Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 20109,20109
• Citation: 414 S.E.2d 877,186 W.Va. 720
• Parties: , 60 USLW 2556 Mark A. ROBINSON, Individually and Julia A. Robinson, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Mark A. Robinson, II, an Infant, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a West Virginia Corporation, and Kanoj K. Biswas, M.D., Defendants Below; Kanoj K. Biswas, M.D., Defendant Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 877

414 S.E.2d 877

186 W.Va. 720, 60 USLW 2556

Mark A. ROBINSON, Individually and Julia A. Robinson Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Mark A. Robinson, II, an Infant Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a West Virginia Corporation, and Kanoj K. Biswas, M.D., Defendants Below; Kanoj K. Biswas, M.D., Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 20109.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 25, 1991.

Decided Dec. 20, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, courts must exercise due restraint, in recognition of the principle of the separation of powers in government among the judicial, legislative and executive branches. [ W.Va. Const. art. V, § 1.] Every reasonable construction must be resorted to by the courts in order to sustain constitutionality, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislative enactment in question. Courts are not concerned with questions relating to legislative policy. The general powers of the legislature, within constitutional limits, are almost plenary. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the negation of legislative power must appear beyond reasonable doubt.' Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965)." Syl. pt. 2, West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System v. Dodd, 183 W.Va. 544, 396 S.E.2d 725 (1990).

2. " ' "Where economic rights are concerned, we look to see whether the classification is a rational one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors whether it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution, which is our equal protection clause." Syllabus Point 7, [as modified,] Atchinson v. Erwin, W.Va. , 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983).' Syllabus Point 4, as modified, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., W.Va. , 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984)." Syl. pt. 4, Gibson v. West Virginia Department of Highways, 185 W.Va. 214, 406 S.E.2d 440 (1991).

3. "When legislation either substantially impairs vested rights or severely limits existing procedural remedies permitting court adjudication, thereby implicating the certain remedy provision of article III, section 17 of the Constitution of West Virginia, the legislation will be upheld under that provision if, first, a reasonably effective alternative remedy is provided by the legislation or, second, if no such alternative remedy is provided, the purpose of the alteration or repeal of the existing cause of action or remedy is to eliminate or curtail a clear social or economic problem, and the alteration or repeal of the existing cause of action or remedy is a reasonable method of achieving such purpose." Syl. pt. 5, Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 185 W.Va. 684, 408 S.E.2d 634 (1991).

4. The language of the "reexamination" clause of the constitutional right to a jury trial, W.Va. Const. art. III, § 13, does not apply to the legislature, fixing in advance the amount of recoverable damages in all cases of the same type, but, instead, applies only to the judiciary, acting "in any [particular] case."

5. W.Va.Code, 55-7B-8, as amended, which provides a $1,000,000 limit or "cap" on the amount recoverable for a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action is constitutional. It does not violate the state constitutional equal protection, special legislation, state constitutional substantive due process, "certain remedy," or right to jury trial provisions. W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10; W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 39; W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10; W.Va. Const. art. III, § 17; and W.Va. Const. art. III, § 13, respectively.

6. W.Va.Code, 55-7B-8, as amended, which provides that "the maximum amount recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss" in a medical professional liability action "against a health care provider" is $1,000,000, applies as one overall limit to the aggregated claims of all plaintiffs against a health care provider, rather than applying to each plaintiff separately.

Sprague W. Hazard, Charles F. Johns, Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, for appellant.

William S. Druckman, Lewis, Ciccarello & Friedberg, Charleston, for appellees.

James A. McKowen, Hunt & Wilson, Charleston, for amici curiae West Virginia Trial Lawyers Ass'n and Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America.

Karen Speidel Rodgers, Kay, Casto, Chaney, Love & Wise, Charleston, for amicus curiae West Virginia State Medical Ass'n.

