Bowman v. Griffith
| Decision Date | 05 October 1892 |
| Citation | 53 N.W. 140,35 Neb. 361 |
| Parties | BOWMAN v. GRIFFITH ET AL. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. When a deed, which is beneficial in its character to the grantee named therein, is properly acknowledged and recorded, the presumption of law is that it was delivered by the grantor and accepted by the grantee.
2. Where a deed beneficial to the grantee recites that it is executed for the purpose of correcting an error in a prior deed between the same parties, the record thereof is evidence of the facts therein recited.
3. Where a claim to real estate can be sustained only upon the ground that the person asserting it is a subsequent purchaser in good faith, such person is required to show affirmatively that he purchased without notice of the equities of another, and relying upon the apparent ownership of his grantor.
4. On the evidence in the record, held, that the defendant is not an innocent purchaser for value.
5. Statements of an agent, with authority to collect rents and care for the property of his principal, will not be received in disparagement of the title of the latter, so as to work an estoppel in favor of one who purchased from a stranger claiming adversely to such principal.
6. One who accepts a quitclaim deed from his grantor is bound, at his peril, to ascertain what equities, if any, exist against his title.
Appeal from district court, Lancaster county; FIELD, Judge.
Action by John W. Bowman against Oliver K. Griffith and W. C. Griffith to quiet title to certain land. W. C. Griffith filed an answer disclaiming any interest in the property. Judgment for Oliver K. Griffith. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.G. M. Lambertson, for appellant.
Chas. O. Whedon, for appellees.
This action was begun in the district court of Lancaster county by the plaintiff to quiet the title, as against defendants, to the N. W. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 of section 26, township 11 N., of range 6, in said county. From the pleadings and proofs it appears that plaintiff claims title through the following conveyances: (1) Patent from the United States to John Brown August 1, 1868, filed for record July 1,1871. (2) John Brown to Thomas Hyde, warranty deed, July 5, 1869, filed for record August 18, 1869. (3) Thomas Hyde to Reddington Stanhope, warranty deed, May 22, 1883, filed for record May 26, 1883. (4) Reddington Stanhope to F. M. Hall, quitclaim deed, July 21, 1883, filed for record July 23, 1883. (5) F. M. Hall to A. B. Smith, warranty deed, July 21, 1884, filed for record August 5, 1884. (6) A. B. Smith to J. W. Bowman, plaintiff, warranty deed, September 21, 1885, filed for record September 23, 1885. The defendant W. C. Griffith filed a disclaimer in the district court, but the other defendant, Oliver K. Griffith, disputes plaintiff's claim, and by way of cross bill asks to have the title to the property in controversy quieted in him. He claims title through the following conveyances: (1) Patent, United States to John Brown, August 1, 1868, filed for record July 1, 1871. (2) John Brown to Hagleton S. Moore, warranty deed, December 8, 1868, filed for record December 18, 1868. (3) Hagleton S. Moore to Oliver K. Griffith, defendant, warranty deed, January 14, 1880, filed for record January 19, 1880. The first question presented by the record is whether the deed from Brown to Moore, through which defendant claims, includes the property in controversy. That deed, as appears from the above statement, was filed for record long before the execution of the deed from Brown to Hyde; hence it is apparent that, if sufficient to pass the title to the grantee therein, Hyde could acquire no title by his deed. According to the description in the deed in question, the property conveyed by Brown to Moore is “the N. W. 1/4 and the S. W. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 of section 26,” etc. The description, we think, does not include the property in controversy. The said deed on its face purports to convey 200 acres, to-wit, all of the N. W. 1/4 of the section aforesaid, and the S. W. 1/4 of the N. E. 1/4 thereof. It is evident, therefore, that the record of said deed was not notice of any equitable claim that Moore may have had to said property at the time of the conveyance by Brown to Hyde; hence, if the latter was a bona fide purchaser within the true definition of the term, he acquired a good title thereto as against Moore and the defendant who claims through him. In Coggswell v. Griffith, 23 Neb. 334, 36 N. W. Rep. 538, on the evidence in the record, it was held that Brown had sold to Moore the W. 1/2 of the N. E. 1/4 of said section, including the land in controversy, and intended to convey the same to him, but, by mutual mistake, the description above quoted was inserted in the deed, instead of the land intended to be conveyed thereby. That case was decided upon evidence not before us now; hence, although apparently relied upon by both plaintiff and defendants, cannot be said to be authority in this.
The question is, therefore, on the record of this case, what are the equities of Moore and his grantees in the subject of the controversy? This brings us to the consideration of an instrument not enumerated in either list of conveyances comprising the respective chains of title. The defendant, having laid the necessary foundation therefor, introduced in evidence the record of a subsequent deed from Brown to Hyde, dated May 15, 1870, and filed for record the same day. Said deed is in the usual form, and the property conveyed is the S. W. 1/4 of the N. W. 1/4 of section 26, etc., and appears to have been made for the purpose of correcting an error in the prior deed between the same parties, dated July 5, 1869, under which the plaintiff claims. Among others it contains the following recital: “This deed is made to correct a mistake made by the above-named grantors to the above-named grantee, dated the 5th day of July A. D., 1869, whereby the above-named grantors conveyed to said grantees the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section twenty-six aforesaid, together with other portions of said section in said deed described; whereas, the lands intended to be conveyed thereby were, and are, the east half of the northeast quarter of section twenty-six aforesaid, and the south half of the northwest quarter of section aforesaid, the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section twenty-six in said deed described having been previously conveyed to H. S. Moore by deed dated the 8th day of December, 1868.” It is argued by plaintiff that the above record does no prove the error alleged in the first deed, inasmuch as...
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...acts, or both combined, is sufficient.'" That a deed has been recorded by the grantor is prima facie evidence of delivery, Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N.W. 140; Gustin v. Michelson, 55 Neb. 22, 75 N.W. 123, and there may be a valid delivery of a deed notwithstanding that the grantee......
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...grantee is voluntarily executed and placed upon record by the grantor, the acceptance of the grantee will be presumed. (Bowman v. Griffith, 35 Neb. 361, 53 N.W. 140; Issitt v. Dewey, 47 Neb. 196, 66 N.W. 288.) And principle the delivery of a mortgage by the mortgagor, or by his direction, a......
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