Johnson v. Rousey

• Decision Date: 19 February 2011
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 10-652-GPM
• Parties: STADFORD R. JOHNSON, IDOC # N78111, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN ROUSEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

STADFORD R. JOHNSON, IDOC # N78111, Plaintiff,

v.KEVIN ROUSEY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 10-652-GPM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dated: February 19, 2011

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Stadford R. Johnson, who is in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act ("ISDPA"), 725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq., and who is confined currently at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center ("Big Muddy"), brings this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. The complaint in this case now is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in relevant part:

(a) Screening.-The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for Dismissal.-On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon whichrelief may be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Though the Court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, "some factual allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff's claim." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Also, courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).¹

Johnson's pro se complaint in this case alleges several violations of Johnson's constitutional rights by IDOC personnel. First, Johnson alleges that on August 19, 2010, Defendant Kevin Rousey, a correctional officer at Big Muddy, subjected Johnson to excessive force. Second, Johnson alleges that Defendants Randy Valdez and Mike Sanders, while sitting on an adjustment committee reviewing disciplinary charges against Johnson on August 26, 2009, improperly recommended that Johnson be sentenced to six months' disciplinary segregation, one month's gym and yard restrictions, and six months' reduction to disciplinary grade C. Johnson claims that Valdez was unfairly biasedagainst him and that Sanders ignored Johnson's requests for a fair disciplinary hearing. Johnson claims also that Defendant John D. Evans, the warden of Big Muddy, approved the allegedly unfair disciplinary sentence recommended for Johnson by Valdez and Sanders. Third, Defendant Sherry Benton, a member of the IDOC's adjustment review board, is alleged by Johnson to have violated his rights by denying administrative appeals Johnson took from denials of grievances that Johnson filed at Big Muddy. Defendant Michael P. Randle, the former director of the IDOC is alleged by Johnson to have violated Johnson's rights by approving Benton's actions.²

The Court turns first to Johnson's claim against Rousey. According to Johnson, Rousey physically picked Johnson up and carried Johnson to the segregation unit at Big Muddy, a charge the Court finds preposterous. However, assuming the truth of Johnson's allegations, the Court nonetheless concludes that Johnson has failed to state a claim for relief. When a prisoner brings an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a court's task "is to determine 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Whitley v. Alters, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). "Whether the defendants' actions were done in a malicious and sadistic manner to cause harm is a strict and fairly high threshold. Factors relevant to [the] inquiry include the nature and extent of the harm, the need for force, the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, andthe extent of the injury inflicted on the prisoner." Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). "Infliction of pain that is 'totally without penological justification' is per se malicious." Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002)). "[N]ot every 'malevolent touch by a prison guard' gives rise to a federal cause of action, even if the use of force in question 'may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers.'" Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Thus, "[t]he use of de minimis force, so long as it 'is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind, ' is not of Eighth Amendment concern." Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10).

In this case Johnson claims that, as a result of Rousey's alleged use of force, Johnson suffered a scar on his wrist. This plainly is a de minimis injury. In Outlaw the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said of an application of force that caused "superficial injuries to [a prisoner's] hand" that,

Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to [the prisoner], a rational jury could draw one of only two possible conclusions: that the incident was an accident, or that [the guard] deliberately and perhaps unnecessarily applied a relatively minor amount of force to achieve a legitimate security objective. Neither scenario would involve a use of force that was "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."

259 F.3d at 839 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). The absence of a serious injury in this case is not the end of the Court's Eighth Amendment inquiry, of course. A prisoner claiming excessive force need not establish serious bodily injury, for "[o]therwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. See also Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1993) (allegations that a prison guard beat an unresisting prisoner and kneed the prisoner in the groin stated an Eighth Amendment claim). However, Johnson's minor injury suggests that Rousey did not act maliciously and sadistically. See Lunsford, 17 F.3d at 1582 ("This type of minor injury further supports our conclusion that at most this incident was a de minimis use of force not intended to cause pain or injury to the inmate."). Thus, "in cases where it's debatable whether the use of force was legitimate or malicious, the lack of serious injury may tip the scales against the prisoner." Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case the use of force at issue was occasioned by the fact that Johnson was refusing to obey Rousey's order for Johnson to report to segregation. "When an order is given to an inmate there are only so many choices available to the correctional officer. If it is an order that requires action by the institution, and the inmate cannot be persuaded to obey the order, some means must be used to compel compliance, such as... physical force.... Orders given must be obeyed. Inmates cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will obey, and when they will obey them." Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984). Rousey's conduct in bringing Johnson to segregation, after Johnson refused to go voluntarily, was a use of minor force to serve a legitimate security objective, not malice or sadism. Johnson's claim against Rousey will be dismissed.³

The Court turns next to Johnson's claims against Valdez, Sanders, and Evans concerning the disciplinary proceeding against Johnson challenged in this lawsuit. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on a claim of a violation of the right to due process, a prisoner must show that he or she possesses a protected liberty or property interest and has been deprived of that interest without due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); Kentucky Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). It is the case that certain due process safeguards apply in prison disciplinary proceedings in which loss of good-time credit is part of the possible punishment. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). However, because Johnson is in IDOC custody pursuant to a civil commitment under the ISDPA, he does not earn good-time credit. See People v. Shiro, 287 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ill. 1972) ("Those persons who are adjudged sexually dangerous under the [ISDPA] are committed to the care of the Director of Corrections, but this does not imply that they are to be treated as criminal prisoners."). Also, Johnson's disciplinary sentence was six months' segregation, one month's gym and yard...