Boyd v. Anderson

Decision Date09 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 3:01-CV-0440 AS.,3:01-CV-0440 AS.
Citation265 F.Supp.2d 952
PartiesRussell Ernest BOYD and David Roberts, Plaintiffs, v. Rondel ANDERSON, Edward Cohn, Barry Nothstine, Thomas P. Steepro, Edward Buss, Vince Forestieri, Gerald Daniels, John Barnes, James Cadwell, Robert Roose, Howard Wilson, Kimbula D. Frierson, Patricia Mundt, Larry Shadley, Steve Hough, Emerson Mccoy, George Payne, Doug Ayres, Gus Carlson, Dale Monroe, Linda Steele, William H. Hartley, Mcarthur Fortney, James Wynn, Joelyn Mick, Charles Penfold, Charles E. Whelan, and Ronda Vega, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

Russell Ernest Boyd, Michigan City, IN, pro se.

David James Roberts, Pendleton, IN, pro se

David A. Arthur, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

Russell Boyd and David Roberts filed a complaint in the LaPorte Superior Court, alleging that Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") officials violated their federally protected rights while they were confined at the Indiana State Prison ("ISP"). They also allege that the defendants violated rights protected by Indiana's constitution and statutes and by IDOC policy. The defendants removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). At the time the complaint was removed, it was not screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Pursuant to § 1915A(a), "(t)he court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." This court screens prisoner complaints brought in this court before they are filed. But even after a complaint is filed, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the court to sua sponte dismiss a prisoner suit at any time if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Because this complaint has already been filed, this court will review it pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court requires only two elements: First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of the right acted under color of state law. These elements may be put forth in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing the complaint on a motion to dismiss, no more is required from plaintiffs allegations of intent than what would satisfy Rule 8's notice pleading minimum and Rule 9(b)'s requirement that motive and intent be pleaded generally.

Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (citations, quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

This complaint is one hundred and three typed pages in length and contains four hundred and nine rhetorical paragraphs. The plaintiffs also attach sixty-three exhibits to the complaint, and some of these documents are quite lengthy. This complaint is one of the longest pro se prisoner complaints ever filed in this court, and the plaintiffs did an excellent job in drafting their complaint.

Because the plaintiffs allege that state officials violated rights protected by the United States Constitution, this court construes their complaint as bringing an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress the violation of federally secured rights by a person acting under color of state law. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1984). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that a person acting under color of state law committed the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The first inquiry in every § 1983 case is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).

I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLAIMS

In the portion of their complaint, entitled "Declaratory Relief (paragraphs 203 through 277), and in the section entitled "Injunctive Relief (paragraphs 278 through 314), the plaintiffs seek extensive injunctive and declaratory relief based on the United States Constitution and on Indiana constitutional and statutory provisions. The Eleventh Amendment, however, precludes this court from entertaining the plaintiffs' request to interpret Indiana's constitution and statutes.

"A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law ... does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 911, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The court will dismiss the plaintiffs' state law claims for injunctive and declaratory relief without prejudice to their right to refile those claims in state court.

II. STATE LAW DAMAGE CLAIMS

Because the plaintiffs filed this complaint in state court asserting both federal and state law claims, this court will treat their state law damage claims as supplemental claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under section 1367, which codified the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, federal courts, unless otherwise provided by statute, "have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action ... that they form part of the same case or controversy."

Where this court dismisses a federal law claim brought by the plaintiffs, it will also dismiss state law claims that are supplemental to that particular federal claim, without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to refile the supplemental claim in state court. This court will retain jurisdiction over the state law claims that are supplemental to federal claims it finds to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and will allow the plaintiffs to pursue these supplemental state law claims to the extent that they have met the procedural prerequisites established by state statute to bring such claims against the defendants.

III. DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AGAINST RUSSELL BOYD

Section IV of the complaint, entitled "Cause of Action," (paragraphs 35 through 108) presents the plaintiffs' legal claims. Section V of the complaint (paragraphs 109 through 202) states the facts on which the plaintiffs rely to support their legal claims.

Paragraphs 35 through 56 and paragraphs 65, 98, 99, and 101 deal with events arising from disciplinary charges filed by Correctional Officers Larry Shadley, Steve Hough, Emerson McCoy, and Gus Carlson against Mr. Boyd, charging him with possession of a security key. Mr. Boyd alleges that these defendants planted a key in his bed in retaliation for his having been among the inmate plaintiffs in Lee v. De-Bruyn, 3:95cv370 RM. He asserts that they then searched his living area based on a bogus "snitch note," recovered the key, and charged him with possession of escape paraphernalia. The conduct adjustment board ("CAB") found Mr. Boyd guilty, demoted him in good time earning class, took away earned good time credits, and placed him in disciplinary segregation.

Mr. Boyd appealed the board's finding of guilt through the IDOC's administrative appeals process described in Markham v. Clark 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir.1992). Exhibit 19 establishes that Mr. Boyd was partially successful in his appeal. On August 4, 1999, ISP Superintendent Rondle Anderson reduced the charge against Mr. Boyd from possession of escape paraphernalia to any unauthorized possession, removal, or relocation of property, modified the segregation sentence to time served, restored Mr. Boyd to Credit Class I, and reduced the loss of credit time from one hundred and eighty days to ninety days.

In paragraphs 35 and 40 of the complaint, Mr. Boyd alleges that defendants Shadley, Hough, McCoy, and Carlson planted a key in his bed area. In Paragraphs 41, 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the complaint, he alleges that the members of the CAB, Vince Forestieri, Gerald Daniels, and John Barnes denied him procedural due process at the disciplinary hearing on this charge.

Indiana prisoners have a protected liberty interest in good-time credits and are therefore entitled to due process before the state revokes those credits. Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.2001). The due process required in a prison disciplinary hearing where a prisoner loses good time credits is set forth Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) and Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), and entails (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present evidence; (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision; and (4) "some evidence" to support the decision. In some circumstances, a prisoner may...

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    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
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    ...invalidated either by the state which rendered it, or by a federal court in a proceeding for habeas corpus."); Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 952, 959-60 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (a prisoner's Section 1983 claim for damages based on allegations that prison guards set the prisoner up to receive a......
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6 books & journal articles
  • Boyd v. Anderson.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 27, August 2003
    • August 1, 2003
    ...District Court HYGIENE Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ind. 2003). Prisoners filed a complaint in state court, alleging that state corrections officials had violated their federally-protected rights while they were confined in a state prison. The case was removed to federal court, ......
  • Boyd v. Anderson.
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    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 27, August 2003
    • August 1, 2003
    ...District Court DUE PROCESS CONDITIONS EXERCISE RECREATION ACCESS TO COURTS WORK Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ind. 2003). Prisoners filed a complaint in state court, alleging that state corrections officials had violated their federally-protected rights while they were confined i......
  • Boyd v. Anderson.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 27, August 2003
    • August 1, 2003
    ...District Court LAW LIBRARY VISITS ACCESS TO ATTORNEY Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ind. 2003). Prisoners filed a complaint in state court, alleging that state corrections officials had violated their federally-protected rights while they were confined in a state prison. The case ......
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    • August 1, 2003
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