Bowie v. State

• Decision Date: 15 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 225,225
• Parties: BYRON A. BOWIE v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

BYRON A. BOWIE v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 225

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

September 15, 2017

Circuit Court for Frederick County

Case No. 10-K-90-012678

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Beachley, Moylan, Charles E., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Beachley, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

On July 3, 1991, in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, appellant Byron Bowie pleaded not guilty pursuant to an agreed statement of facts. After the State read the agreed facts to the court, the court found appellant guilty of first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. On January 23, 1992, the court sentenced appellant to life in prison for first-degree murder, fifteen years concurrent for assault with intent to murder, and ten years concurrent for the handgun count. On February 3, 2017, appellant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and Request for Hearing, arguing that recent United States Supreme Court precedent rendered his sentence unconstitutional. The circuit court denied appellant's motion without a hearing. Appellant presents the following issue for our review: Did the circuit court err in denying appellant's motion to correct illegal sentence? We affirm the circuit court's decision.

BACKGROUND

According to the agreed statement of facts, on the night of September 28, 1990, appellant shot and killed one man, and wounded another man. Approximately twenty years after appellant received his life sentence for first-degree murder, the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional for a state to sentence a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without the possibility of parole, depriving that juvenile of a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). The Supreme Court made clear, however, that a state need not guarantee eventual freedom to such an offender. Id. Two years later, the Supreme Courtextended Graham and held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). Although Graham addressed a juvenile nonhomicide offender's sentence, the Supreme Court in Miller explained that "Graham's reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses." Id. at 473. Finally, four years after Miller, the Supreme Court announced that Miller constitutes a substantive rule and applies retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734 (2016).

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that we must vacate his sentence for several reasons. First, he contends that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because Maryland's parole system does not afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, rendering his life sentence the equivalent of life without parole. Second, appellant argues that the regulations promulgated by the Maryland Parole Commission (the "Commission") do not comply with the mandates of the Eighth Amendment and Graham and its progeny, also rendering his life sentence the equivalent of life without parole. Third, he argues that the sentencing court erred by not considering his youth as a mitigating factor in violation of Miller. Finally, appellant argues that the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides him with additional protections not provided by the Eighth Amendment.

I.

Appellant first argues that his parolable life sentence functions as life without the possibility of parole because the Governor's role in the parole system does not afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. This is so, appellant argues, because in Maryland, the Governor "has unfettered authority to approve or deny parole to an inmate serving a life sentence and is not bound to consider appellant's demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation or the distinctive attributes of youth." As we shall explain, appellant's claim is premature.

In Maryland, the Commission "has the exclusive power to . . . authorize the parole of an individual sentenced under the laws of the State to any correctional facility in the State" as well as to "hear cases for parole in which . . . the inmate is serving a sentence of life imprisonment[.]" Md. Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 7-205(a)(1), (3)(iii) of the Correctional Services Article ("CS"). "[A]n inmate who has been sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole consideration until the inmate has served 15 years or the equivalent of 15 years considering the allowances for diminution of the inmate's term of confinement." CS § 7-301(d)(1). A homicide offender such as appellant, however, is not eligible for parole until he serves twenty-five years (or the equivalent period with applicable diminution credits). CS § 7-301(d)(2), (3). Parole for an inmate sentenced to life is governed by CS § 7-301(d)(4), which provides that, "if eligible for parole under this subsection, an inmate serving a term of life imprisonment may only be paroled with the approval of the Governor." For those serving life sentences, theCommission can only review and make recommendations to the Governor. CS § 7-206(3)(i).

Put simply, once a homicide offender sentenced to life has served twenty-five years (or the equivalent period with applicable diminution credits), that offender becomes eligible for parole. If the Commission recommends parole for such an offender, the Governor has the exclusive power to decide whether to grant or deny parole.¹

Appellant argues that CS § 7-301(d)(4) does not require the Governor to consider demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and the distinctive attributes of youth—standards the Supreme Court in Graham required the States to explore when considering parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Appellant correctly notes that there is no statutory provision that requires the Governor to consider any particular factors in deciding whether to grant parole. This unfettered discretion to deny parole, appellant argues, renders CS § 7-301(d)(4) unconstitutional.

In Graham, the State of Florida sentenced Graham, a juvenile nonhomicide offender, to life in prison. 560 U.S. at 52-53, 57. Because Florida had abolished its parole system, Graham's life sentence effectively became life without the possibility of parole—his only opportunity for release was through executive clemency. Id. at 57. In holding that sentence unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated,

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance. It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.

560 U.S. at 75.

Pursuant to Maryland's parole procedures, the Commission must first recommend appellant for parole before the Governor can consider whether to ultimately grant parole. Appellant does not claim that the Commission has recommended him for parole, nor can he claim that his parole status now depends exclusively on the actions of the Governor. In short, the Governor has no duty, at this juncture, to consider appellant's parole status.

The Court of Appeals "has emphasized, time after time, that [its] strong and established policy is to decide constitutional issues only when necessary." VNA Hospice of Md. v. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, 406 Md. 584, 604 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burch v. United Cable, 391 Md. 687, 695-96 (2006)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations." Cty. Court ofUlster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155 (1979). The Supreme Court has explained that, to have constitutional standing, a party "must have suffered an 'injury in fact'—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical[.]'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, in the absence of a recommendation for parole by the Commission, there is no need to decide a constitutional issue regarding the Governor's alleged unfettered discretion in the parole process. Appellant's claim, in the parlance of Lujan, is "conjectural" or "hypothetical."

We find support for our conclusion in the relevant case law. In People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 1053, 1054 (Cal. 2016), the Supreme Court of California addressed an appeal pursuant to Graham and its progeny regarding a juvenile homicide offender. There, in addition to addressing other issues, the Franklin court...