. * * * We have no objections to the facts going in, but the conclusions of the witness--’

Considerable colloquy ensued between court and counsel, following which defendant's counsel, in response to an inquiry by the court said:

‘Yes, the defendant moves the court at this time to instruct the jury that any answers which Dr. Bishop made to questions concerning the way Mrs. Bowerman felt upon reading the article of July 9, 1935, must be stricken and that the jury must pay no attention to such answers.’

This motion was denied. In so ruling, we think the court committed error. We do not overlook the fact pointed out by appellee that the doctor was an expert rather than a lay witness. Nonetheless there are limitations to the scope of the testimony of such a witness. Even if it be assumed that the doctor was entitled to consider and state to the jury something of the ‘history’ of Mrs. Bowerman's case; still we think it was going too far for him to say that Mrs. Bowerman, plaintiff in the case, ‘felt it (the published article) was unfair to her.’ Her statement in that regard as testified to by the doctor was hearsay; and it related very directly to the question of injury to plaintiff's feelings for which the jury awarded her $5,000 damages. There was further error in taking the quoted testimony of Dr. Bishop in that instead of testifying what in his opinion was or might have been the effect of the article upon her, he testified positively (not in the terms of expert testimony) that ‘the effect it had upon her’ was that ‘she was considerably more agitated the next day after reading this article; felt it was unfair to her.’ While the motion to strike was under consideration by the court, defendant's counsel said:

‘We are basing the objection on the conclusions of the doctor. We want the facts and let the jury draw the conclusions.’

Conceding that in his professional capacity the doctor might have testified that he was of the opinion that plaintiff's condition was...