Boyd v. Bulala
| Decision Date | 12 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 88-2055,88-2056,s. 88-2055 |
| Citation | 877 F.2d 1191 |
| Parties | Helen C. BOYD; Roger E. Boyd; Veronica Lynn Boyd; by her parents and next friends, Helen Boyd & Roger E. Boyd, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. R.A. BULALA, M.D., Defendant-Appellant, Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Virginia Trial Lawyers Association; Distressed Parents Together; Consumer Federation of America Medical Society of Virginia, Amici Curiae. Helen C. BOYD; Roger E. Boyd; Veronica Lynn Boyd, by her parents and next friends, Helen Boyd & Roger E. Boyd, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; R.A. Bulala, M.D., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
A.E. Dick Howard, Phillip C. Stone (Ronald D. Hodges, Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, Harrisonburg, Va., Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., Stuart, Va., Gregory E. Lucyk, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendants-appellants.
Rosemarie Annunziata (Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C., William O.P. Snead, III, Fairfax, Va., J. Randolph Parker, Tucker, Parker & Beskin, Charlottesville, Va., on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
(Bill Wagner, Jeffrey R. White, Fred D. Smith, Jr., Minor & Smith, Richmond, Va., on brief), for amici curiae, The Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, Va. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Consumer Federation of America, Distressed Parents Together.
(Allen C. Goolsby, III, Patricia M. Schwarzschild, Robert Acosta-Lewis, Timothy A. Hartin, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Va., on brief), for amicus curiae, the Medical Soc. of Va.
, for amicus curiae, State of Md.
(John R. Bolton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert S. Greenspan, Silver Spring, Md., Scott R. McIntosh, Appellate Staff, Washington, D.C., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, on brief), for amicus curiae, U.S. in support of defendants-appellants.
Before WINTER, HALL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
This medical malpractice action against Dr. R.A. Bulala arose out of his mismanagement of the birth of Veronica Boyd, now deceased. Veronica obtained a verdict for $1,850,000 in compensatory damages and a verdict for $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Her mother, Helen Boyd, obtained a verdict for $1,575,000 in compensatory damages and a separate verdict for $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Her father, Roger Boyd, obtained a verdict for $1,175,000 in compensatory damages and her mother and father jointly obtained a verdict for $1,700,000 for Veronica's medical expenses until she reached the age of 18. 1 The doctor and the Commonwealth of Virginia, which intervened in the proceedings, appeal.
One of the principal issues in these appeals is whether plaintiffs' recovery, in the aggregate or in part, should be limited to $750,000, the Virginia cap on recovery in an action for medical malpractice effective when the malpractice in this case occurred. See Va.Code Ann. Sec. 8.01-581.15 (1984). 2 The district court held that the cap unconstitutionally denied plaintiffs their right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Federal and Virginia Constitutions, and therefore declined to apply it. The doctor and the Commonwealth contend that the cap is constitutionally valid, but plaintiffs assert that it is unconstitutional on the ground assigned by the district court and also for other reasons. Subsequent to oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of Sec. 8.01-581.15 under both the Virginia and Federal Constitutions. See Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, Inc., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). In light of this development, we view as settled the constitutionality of the cap under the Virginia Constitution. Moreover, we agree with the Supreme Court of Virginia that the cap offends no provision of the Federal Constitution.
There are a number of other issues which require decision as well. Some of them turn on Virginia state law where we think the law is settled and we are competent to apply it. Others turn on state law where there is no definitive adjudication by the Supreme Court of Virginia and where the decisions of Virginia nisi prius courts are in conflict. We therefore decide as much as we are able to decide authoritatively and certify to the Supreme Court of Virginia those unsettled questions of state law which must necessarily be resolved in order to formulate a final decision in these appeals.
Specifically, we hold that according to settled state law Dr. Bulala may, under the evidence in this case, be vicariously liable for the negligence of the hospital's nurses and that the jury was properly instructed in this regard. We also hold that Veronica's father may recover for the infliction of emotional distress even though he suffered no actual physical injury, and that Virginia law allows the recovery of punitive damages in this case.
