Boyd v. Smith (In re Will)
| Decision Date | 29 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-CA-01011-SCT, NO. 2019-CA-01012-SCT,2019-CA-01011-SCT |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Last WILL and Testament OF George Ben RATCLIFF, Deceased: Amanda Ratcliff Boyd, George Ben Ratcliff Jr. and John Michael Eaton v. Patricia Diane Ratcliff Smith In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of George Ben Ratcliff, Deceased: Amanda Ratcliff Boyd, George Ben Ratcliff Jr. and John Michael Eaton v. Patricia Diane Ratcliff Smith |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: WAYNE DOWDY, Magnolia
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH M. STINSON, Tylertown
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The case sub judice is an appeal of two matters from the Chancery Court of Walthall County. They have been consolidated here. In the first, Amanda Boyd and George Ben Ratcliff Jr. (George Ben Jr.) filed a complaint challenging an inter vivos gift of real property to Patricia Smith, which ended in the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Smith. Boyd and George Ben Jr. appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in Smith's favor. In the second, the trial court granted summary judgment to Patricia Smith in a will contest filed by Boyd and her brother George Ben Jr. The trial court granted summary judgment pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 91-7-23 (Rev. 2018), which provides a two-year statute of limitations to contest a probated will.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. George Ben Ratcliff Sr. (George Ben Sr.) died on October 15, 2013. Before his death, George Ben Sr. signed a warranty deed conveying all of his real and personal property to his daughter Smith. On November 6, 2014, George Ben Sr.’s other children, Amanda Boyd and George Ben Jr., filed a complaint seeking to set aside the warranty deed. The complaint alleged fraud, duress, undue influence, and incapacity of the grantor. On April 8, 2015, Smith filed a Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of George Ben Ratcliff and for Letters Testamentary, seeking to probate a will created by George Ben Sr. on July 3, 2013. Smith attached a copy of the 2013 will to her Petition for Probate. On April 30, 2015, the chancellor entered an order admitting the 2013 will for probate. Indeed, the chancellor's 2015 order specifically and with detail admitted the 2013 will, and no other, to probate. However, years later, Smith discovered that, inadvertently, she had delivered an original 2009 will to the chancery clerk—instead of the original 2013 will—for "safekeeping," as the chancellor called it in the order admitting the 2013 will for probate.
¶3. On June 6, 2018, Smith filed a motion to dismiss the complaint seeking to set aside the warranty deed, and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Smith claimed that the warranty deed was moot because the 2013 will had been admitted for probate for more than two years without challenge, and the deed and the will conveyed the same property. After the filing of the motion for summary judgment, the clerk of the court notified Smith that the original of the 2013 probated will had not been filed with the clerk. A will from 2009 had been mistakenly filed with the clerk instead of the 2013 will. Smith filed the 2013 will to correct the error. On November 29, 2018, Boyd and George Ben Jr. contested the 2013 will under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-21 (Rev. 2018). The cases were consolidated, and the trial court dismissed the will contest, finding under Section 91-7-23 that the statute of limitations had run and that the will contest was procedurally barred. The trial court also granted summary judgment on the complaint seeking to set aside the warranty deed, finding the issue to be moot because the warranty deed conveyed the same property as the 2013 will. Boyd and George Ben Jr. appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. "The Court applies a de novo standard of review to statutes of limitation." Am. Optical Corp. v. Estate of Rankin , 227 So. 3d 1062, 1067 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2017) (citing Phillips 66 Co. v. Lofton , 94 So. 3d 1051, 1059 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2012) ).
Additionally, the "Court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo." Tippah Cnty. v. LeRose , 283 So. 3d 149, 150 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2019) (citing Miss. Dep't of Revenue v. AT & T Corp. , 202 So. 3d 1207, 1213 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2016) ).
DISCUSSION
¶5. Boyd and George Ben Jr. argue that Smith's failure to join them in the will-probate proceeding amounts to concealed fraud. Additionally, Boyd and George Ben Jr. argue that, as to the will contest, the two-year limitations period did not begin to run on the date the chancellor ordered that the 2013 will be admitted for probate because Smith submitted the wrong original will—the 2009 will—to the chancery clerk for filing.
