Rittenhouse v. Erhart

Decision Date08 January 1986
Docket Number73659 and 72596,Docket Nos. 72074
Citation380 N.W.2d 440,424 Mich. 166,71 A.L.R.4th 1069
PartiesDonald RITTENHOUSE, Next Friend of Karen Rittenhouse, a Minor, Plaintiff- Appellee, v. Earl M. ERHART and General Motors Corporation, Defendants, and Tuffy Service Centers, Inc., Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiff, and North Woodward Mufflers, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Supreme Muffler, Division of Arvin Industries, Inc., Third-Party Defendant- Appellee. Michael JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARTON MALOW COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. Michael GAGNON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES CORP., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Industrial Crane Industries, Inc., a corporation, Defendant. 424 Mich. 166, 380 N.W.2d 440, 71 A.L.R.4th 1069, 54 U.S.L.W. 2373
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Zeff, Zeff & Materna by Michael T. Materna, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee Donald Rittenhouse; Gromek, Bendure & Thomas by Mark R. Bendure, Detroit, of counsel.

Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr, Heaphy, Moore, Sills & Poling, P.C., Detroit, for North Woodward Mufflers, Inc., defendant-third-party plaintiff-appellant.

Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson by Nicholas J. Rine, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee, Michael Gagnon.

Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by Thomas F. Myers, Detroit, for Dresser Industries Corp.

Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich, Rosen & Bartnick by Richard E. Shaw, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee, Michael Jackson.

Joselyn, Rowe, Jamieson, Grinnan, Hayes & Feldman, P.C. by Joseph E. Grinnan, Detroit, for defendant-appellee-appellant Barton Malow Co.

Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman, John E. S. Scott and Susan Bieke Neilson, for amicus curiae Michigan Defense Trial Counsel, Inc., and Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

BRICKLEY, Justice.

The common issue in these three consolidated cases is whether, in a tort action in which there is settlement with one or more defendants before trial, and a verdict is subsequently obtained against the remaining defendants which must be reduced both by the settlement amount and a comparative negligence factor, a court should first subtract the settlement amount or the comparative negligence factor. In Rittenhouse, the appellant also contends that the prejudgment interest against it was improperly calculated.

FACTS

The facts leading to this appeal are largely undisputed in each case.

Rittenhouse

Karen Rittenhouse is the daughter of plaintiff, Donald Rittenhouse. On the evening of June 14, 1973, Rittenhouse, then a sixteen-year-old high school student, was at home with her boyfriend, seventeen-year-old Kerry Erhart. At approximately 10:00 p.m., they left in Erhart's 1969 Chevrolet, saying that they would return soon.

About 7:00 a.m. the following morning, the Erhart family automobile was found parked in a nearby subdivision with the two teenagers inside. The ignition switch was in the "on" position, but the engine was not running. Carbon monoxide poisoning caused the death of Erhart, and Rittenhouse suffered brain injuries from which she has not fully recovered.

On December 20, 1974, plaintiff obtained an order appointing him next friend of Karen Rittenhouse, and he filed a complaint listing Earl M. Erhart (father of the deceased) as the sole defendant. Appellant North Woodward Mufflers, who had installed the exhaust system on the Erhart auto, entered the case when a second amended complaint was filed on October 12, 1976.

Other defendants were also named, but they settled for the combined amount of $395,000 prior to or during trial. At trial the jury found that appellant was negligent and that plaintiff had suffered damages in the amount of $1,500,000. Earl Erhart was not found to have been negligent. The jury also found that plaintiff had been twenty percent comparatively negligent. The trial judge computed prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the second amended complaint and the amount of judgment in the manner proposed by appellant:

                $1,500,000  Plaintiff's damages
                 - 300,000  Twenty percent comparative
                ----------
                              negligence
                $1,200,000
                 - 395,000  Settlements
                ----------
                $  805,000  Judgment against appellant
                

The Court of Appeals affirmed 1 the circuit court's judgment, except that it recomputed the amount of the judgment against appellant in the following manner:

The Court of Appeals also noted that plaintiff had failed to cross-appeal the issue of when the prejudgment interest should have begun to run. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal on a particular issue, which the Court of Appeals granted, and the court ruled that interest should have been calculated from the date the original complaint was filed.

