Bowers v. State
| Decision Date | 19 November 1902 |
| Citation | 71 S.W. 284 |
| Parties | BOWERS v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Falls county; Sam R. Scott, Judge.
Jim Bowers was convicted of theft, and appeals. Reversed.
Nat Lewellyn, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was charged with the theft of cattle, the indictment containing four counts. Upon the trial he was convicted under the second count, and given two years in the penitentiary.
Bill No. 1 complains of the action of the court overruling his third application for continuance. The application seeks a continuance on the absence of the witness Frank Woods. Appellant states that he expected to show by said witness that he (witness) was acquainted with Henry Mayfield, and that Henry Mayfield was buying and selling cattle in Falls county about the time appellant is charged with stealing cattle alleged in the indictment. It is not shown in the application in what way the testimony of Mayfield was material. The application, in the light of the record before us, does not show that the testimony is either material or probably true, and the court did not err in overruling the motion. Furthermore, we note that the application does not state that the witness is not absent by the consent or procurement of appellant. This is a statutory requisite. Article 597, Code Cr. Proc.
Bills Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, complain that the court erred in permitting the state to crossexamine appellant and his witness Foster as to their having been charged with the crime of murder and maiming some 18 years before the charge against defendant for theft. In this there was no error. The lapse of time since the commission of the crime could not be any objection to the admissibility of the testimony, but might go to its weight. Henderson v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 62 S. W. 752; Mootry v. Same, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 450, 33 S. W. 877, 34 S. W. 126.
Bill No. 6 complains that the court told the jury that they "are the judges, from all the facts and circumstances of the case, whether or not a purchase of the alleged stolen property was in fact a bona fide purchase, or whether or not it is a device and sham." Appellant insists that this charge was calculated to influence the jury, or cause them to believe that said purchase was a sham. No other objection is made to this charge. We do not think the charge of the court is subject to the criticism urged by appellant.
The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, and, no error appearing in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
On Rehearing.
(Dec. 17, 1902.)
This case was affirmed at a previous day of this term, and now comes before us on motion for rehearing. Appellant complains by a number of bills of exception that the court permitted the state to cross-examine appellant and his witness Foster on the question of their having been charged with the crime of murder and maiming some 15 or 17 years before the charge against appellant for theft. In the original opinion we held that this was not error; that the lapse of time would merely go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. In this we were in error. It appears by bill No. 2 that the state asked the witness Foster if he had not been previously charged with perjury in 1885. Bill No. 3 alleges the state was permitted to ask the same witness, and he was forced to testify, that he had been charged with maiming in 1887. Bill No. 4 complains that the state was permitted to ask defendant's witness W. P. Moodey if appellant was not implicated with witness' brother, and was not a...
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Skidmore v. State
... ... We hold that said acts of intimacy are too remote. There was ample time for the parties to have reformed or to have become estranged. This is in accord with the doctrine announced in Bowers v. State [71 S. W. 284]." It will be noted that ultimately the decision of the case was rested on the fact that, the acts of familiarity having occurred some four or five years before the one charged, they were too remote. There is no discussion here of the doctrine, but Judge Henderson seems to ... ...
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Cooper v. State
...relation to the time at which the testimony is given, and that the period of 15 years is too remote. ***" See, also, Bowers v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 71 S.W. 284; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35, 32 Am. Rep. 686; Dyer v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 77 S.W. 456. It is not insisted that evid......
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Cooper v. State
...relation to the time at which the testimony is given, and that the period of 15 years is too remote. * * *" See, also, Bowers v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 71 S. W. 284; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. 35, 32 Am. St. Rep. 686; Dyer v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 77 S. W. It is not insisted that ......
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Vick v. State
...all the cases but will cite some of the most recent ones and all that we have been able to find directly in point. In the case of Bowers v. State, 71 S. W. 284, this court first held that a conviction occurring 18 years before the trial was admissible for the purpose of affecting the credib......