Bowles v. Beal
| Decision Date | 09 November 1883 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1407. |
| Citation | 60 Tex. 322 |
| Parties | J. P. BOWLES v. P. M. BEAL ET AL. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Navarro. Tried below before the Hon. L. D. Bradley.
Trespass to try title brought in the district court of Navarro county by the appellant against the appellees, John P. Whatley and W. C. McClurg, and P. M. Beal. Pending the suit Beal died, and his administratrix, Mrs. W. Beal, was made party defendant. The suit was for the recovery of about nine hundred acres of land in Navarro county, on the Elijah Powers league. Verdict and judgment for the appellant for a one-half undivided interest in the land sued for.
The plaintiff and one Jeffries purchased the land sued for at execution sale against the defendant P. M. Beal. The other defendants claimed under Beal. The plaintiff undertook to deraign his title from Jeffries for the undivided part he purchased at an execution sale, but the court excluded his title. This ruling of the court, as well as the charges of the court, were assigned for error.
The league of land of which the land sued for is part was patented to Elijah Powers in 1846. Before 1857 Powers died, leaving the defendant Beal one of his heirs. J. P. Bowles and J. F. Jeffries recovered a judgment in the district court of Falls county against P. M. Beal for $320.32 and costs, and foreclosing an attachment lien on said league of land. On the first Tuesday in February, 1858, the interest of P. M. Beal in the league was sold by the sheriff of Navarro county, by virtue of an order of sale issued on this judgment, and Bowles and Jeffries became the purchasers, and on the 2d day of February, 1858, the sheriff of Navarro county made to them his deed for Beal's interest in the land. March 20, 1872, in a suit for partition amongst the heirs of Elijah Powers, the particular tract, a part of the league, was allotted to P. M. Beal. The plaintiff sought to deraign his title from Jeffries to his interest, and having shown the deed of assignment by the register in bankruptcy to M. L. Ritter, assignee in bankruptcy of Jeffries, he offered in evidence the deed of Ritter, assignee in bankruptcy of Jeffries, to E. G. Bower, Julian Peak and E. H. T. Nichols. On the objection of the defendant this deed was excluded, with other reasons, because the court was of opinion “that the description of the land therein conveyed is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to render said deed void for want of sufficient description.” This deed described the land sold as follows: “An undivided one-third of one-sixth of a league of land in Navarro county, Texas, patented to Elijah Powers, the same being one-third of the interest in said land heretofore conveyed by the sheriff of said county of Navarro to J. P. Bowles and J. F. Jeffries.” The league was particularly described in the patent to Elijah Powers and the sheriff's deed conveyed this league.
Goodrich & Clarkson, for appellant.
No briefs on file for appellees.
The bill of exceptions shows that there were but two objections raised to the introduction in evidence of the deed of Ritter, assignee of Jeffries, to Bower, Peak and Nichols, for a portion of the land sued for. These related to the supposed want of certainty in the terms used in the deed, in describing the land intended to be conveyed, and to the fact disclosed on the face of the deed, that the sale was made in Dallas county by the assignee.
We do not regard either objection as tenable.
The deed of the assignee under consideration described the land sold and conveyed with reasonable certainty, and referred to the deed of the sheriff of Navarro county, that was already in evidence, to identify the particular interest in the Powers league that was conveyed. This description, under our previous decisions, was sufficient to admit the deed under consideration in evidence. The cases alluded to are collected below. The court erred in excluding it. Montgomery v. Carlton, 56 Tex., 433;Knowles v. Torbitt, 53 Tex., 558;Rogers v. McLaren, 53 Tex., 426;Steinbeck v. Stone, 53 Tex., 386;Wilson v. Smith, 50 Tex., 369, 370;Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex., 395-6. See, also, Waters v. Spofford, 58 Tex., 124;Kingston v. Pickins, 46 Tex., 101;Berry v. Wright, 14 Tex., 273;Flanagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex., 335;Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex., 616-17.
The conveyance was clearly not void on its face, on...
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...certain which may be made certain. Vineyard v. O'Connor, 90 Tex. 59, 36 S. W. 424; Gresham v. Chambers, 80 Tex. 544, 16 S. W. 326; Bowles v. Beal, 60 Tex. 322; Land & Cattle Co. v. Chisholm, 71 Tex. 523, 9 S. W. Since the assignment from Townsend to Day refers to the deed records for a more......
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