Bowne v. Nassau County

Decision Date09 June 1975
Citation37 N.Y.2d 75,332 N.E.2d 323,371 N.Y.S.2d 449
Parties, 332 N.E.2d 323 In the Matter of Edna BOWNE et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent. In the Matter of Helen COLVIN et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent. In the Matter of Myron DI PASQUALE et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

John F. O'Shaughnessy, County Atty. (William S. Norden, Natale C. Tedone and James N. Gallagher, Mineola, of counsel), for appellants.

William D. Friedman, New York City, for respondents.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Jesse J. Fine and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law.

PER CURIAM.

Section 256 of the Executive Law, Consol.Laws, c. 18 (L.1971, ch. 387) places the Probation Department of Nassau County und the supervision and control of the county executive. Prior to the effective date of this statute, this power had been exercised by the judiciary originally on the local level and later by the Judicial Conference. The petitioners, employees of the department, claim that the current statute violates article VI of the State Constitution. The question is whether the Probation Department is Constitutionally part of the unified court system as defined in section 28 of article VI of the Constitution. Special Term held that it was not, and the Appellate Division reversed. We have concluded that the order of Special Term should be reinstated.

The only explicit reference to the Probation Department in the Constitution is found in section 5 of article XVII, which empowers the Legislature to 'provide for the maintenance and support of institutions for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of crime and for systems of probation and parole of persons convicted of crime.' The judiciary's past authority over the Nassau County Probation Department derived solely from legislation (Code Crim.Proc., § 938--d) which vested in the Judges of the County and Family Court power to appoint directors of probation and certify payrolls for employe of the Probation Department. Then, in 1962, the Constitution was amended to provide for a unified court system (N.Y.Const. art. VI). Central to constitutional reorganization of the court system was the concept that the general supervisory powers formerly granted to individual courts should pass to the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference (N.Y.Const. art. VI, § 28). Thereafter we recognized that the Probation Departments were subject to the supervision and control of the board rather than the individual courts designated by statute (Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 292, 279 N.Y.S.2d 345, 226 N.E.2d 174; McCoy v. Helsby, 28 N.Y.2d 790, 321 N.Y.S.2d 902, 270 N.E.2d 722). In neither of these cases however did we consider or decide whether the Probation Department is for all purpose Constitutionally a part of the unified court system.

In Kleinman, 19 N.Y.2d p. 295, 279 N.Y.S.2d p. 347, 226 N.E.2d p. 175 the New York City Labor Department had certified the collective bargaining agent for all probation officer trainees and probation officers employed in the courts in New York City. This was done pursuant to an agreement between the Administrative Board and the city, and the petitioners claimed that this was an invalid delegation of the board's constitutional power of 'administrative supervision' of the 'court system'. We held that it was not since '(i)n collective bargaining with court personnel on salaries and other money benefits, where the City of New York is to pay the cost, both the board and the city are jointly concerned in any negotiation.' By approaching the issue in this matter we affirmed the board's constitutional power to administer the Probation Department as part of the 'court system' of which it was legislatively then a part.

This does not mean however that these agencies are...

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15 cases
  • People v. Correa
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • February 23, 2010
    ...passed to the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 28) ( see Matter of Bowne v. County of Nassau, 37 N.Y.2d 75, 79, 371 N.Y.S.2d 449, 332 N.E.2d 323 [1975] ), composed of the Chief Judge of theCourt of Appeals and the Presiding Justice of each of the Appe......
  • Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • May 14, 1997
    ...court documents. Id. at § 390.50(1). Although not formally located within the judicial branch, Bowne v. County of Nassau, 37 N.Y.2d 75, 371 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452, 332 N.E.2d 323 (1975), New York statutes intimately tie the probation department to the sentencing process.4 The dissent suggests th......
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    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 21, 1975
    ...of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 132, 83 N.E. 693, 696; Matter of Bowne v. County of Nassau, 37 N.Y.2d 75, 371 N.Y.S.2d 449, 332 N.E.2d 323 (dec. June 9, Thus, it is undoubtedly within the competence of the Legislature to define the nature and cont......
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    ...granted to the individual courts should pass to the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference (Bowne v. Nassau County, 37 N.Y.2d 75, 371 N.Y.S.2d 449, 332 N.E.2d 323). The 1978 amendments further vested the Chief Administrative Judge with complete authority to oversee the Unified Cour......
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