Boyd v. Cress

• Decision Date: 10 February 1956
• Citation: 46 Cal.2d 164,293 P.2d 37
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Guy BOYD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John CRESS, Defendant and Appellant. Sac. 6595.

Page 37

293 P.2d 37

46 Cal.2d 164

Guy BOYD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John CRESS, Defendant and Appellant.

Sac. 6595.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 10, 1956.

McDougall & Fitzwilliam, Robert H. Memering and Leo Fitzwilliam, Sacramento, for appellant.

J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein, San Francisco, and Reginald M. Watt, Chico, for respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

Defendant Cress appeals from a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff for personal injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident.

On September 2, 1951, Cress and the plaintiff Boyd left Chico, California, in Cress' automobile for the purpose of driving to Fall River, California, in order to make plans for deer hunting trips later in the year. Cress drove his car and Boyd accompanied him as a nonpaying passenger. Sometime between 2 and 3 o'clock on the morning of September 3, after driving four or five hours, Cress steered his automobile over to the side of the highway and stopped, apparently for the purpose of examining the tires and to stretch and relax momentarily. Boyd stepped out on the right side of the vehicle, leaving the right door in a 'locked open' position. Standing next to the door outside of the automobile, Boyd was struck by the door when the car suddenly rolled backward a few feet. Cress was sitting in the driver's seat at this point but he was unable to stop the car before the open door struck Boyd causing him in turn to spin around the door and to strike the right front bumper injuring his shoulder. After the accident Boyd and Cress resumed their trip, driving first to Fall River, as originally contemplated, and then returning to Chico.

Boyd commenced this action on January 7, 1952, alleging that Cress negligently failed to set the brakes on the automobile, allowing it to roll backward and to strike him while he stood on the adjacent ground. The trial court found generally for the plaintiff, awarding $500 general and $1,300 special damages.

Cress' sole contention is that the foregoing facts show that Boyd was a 'guest' at the time of the injury within the meaning of section 403 of the Vehicle Code and for that reason has no right of recovery. It was stipulated by the parties that Boyd was a guest at the outset of their trip together. Hence the controlling question is whether Boyd remained a guest within the meaning of the statute after he stepped out of the automobile.

Section 403 provides that 'No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of such vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that such injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of said driver.' Unless it appears that all of the conditions of section 403 are satisfied, the plaintiff is not a guest within the meaning of the statute and the defendant is liable for injuries resulting from his negligence. In order to qualify the plaintiff as a guest it must appear 1) that the plaintiff accepted a 'ride' as a guest, 2) that the ride was 'in' a vehicle upon a highway, and 3) that death or injury was suffered by the guest 'during such ride.' The defendant is entitled to the protection of the statute only if all of the foregoing requirements are satisfied.

It does not appear that Boyd was a guest at the time of the accident. Boyd unquestionably accepted the ride as a guest in a vehicle upon a highway as the statute contemplates. But it does not follow that he suffered the injury 'during such ride.' At the time of the accident, Boyd was entirely removed from Cress' automobile.

The terms 'ride' and 'riding' have been the subject of judicial interpretation in a consistent line of cases in this state. In all instances it has been determined that being in or upon the vehicle at the time of the accident is a necessary element of the 'ride.' In Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.2d 89, at page 94, 98 P.2d 729, at page 732, which applied section 141 3/4 of the Vehicle Act, the predecessor of section 403, the court stated: 'We are likewise of the opinion that a person alighting from an automobile, who is in a position with one foot on the ground and the other on the running board when it so moves cannot be said to be 'riding' in said automobile within the meaning of said statute.' Under such circumstances the court held that the guest statute was not applicable. A similar result was reached in Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal.App.2d 43, 127 P.2d 292, where the plaintiff was injured at the outset of the ride when the defendant negligently permitted the car to roll backwards a few feet as the plaintiff started to enter the automobile. In that case the court stated at page 46 of 53 Cal.App.2d, at page 294 of 127 P.2d that 'In order to claim the benefit of the lessened liability provided by this section the defendant must show that the 'guest' first accepted a ride in a vehicle and was thereafter injured during...