With regard to issues where there is not settled state law, we certify the questions of whether in applying the cap where there are two or more plaintiffs entitled to recover as a result of medical malpractice, the cap applies individually to each plaintiff or overall to two or more plaintiffs having causes of action arising from the same act or acts of malpractice, and of how, if the cap does apply to all or any combination of plaintiffs' claims, it is to be apportioned among them. We also certify the related questions of whether the cap applies to an action for infliction of emotional distress and whether the cap applies to punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. In regard to the recovery by Veronica, we certify the questions of whether Veronica is entitled to recover for loss of enjoyment of life as an element of compensatory damages and whether she is entitled to recover for lost earning capacity as an element of compensatory damages when the evidence shows that had she survived, she would never have developed beyond the mental age of one year. Finally, we certify the question of the effect under Virginia law of Veronica's death after verdict, but before judgment on the verdict, on her recovery for compensatory damages and on her parents' recovery for future medical expenses when her death established beyond peradventure of doubt that those expenses would not be incurred. Specifically, did the district court correctly enter judgment on these verdicts pursuant to Va.Code Ann. Sec. 8.01-21 (1984) or should Veronica's suit have been converted to a wrongful death action pursuant to Va.Code Ann. Secs. 8.01-25 and 8.01-56 (1984)?
We begin with a brief overview of the evidence in this case, noting that we will discuss additional relevant facts in conjunction with our consideration of the various contentions to which they relate.
The facts are not materially in dispute. Dr. Bulala, a board-eligible obstetrician and gynecologist, undertook the care and treatment of Helen Boyd on the occasion of her second pregnancy. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of January 31, 1982 Dr. Bulala received a telephone call from a nurse at Clinch Valley Community Hospital notifying him that Mrs. Boyd had been admitted in active labor. Although Mrs. Boyd's labor was almost three weeks premature, Dr. Bulala did not proceed to the hospital to conduct an independent evaluation of her condition or to supervise the nursing staff personally. Instead, he elected to remain at home, some twenty minutes away, and delegate the monitoring of Mrs. Boyd's labor to the night nursing staff. Indeed, Dr. Bulala had a routine order that, unless there were complications, he was not to be summoned to the hospital for an off-hours delivery until "crowning," the stage of labor at which the baby's head reaches the vaginal opening. In accordance with his order, the nurses did not notify Dr. Bulala when Mrs. Boyd entered the second stage of labor at 7:00 a.m.
At some point following Mrs. Boyd's admission to the hospital, probably within the hour or two before birth, the fetus suffered acute distress. Because they had failed to monitor Mrs. Boyd properly, however, the nurses did not detect the emergency until 7:45 a.m., when they discovered that the fetal heart rate was well below normal. Some fifteen minutes later, a nurse called Dr. Bulala, still at home, and informed him for the first time of the complications surrounding Mrs. Boyd's labor. Shortly thereafter, the nurses rushed Mrs. Boyd to the delivery room where she gave birth to her severely asphyxiated baby, Veronica, before Dr. Bulala could arrive.
Because of a prenatal oxygen deficiency, Veronica suffered from a number of grave birth defects, including seizures, cerebral palsy, and mental retardation, which in turn led to feeding difficulties, recurrent pneumonia, and a danger of bone deformation. Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F.Supp. 915, 917-18 (W.D.Va.1987). About a month-and-a-half after trial, before the district court had ruled on any post-trial motions, Veronica Boyd died.
We address first plaintiffs' contentions regarding the validity of Sec. 8.01-581.15 under the Virginia Constitution. Plaintiffs assert that the cap denies the right of trial by jury and violates the separation of powers, anti-discrimination, and special legislation clauses of the Virginia Constitution. See Va. Const. art. I Sec. 11; art. III Sec. 1; art. IV Sec. 14. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of...
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