¶6. Boyd and George Ben Jr. argue that Smith's failure to join them as necessary parties amounted to concealed fraud, tolling the statute of limitations. However, Boyd and George Ben Jr. did not allege concealed fraud in the trial court. The Court has held that for an issue to be considered on appeal, it must first have been considered by the trial court. Fowler v. White , 85 So. 3d 287, 293 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2012). The Court stated:
We have been consistent in holding that we need not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal, which practice would have the practical effect of depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue, so that we can then review such trial court ruling under the appropriate standard of review.
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Daniel , 904 So. 2d 172, 183 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2005) ).
¶7. The issue of whether concealed fraud tolled the statute of limitations is procedurally barred. Regardless of the procedural bar, joinder of parties is not required for probate of a will in common form.
¶8. Mississippi Code Section 91-7-23 states the following:
Any person interested may, at any time within two years, by petition or bill, contest the validity of the will probated without notice; and an issue shall be made up and tried as other issues to determine whether the writing produced be the will of the testator or not. If some person does not appear within two years to contest the will, the probate shall be final and forever binding, saving to infants and persons of unsound mind the period of two years to contest the will after the removal of their respective disabilities. In case of concealed fraud, the limitation shall commence to run at, and not before, the time when such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered.
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-23 (Rev. 2018).
¶9. "[T]he heirs at law who would take the property of the deceased in the absence of a valid will are interested parties and are necessary parties ...." Williams v. Estate of Winding (In re Will of Winding) , 783 So. 2d 707, 709 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2001) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoskins v. Holmes Cnty. Cmty. Hosp. , 135 Miss. 89, 99 So. 570, 573 (1924) ). Additionally, "parties to an earlier will are necessary parties to a later will contest." Id. (citing Schneider v. Schneider (In re Estate of Schneider) , 585 So. 2d 1275, 1277 (Miss. 1991) ). However, the Court has stated:
Since the will was admitted to probate in common form, the only duties were to notify the parties named in the will (as they take under the will) and give 90 day notice to creditors, both of which were done. Anyone else is not a party to a common form probate, unless they petition for will contest within the statutorily prescribed time limit. Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-23 (1994).
¶10. The case sub judice is "a matter of clear statutory language." Id. (¶ 15). If the issue were one of intestate succession or a will contest, Boyd and George Ben Jr. would be necessary parties. However, since the will was admitted to probate in common form, Smith was not required to give notice to anyone who was not named in the will. There was no will contest until after the will was probated, at which point it was too late to contest the will.
¶11. Accordingly, the chancellor did not err by finding that Boyd and George Ben Jr. were not necessary parties to be joined in the probate of the will in common form.
¶12. Boyd and George Ben Jr. argue that because Smith failed to submit the original 2013 will to the chancery clerk for filing the statute of limitations should have been tolled. Mississippi Code Section 91-7-31 states:
All original wills, after probate thereof , shall be recorded and remain in the office of the clerk of the court where they were proved, except during the time they may be removed to any other court under proper process, from which they shall be duly returned to the proper office. Authenticated copies of such wills may be recorded in any county in this state.
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-31 (Rev. 2018) (emphasis added).
¶13. Again, Mississippi Code Section 91-7-23 states that "[a]ny person interested may, at any time within two years , by petition or bill, contest the validity of the will probated without notice [.]" Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-23 (emphasis added). Further, "[i ]f some person does not appear within two years to contest the will, the probate shall be final and forever binding ...." Id. (emphasis added).
¶14. When read together, the clear statutory language provides that probate is not final until after the two-year statute of limitations has run; only then must the original will be recorded. "All original wills, after probate thereof, shall be recorded ...." Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-31. Below, the chancellor explained her decision as follows:
Rule 6.15 of the Mississippi Uniform Chancery Court Rules requires that every petition to probate a will must have a copy of the will attached to it, and the petition filed in Cause No....
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