Boyd v. State

• Decision Date: 29 January 1890
• Citation: 88 Ala. 169,7 So. 268
• Parties: BOYD v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

7 So. 268

88 Ala. 169

BOYD v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 29, 1890

Appeal from criminal court, Pike county; W. H. PARKS, Judge.

The defendant in this case, Benjamin Boyd, a school-master, was indicted for an assault and battery on Lee Crowder, who was one of his scholars; and, the case being submitted to the court without a jury, he was convicted, and fined $25.

W L. Parks, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Martin, for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

The defendant, a school-master, being indicted, was convicted of an assault and battery on one Lee Crowder, a pupil in his school, who is shown to have been about 18 years of age. The defense is that the alleged battery was a reasonable chastisement inflicted by the master in just maintenance of discipline, and in punishment of conduct on the part of the pupil which tended to the subversion of good order in the school.

The case involves a consideration of the proper rule of law prescribing the extent of the school-master's authority to administer corporal correction to a pupil. The principle is commonly stated to be that the school-master, like the parent, and others in foro domestico, has the authority to moderately chastise pupils under his care, or as stated by Chancellor Kent, the "right of inflicting moderate correction, under the exercise of a sound discretion." 2 Kent, Comm. *203-*206. In other words, he may administer reasonable correction, which must not "exceed the bounds of due moderation, either in the measure of it, or in the instrument made use of for the purpose." If he go beyond this extent, he becomes criminally liable; and, if death ensues from the brutal injuries inflicted, he may be liable, not only for assault and battery, but to the penalties of manslaughter, or even of murder, according to the circumstances of the case. 1 Archb. Crim. Proc. *218; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, (7th Ed.) §§ 881, 882.

This power of correction vested by law in parents is founded on their duty to maintain and educate their offspring. In support of that authority, they must have "a right to the exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred trust." 2 Kent, Comm. *203. And this power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the child "may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purpose of education." Id. *205; 1 Bl. Comm. *507. The better doctrine of the adjudged cases, therefore, is that the teacher is, within reasonable bounds, the substitute for the parent, exercising his delegated authority. He is vested with the power to administer moderate correction, with a proper instrument, in cases of misconduct, which ought to have some reference to the character of the offense, the sex, age, size, and physical strength of the pupil. When the teacher keeps within the circumscribed sphere of his authority, the degree of correction must be left to his discretion, as it is to that of the parent, under like circumstances. Within this limit, he has the authority to determine the gravity or heinousness of the offense, and to mete out to the offender the punishment which he thinks his conduct justly merits; and hence the parent or teacher is often said pro hac vice to exercise judicial functions. All of the authorities agree that he will not be permitted to deal brutally with his victim, so as to endanger life, limb, or health. He will not be permitted to inflict "cruel and merciless punishment." Schouler, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) § 244. He cannot lawfully disfigure him, or perpetrate on his person any other permanent injury. As said by GASTON, J., in State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & B. 365, a case generally approved by the weight of American authority: "It may be laid down as a general rule that teachers exceed the limits of their authority when they cause lasting mischief, but act within the limits of it when they inflict temporary pain."

There are some well-considered authorities which hold teachers and parents alike liable, criminally, if, in the infliction of chastisement, they act clearly without the exercise of reasonable judgment and discretion. The test which seems to be fixed by these cases is the general judgment of reasonable men. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273. The more correct view, however, and the one better sustained by authority, seems to be that when, in the judgment of reasonable men, the punishment inflicted is immoderate or excessive, and a jury would be authorized, from the facts of the case, to infer that it was induced by legal malice, or wickedness of motive, the limit of lawful authority may be adjudged to be passed. In determining this question, the nature of the instrument of correction used may have a strong bearing on the inquiry as to motive or intention. The latter view is indorsed by Mr. Freeman in his note to the case of State v. Pendergrass, 31 Amer. Dec. 419, as the more correct. "The qualification," he observes, "that the school-master shall not act from malice, will protect his pupils from outbursts of brutality, whilst, upon the other hand, he is protected from liability for mere errors of judgment." Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Amer. Dec. 156, and note on pp. 164-167; State v. Alford, 68 N.C. 322; State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1.

Judge Reeve, in his work on Domestic Relations, indorses the same view, asserting that the parent and school-master, in imposing chastisement for cause, must be considered as acting in a judicial capacity, and are not to be held legally responsible for errors of judgment, although the punishment may appear to the trial court or jury to be unreasonably severe, and not proportioned to the offense, provided they act "conscientiously, and from motives of duty." "But," he says further, "when the punishment is, in their opinion, thus unreasonable, and it appears that the parent acted malo animo,-from wicked motives,-under the influence of an unsocial heart, he ought to be liable to damages. For error of opinion he ought to be excused, but for malice of heart he must not be shielded from the just claims of the child. Whether there was malice may be collected from the circumstances attending the punishment." Reeve, Dom. Rel. (4th Ed.) 357, 358.

Dr. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law, thus states the principle: "The law confides to school-masters and teachers a discretionary power in the infliction of punishment upon their pupils, and will not hold them responsible unless the punishment be such as naturally to occasion permanent injury to the child, or be inflicted merely to gratify their own evil passions. The teacher must be governed, when chastisement is proper, as to the mode and severity of the punishment, by the nature of the offense, the age, size, and apparent powers of endurance of the pupil. It is for the jury to decide whether the punishment is excessive." 1 Whart. Crim. Law, (9th Ed.) § 632.

Mr Bishop adds, pertinent to the same subject: "The law has provided no means whereby a parent, meditating chastisement, can first obtain a judicial opinion as to its necessity, the proper instruments, and its due extent. In reason, therefore, if he acts in good faith, prompted by true parental love, without passion, and inflicts no permanent injury on the child, he should not be punished merely because a jury, reviewing the case, do not deem that it was wise to proceed so far." 1 Bish. Crim. Law, (7th Ed.) § 882. See,...