Bowles v. Tatom
| Decision Date | 28 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 47S01-8911-CV-876,47S01-8911-CV-876 |
| Citation | 546 N.E.2d 1188 |
| Parties | Doris J. BOWLES, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. William J. TATOM, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
James L. Whitlatch, Bunger, Robertson, Kelley & Steger, Bloomington, for appellant.
Darlene S. McSoley, Steele, Steele & Steele, Bedford, for appellee.
In this small-claims property damage action under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-1 to -14, the Lawrence County Court entered judgment finding defendant-appellant Doris J. Bowles 100 percent at fault and awarding damages of $1908.60 plus costs to plaintiff-appellee William J. Tatom. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings including a reassessment of fault percentage. Bowles v. Tatom (1988), Ind.App., 523 N.E.2d 458.
Vehicles operated by Tatom and Bowles collided in a Bedford, Indiana, intersection on June 14, 1986, when Bowles, unfamiliar with the area, failed to stop for a stop sign that was allegedly obscured by foliage. Tatom's claim against Bowles was denied by her insurer with the allegation that the city was responsible by reason of the obscured stop sign. Tatom filed a timely claim against the city and thereafter commenced this action against Bowles, the City of Bedford, and its mayor. When the answer filed on behalf of the city and mayor named the adjacent property owners as non-parties under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, Tatom formally named the property owners as additional defendants.
At the ensuing bench trial, Tatom presented evidence including his testimony describing the accident, photographs of the accident scene showing the view of each driver, the Bedford City Police report, a compilation of Bedford ordinances designating through streets, and documents establishing the extent of damage. Following the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted motions to dismiss the property owners, the city, and the mayor, finding "no evidence" that "either one of these parties has any liability." During the presentation of her case in defense, Bowles submitted photographs which, in contrast to those submitted by plaintiff (to which Bowles did not object), showed the stop sign obscured by foliage. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court found Bowles to be 100 percent at fault and entered judgment for damages and costs solely against Bowles.
Bowles appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding her at fault. She argued that the stop sign was not visible and that the proximate cause of the accident was the failure to maintain and assure the sign's visibility. In her argument, she asserted that the dismissal of other parties did not preclude the assessment of fault as against them.
The Court of Appeals declined to find trial court error in determining Bowles at fault, but found that the trial court "should have assessed the percentage of the fault against the party or parties responsible for the stop sign and the obstruction," and that fault percentage could be allocated to the city, the mayor, and the adjacent property owners even though they had been dismissed and even though Bowles did not plead a nonparty defense. 523 N.E.2d at 461.
Following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals, Tatom petitioned for transfer. He contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals erroneously a) ruled that named parties in a comparative fault action can revert to nonparty status; b) ruled that the defendant did not bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense, and c) held the dismissal of claims as a bar against plaintiff but allowed the remaining defendant to allocate fault against the dismissed defendants.
Bowles responds that the Indiana Comparative Fault Act was enacted to achieve a fair apportionment of fault to all, and that by holding that the dismissed parties reverted to nonparty status, the decision of the Court of Appeals was consistent with the legislative intent of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act.
We find that the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's finding of fault on the part of defendant Bowles. We grant transfer to address whether the Indiana Comparative Fault Act requires that parties dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case remain as nonparty defendants for the purpose of final determination of fault. The answer to this question is not expressly prescribed by the provisions of the Act.
Relevant to our determination are the following sections of the Indiana Comparative Fault Act:
Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-2(a). "Nonparty" means a person who is, or may be, liable to the claimant in part or in whole for the damages claimed but who has not been joined in the action as a defendant by the claimant. A nonparty shall not include the employer of the claimant.
Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-10(a). In an action based on fault, a defendant may assert as a defense that the damages of the claimant were caused in full or in part by a nonparty. Such a defense is referred to in this section as a nonparty defense.
Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-10(b). The burden of proof of a nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the defense. However, nothing in this chapter relieves the claimant of the burden of proving that fault on the part of the defendant or defendants caused, in whole or in part, the damages of the claimant.
Ind.Code Sec. 34-4-33-5(a)(1). The jury shall determine the percentage...
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