We granted North Woodward's application for leave "limited to the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its method of calculating the judgment amount, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination of the date from which the appellant is to be charged judgment interest." 418 Mich. 955 (1984).

Gagnon

Plaintiff, Michael Gagnon, suffered a broken leg and other complications as a result of an industrial accident on July 26, 1976. Plaintiff filed suit naming several defendants including appellant, Dresser Industries. Settlements totaling $100,000 were made with other defendants, and plaintiff went to trial against Dresser only.

The jury found appellant negligent and that plaintiff had suffered $200,000 worth of damages. It also found, however, that plaintiff was fifty percent comparatively negligent. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict in the manner proposed by plaintiff:

                $ 200,000  Plaintiff's damages
                - 100,000  Settlements
                ---------
                $ 100,000
                 - 50,000  Fifty percent comparative negligence
                ---------
                $  50,000  Judgment against appellant
                

$ 200,000 Plaintiff's damages - 100,000 Fifty percent comparative negligence --------- $ 100,000 - 100,000 Settlements --------- $ 0 Judgment against appellant

In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 130 Mich.App. 452, 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983). We, thereafter, granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 419 Mich. 917 (1984).

Jackson

Plaintiff, Michael Jackson, was injured while working at a construction site in 1977. He was accidently struck in the face with a shovel wielded by a coworker. Suit was filed against the general contractor and the appellant, Barton Malow. After plaintiff and the general contractor settled for $150,000, the case went to trial.

The jury, as in the companion cases, was not informed of the settlement. Plaintiff was found to have suffered $400,000 in damages. The jury found plaintiff seventy-five percent negligent and defendant twenty-five percent negligent.

Defendant successfully urged the trial judge to compute the amount of judgment accordingly:

                $ 400,000  Plaintiff's damages
                - 300,000  Seventy-five percent comparative
                ---------
                             negligence
                $ 100,000
                - 150,000  Settlement
                ---------
                $    0     Judgment against appellant
                

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals modified the amount of the judgment by the following method:

                $ 400,000  Plaintiff's damages
                - 150,000  Settlement
                ---------
                $ 250,000
                - 187,500  Seventy-five percent comparative
                ---------
                             negligence
                $  62,500  Judgment against appellant
                

131 Mich.App. 719, 346 N.W.2d 591 (1984).

We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal and ordered this case to be argued and submitted with Rittenhouse and Gagnon. 419 Mich. 917 (1984).

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case.

I

In 1978, the Legislature decreed that comparative negligence be applied in products liability cases. M.C.L. Sec. 600.2949(1); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2949(1) provides:

"(1) In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff."

One year later this Court formally 2 adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence in Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979). The pure comparative negligence form was adopted, because it is the one which "most nearly accomplishes the goal of a fair system of apportionment of damages." Id., 660, 275 N.W.2d 511. This is the only doctrine that "truly distributes responsibility according to the fault of the respective parties." Id. (Citation omitted.)

Citing Kirby, supra, the Placek court also noted that one of the virtues of pure comparative negligence is that it does not " 'unjustly enrich' anyone." Id. Also, the following language from Kirby was approved:

"The doctrine of pure comparative negligence does not allow one at fault to recover for one's own fault, because damages are reduced in proportion to the contribution of that person's negligence, whatever that proportion is. The wrongdoer does not recover to the extent of his fault, but only to the extent of the fault of others. To assume that in most cases the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant is an argument not based on equity or justice or the facts. What pure comparative negligence does is hold a person fully responsible for his or her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is justice." Id., 661, 275 N.W.2d 511.

With these general principles in mind, we now turn to the issue in the cases at bar.

Appellants contend that the amounts of plaintiffs' total damages in these cases must be reduced by the percentages of comparative negligence returned by the juries before subtractions of the settlements. They assert that the percentages of...

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