Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm'n
| Decision Date | 22 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-15737,16-15737 |
| Parties | VERONZA L. BOWERS, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, WARDEN, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-02095-WCO
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Before JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.
Petitioner Veronza Bowers was convicted in 1974 for the murder of a federal park ranger, and he has been incarcerated ever since. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to parole, given how much time he has served on his sentence. Petitioner's right to any parole is governed by the 1976 Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 et seq. (the "Parole Act" or the "Act"), under which he became eligible to be considered for "mandatory"1 parole in April 2004. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Since that time, the United States Parole Commission has repeatedly denied Petitioner's requests for release under § 4206(d), finding that he is ineligible for this type of parole because he seriously violated institutional rules.
This appeal arises from his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of Georgia. In the district court, Petitioner alleged that theCommission erred in denying his parole for two reasons: first, by applying an erroneous interpretation of the Parole Act's mandatory parole provision, § 4206(d), and second, by denying his parole in response to improper political pressure, thus failing to act as a neutral, unbiased decision-maker in considering his right to parole. The district court denied his petition for habeas relief. Petitioner now appeals. After careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, we AFFIRM.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required federal defendants to be sentenced pursuant to federal Sentencing Guidelines and it eliminated any early release from a sentence pursuant to parole. See Pub. L. 98-473, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 1837, 2027, 2031 (1984); Walden v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 114 F.3d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir. 1997). Prior to enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act, the 1976 Parole Act defined the circumstances under which individuals serving prison sentences may become eligible for parole. Notwithstanding its repeal, the Parole Act continues to apply to prisoners who were sentenced prior to the effective date of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Walden, 114 F.3d at 1138.
The United States Parole Commission (the "Commission") is the executive agency responsible for administering the Act's parole guidelines for the everdecreasing number of inmates who are able to avail themselves of its benefits. The Commission makes discretionary judgments regarding federal prisoners' right to parole at various stages of incarceration. In performing this function, the Commission is "independent for policy-making purposes, but is attached to the Department of Justice for administrative convenience." S. Rep. 94-369, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 336.
Ever since the repeal of the Parole Act, Congress has debated whether to keep the Parole Commission in existence in its current form or to disband it altogether in favor of a new administrative process for those prisoners who were not sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Commission was initially slated for elimination under the latter statute, until Congress changed course and renewed the Commission's mandate. Congress has reauthorized the Commission several times since then, and the Commission's continued existence depends, in part, on periodic reports from the Attorney General as to whether "the continuation of the Commission is the most cost-effective and cost-efficient manner for carrying out the Commission's functions." Parole Commission Phaseout Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-232, 110 Stat. 3055, 3056 (1996). Thus, the Commission itself is not involved in its own reauthorization process. Instead, it is the Attorney General who decides whether to advocate for its periodic reauthorization by Congress.
In the present case, Petitioner challenges the Commission's most recent denial of his claimed right to release. This present claim, however, is preceded by a lengthy and complex history involving both the Parole Commission and federal courts. Indeed, we have twice before considered his case in Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Bowers I"), and Bowers v. United States Parole Comm'n, Warden, 760 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Bowers II"). We begin by summarizing the various phases of the underlying proceedings in order to provide context for the two core issues before us on appeal.
Petitioner was tried and convicted for the brutal murder of a federal park ranger in Point Reyes National Seashore, a national park in California. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1974. Bowers I at 1282-83.2
Basing its denial of parole on Petitioner's serious violation of institutional rules, the Commission cited an unsuccessful attempt by Petitioner to escape from prison shortly after his conviction. Id. Specifically, in 1979, Petitioner and a fellow inmate scaled an interior perimeter fence while other prisoners were in the recreation yard. Id. As soon as guards detected them, Petitioner and his partner were pinned down by tower gunfire between the inner and outer fences of the recreation yard. Id. Gunfire twice hit the other inmate involved in the attempted escape. Id. In the view of prison administrators, Petitioner's actions created a "very serious situation" because it created a risk of injury to other inmates in the area. Id. The prison investigated the incident, and Petitioner was ultimately convicted of attempted escape. Id.3
In recent years, Petitioner has violated no prison regulations. A hearing examiner considering Petitioner's record in 2004 stated that Petitioner had not beenthe subject of a disciplinary report since 1988 and had no history of causing management problems for prison staff. And according to his habeas petition, Petitioner has used his time in prison to attain an Associate's Degree and become an expert in meditation, yoga, the Japanese shakuhachi flute, sign language, and baking. A chaplain at the prison further described Petitioner as an instrumental part of the prison's religious service programs and as having "the most positive attitude that could be imagined."
Petitioner became eligible to be considered for mandatory parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) on April 7, 2004. Id. at 1284. This provision essentially requires that every prisoner, no matter his crime or sentence, be released after serving thirty years, subject to three exceptions. The entire provision reads as follows:
Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is earlier: Provided, however, That the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines that he has seriouslyorfrequentlyviolated institution rules and regulations orthat there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.
18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (emphasis added). After initially deciding to grant Petitioner mandatory parole, the Commission subsequently changed its mind, and its actions are at the center of this appeal. As such, we summarize the procedural history ofPetitioner's pursuit of parole before the Commission, the district court, and this Court.
When Petitioner first became eligible for mandatory parole on April 7, 2004, the prison automatically processed him for release. Bowers I at 1284. His release was halted, however, after prison authorities informed him that he was ineligible for parole because he had waived his right to a statutory interim hearing two years earlier. Id.
Petitioner immediately filed an emergency habeas petition in the Middle District of Florida. Id. The court considered and rejected the Commission's waiver argument and faulted the Commission for failing to properly review Petitioner for mandatory parole eligibility. Id. The Commission was ordered to immediately consider Petitioner's rights under § 4206(d) and to hold any necessary hearings within sixty days. Id. In compliance with this directive, the Commission initiated a series of proceedings to determine whether Petitioner satisfied the criteria for mandatory parole.
Following the above-described remand by the district court, three Commission examiners recommended that Petitioner be paroled based on hisrecord of good behavior during his confinement. The Commission thereafter approved Petitioner's parole under § 4206(d), on January 13, 2005. Bowers I at 1284. On February 17, 2005, shortly before Petitioner was set to be released, the Commission decided to reopen his case "to consider new adverse information." Id. at 1284-85. The information prompting reconsideration came from the victim's widow, who had submitted to the Commission a letter describing a 2002 radio interview Petitioner conducted while in prison. Id. at 1285. In the interview, Petitioner maintained his innocence and stated his belief that the FBI had targeted him because of his activity as a member of the Black Panthers. Id. Petitioner also identified himself in the interview with other prisoners who had labeled themselves "political prisoners."4 Id.
The Commission re-voted Petitioner's case for parole, taking the radio interview into account as possible evidence that Petitione...
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