Boyd v. SAIF Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 September 1992 |
| Citation | 115 Or.App. 241,837 P.2d 556 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Compensation of Clairrean Boyd, Claimant. Clairrean BOYD, Petitioner, v. SAIF CORPORATION and Discovery Plastics, Respondents. WCB 89-16057; CA A68060. Court of Appeals of Oregon, In Banc |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Roger Ousey, Eugene, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Michael Strooband and Bischoff & Strooband, P.C., Eugene.
John T. Bagg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem. DEITS, Judge.
Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Board finding that her injury was not compensable. The Board adopted the referee's opinion. We reverse and remand.
After leaving work at the end of her shift, claimant went to her car, which was parked in employer's parking lot adjacent to claimant's work place. The parking lot was provided for employees, and claimant had been instructed to park there. When she started to get into her car, her knee twisted, she heard a popping noise and experienced immediate pain. She has had surgery and suffers some permanent impairment.
Claimant filed a claim on two bases: First, her disability was an occupational disease caused by the repetitive pivoting from side to side required by her job as a fabricator; and second, the twisting of her knee in the parking lot was an injury that occurred in the course and scope of her employment. SAIF denied the claim on both theories, and the Board upheld SAIF's denials.
The Board rejected the occupational disease claim on the basis of a medical opinion. Claimant contends that the Board's conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. There were conflicting medical opinions about the genesis of claimant's disability, and the Board's selection of one as opposed to the other was not error. Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or.App. 200, 752 P.2d 312 (1988).
Claimant's second assignment of error is that the Board erred in concluding that her injury was not sufficiently work related to be compensable. The Board adopted the referee's order, which said:
Oregon follows the "going and coming rule" or limitation, which provides that injuries sustained while going to and from work are not compensable. Cope v. West American Ins. Co., 309 Or. 232, 237, 785 P.2d 1050 (1990). However, as noted by the court in Cope, one of the exceptions to the rule is when the injury occurs on the employer's premises, including an employee parking lot. 309 Or. at 238, 785 P.2d 1050.
Montgomery Ward v. Cutter, 64 Or.App. 759, 762, 669 P.2d 1181 (1983). (Citations omitted.)
SAIF argues that because claimant was injured while getting into her car, as opposed to being injured while crossing the lot, or tripping over something in the lot, her injury is not sufficiently work related to be compensable. However, as explained in Cope, employer control of the property is the rationale supporting the parking lot exception. The fact that an injury occurs on employer-controlled premises while the employee is traveling to and from work makes the incident sufficiently work connected.
Cope v. West American Ins. Co., supra, 309 Or. at 239, 785 P.2d 1050. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In this case, employer's control over the parking lot, its instructions to its employees to park there and the fact that claimant was on her way home from work establish the work-connection. See Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp. v. Rodriguez, 97 Or.App. 500, 776 P.2d 588 (1989). We recognize that not all injuries that occur on employer premises are necessarily work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Circumstances may show that the work-connection has been broken. If it is shown that a claimant was engaged in activity of a personal nature, the injury may not be sufficiently work-connected. For example, in Allbee v. SAIF, 45 Or.App. 1027, 1030, 609 P.2d 920 (1980), we held that a claimant who slipped and fell while putting chains on his tires, even though he was in his employer's parking lot, was acting outside the course and scope of employment, because he had left work for the day and was putting chains on for personal benefit. Here, claimant's act of getting into her car at the end of her work shift was not of such a personal nature as to break the work-connection. We conclude that the Board erred in denying the compensability of claimant's injury on the basis that it was not within the course and scope of her employment.
Reversed and remanded.
I agree with the majority that the Board properly rejected claimant's occupational disease claim. Contrary to the majority, I think that the Board also properly rejected her injury claim.
The majority says:
115 Or.App. at 244, 837 P.2d at 557.
There is language in Cope to support that conclusion. However, the Supreme Court's statement of the rule...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Greenblatt v. Symantec Corp. (In re Comp. of Greenblatt)
...relating to the compensability of injuries arising out of and in the course and scope of employment. See, e.g. , Boyd v. SAIF , 115 Or. App. 241, 244, 837 P.2d 556 (1992) (addressing compensability of injury sustained in employer-owned parking lot). But the Supreme Court said in Roberts tha......
-
Norpac Foods, Inc. v. Gilmore
...with employer's parking lot and claimant's injury. On review, the Board reversed the referee's decision, relying on Boyd v. SAIF, 115 Or.App. 241, 244, 837 P.2d 556 (1992), in which the Court of Appeals held that "[t]he fact that an injury occurs on employer-controlled premises while the em......