McHUGH, Justice:

The key issue in this appeal from a judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs is the constitutionality, vel non, of the $1,000,000 "cap" on the amount recoverable for a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action provided by W.Va.Code, 55-7B-8, as amended. We conclude that such "cap" is constitutional and, therefore, reverse the contrary ruling of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. On the other hand, we conclude that all of the other assignments of error by Dr. Biswas, the appellant, fail to establish reversible error and, therefore, we affirm the rulings pertaining to those assignments of error. ¹ I.

Mark A. Robinson, II, an infant, has suffered permanent and total brain damage. His life expectancy is, however, normal. The trial theory of his parents on his behalf as the plaintiffs in this medical professional liability action was that the brain damage was caused by a lack of oxygen to his brain during the lengthy labor and the forceps delivery performed negligently by the appellant, Dr. Biswas, in July, 1987. Mark A. Robinson, II also has certain congenital cardiovascular defects. The primary defense of Dr. Biswas, an obstetrician/gynecologist, was that these congenital defects caused the brain damage in question.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The damages awarded, all of which were compensatory, were as follows. Mark A. Robinson, II: $10,000,000 for future medical and nursing costs and costs of care; $750,000 for future lost earnings; $2,500,000 for past, present and future loss of enjoyment of life and other noneconomic damages. Mark A. Robinson (father): $1,000,000 for noneconomic damages. Julia A. Robinson (mother): $1,000,000 for noneconomic damages. The trial court, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, denied Dr. Biswas' various post-trial motions and entered judgment for the plaintiffs for the total compensatory damages of $15,250,000.

Based upon the constitutionally valid $1,000,000 statutory "cap" on the amount recoverable for a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action, we uphold a total damage award to plaintiff Mark A. Robinson, II in the amount of $11,750,000, consisting of $10,750,000 for economic damages and $1,000,000 for recoverable noneconomic loss.

II.

A. The Act

Effective on and after June 6, 1986, ² the legislature enacted the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act of 1986, W.Va.Code, 55-7B-1 to 55-7B-11, as amended ("the Act"). The legislature set forth an elaborate statement of its findings and purpose for the Act. The overriding concern of the legislature was to encourage and facilitate the provision of the best health care services to the citizens of this state. W.Va.Code, 55-7B-1 [1986]. The legislature found that in recent years the cost of professional liability insurance for health care providers has risen dramatically and that the nature and extent of coverage concomitantly has diminished, to the detriment of the injured and health care providers. Id. Therefore, to provide for a comprehensive, integrated resolution, the legislature determined that reforms in three areas must be enacted together: in (1) the common-law and statutory rights of the citizens to compensation for injury or death in medical professional liability cases; in (2) the regulation of rate making and other health care liability insurance industry practices; and in (3) the authority of medical licensing boards to regulate effectively and to discipline health care providers. Id. ³ One component of the Act is a limit or "cap" of $1,000,000 on the amount recoverable for a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action against a health care provider. The language of W.Va.Code, 55-7B-8, as amended, is as follows: "In any medical professional liability action brought against a health care provider, the maximum amount recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss shall not exceed one million dollars and the jury may be so instructed." A "noneconomic loss" is defined as "losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief." W.Va.Code, 55-7B-2(g) [1986].

B. General Principles on Constitutionality

This $1,000,000 statutory "cap" on a noneconomic loss in a medical professional liability action is challenged here as violative of several state constitutional provisions, namely, the equal protection, special legislation, due process, "certain remedy" and jury trial provisions set forth in, respectively, W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10 (implied), W.Va. Const. art. VI, § 39, W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10, W.Va. Const. art. III, § 17 and W.Va. Const. art. III, § 13. This Court concludes that this statutory "cap" does not violate any of these state constitutional provisions. ⁴

In addressing a claim that legislation is unconstitutional, we start with the fundamental precept that the powers of the legislature are almost plenary: "The Constitution of West Virginia being a restriction of power rather than a grant thereof, the legislature has the authority to enact any measure not inhibited thereby." Syl. pt. 1, Foster v. Cooper, 155...