Boyd v. Martin

Decision Date30 April 1872
PartiesA. M. BOYD v. ROSA MARTIN and JOHN MARTIN.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

FROM SHELBY.

Appeal from the decree of the Chancery Court, April Term, 1869. WILLIAM M. SMITH, Ch.

R. J. MORGAN, JARNAGIN & FRAZER, A. M. BOYD for appellant.

STOVALL & FLIPPIN, WRIGHT & MCKISSICK, THORNTON & COLEMAN for appellee.

DEADERICK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

These two causes were consolidated and heard together, in the Chancery Court of Memphis. The defendants are the widow and heir-at-law, of John D. Martin, deceased. One of the bills was filed to enforce the vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase money for a house and lot in the city of Memphis. The other is an attachment bill, for the collection of certain debts, against the said John D. Martin, and in which case an attachment was levied upon the interest of said John D. in the said house and lot and in other property.

The Chancellor directed a sale of the house and lot for the satisfaction of the vendor's lien, and the sale producing more than the balance of the unpaid purchase money, he decreed that after the satisfaction of the costs and the purchase money due upon the house and lot, and the taxes upon the property, that the defendant Rosa, widow of the said John D. Martin, deceased, was entitled to the whole of the surplus for and during her natural life, as dower--that surplus not being equal to or in excess of the value of one-third of the whole property.

The Chancellor further decree that as to debts due to said complainant Boyd, other than that due for purchase money, he could only be let in upon said surplus, after the termination of the widow's life estate therein.

The property, after the filing of the bills, had upon the application of the complainant, been placed in the hands of a receiver, and a small amount of rents had been received. These rents the Chancellor refused to apply towards the liquidation of complainant's debts, and directed that they should be paid, one-third to the widow, and the other two-thirds to the heir-at-law, or his guardian, he being a minor. From this decree the complainant appealed to this Court.

The first question presented is, Did the Chancellor err in decreeing the whole amount of the surplus proceeds of the sale of the house and lot to the widow? The deed to Martin, for the house and lot, reserved upon its face a lien for the purchase money. In such a case the vendee takes the legal title, subject to an express lien for the purchase money due the vendor.

The relation of the parties has been assimilated to that of mortgagor and mortgagee: 2 Heis., 402; yet it does not fall within the provisions of section 2399 of the Code, which gives the widow dower in lands mortgaged or conveyed in trust by the husband to pay debts, if he dies before foreclosure, this being a mere mortgage or conveyance in trust to secure debts, but a retaining of the legal title as a security. The vendor's lien thus retained for unpaid purchase money is superior to the widow's right of dower. She cannot have dower out of so much of such estate as is required to pay the purchase money. Of what, then, may she be endowed? Clearly of so much as belonged to her husband's estate legally or equitably. If the house and lot sold for $1,500 more than was sufficient to pay the vendor's lien, that sum belonged to the estate of Martin, and the widow's dower of one-third is to be taken out of that sum.

To hold that she should take all the surplus of $1,500, would be to disregard the well-settled principle or rule of law, that the widow shall have as dower one-third part of all the lands of which the husband was the legal or equitable owner at the time of his death. The husband was neither the legal or equitable owner of the property until it was paid for; so as that the widow upon his death was entitled to dower out of the whole; but her right to dower is restricted to...

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