Boyd v. State

Decision Date31 July 1840
Citation21 Tenn. 39
PartiesBOYD v. THE STATE.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

J. A. McKinney, for Boyd; Attorney General, for the State.

Reese, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment, under the act of 1803, ch. 9, for the malicious disfigurement of a horse. The indictment contains four counts. Of the second count, charging a disfigurement of the horse by cutting off his tail, the defendant was acquitted by the verdict. Of the other three counts, upon which a conviction has taken place, we are of opinion that the first and third are not good, because not alleging the act in question to have been done maliciously. See The State v. Wilcox, 3 Yerg. 378. The fourth count charges that the defendant and one William Depew did unlawfully, maliciously, and of purpose disfigure a gelding, the horse beast of Benjamin Birdwell, of the value of $100, by then and there, etc., cutting off the hair of the tail of said horse beast, and by then and and there cutting off the mane of said horse beast, etc. For the defendant it is urged that the act charged does not fall within the meaning and mischief of the statute of 1803, ch. 9. We take it that the act in question falls within both. Mutilation by dismemberment is prohibited, in cutting off the ear, tail, or tongue, putting out an eye, or otherwise, and wounding and killing are prohibited by the statute. The words ““to disfigure” seem to operate to describe such an act as that charged, and are unnecessary and unmeaning in the statute if not applied. If all the hair belonging to the mane and tail of a horse be shaved off, it may be that we would not speak of him as having been dismembered, but all the world would say that he was much disfigured. It is the very term which would be used, and maliciously to impair the use and value of a horse, by injuring his appearance and marring his beauty in removing of those parts alike ornamental and useful, falls entirely within the mischief which the act seeks to prevent. We are of opinion, therefore, that the reasons in arrest of judgment were properly overruled.

The bill of exceptions shows that one of the witnesses for the State, at whose house the act charged in the indictment took place, testified that, after the defendant and Depew were arrested, he said to them that if they would acknowledge that they did it in a frolic, and from no disrespect to his family, he would forgive them, and use his endeavors to get Birdwell to drop the prosecution...

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6 cases
  • Monts v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • March 2, 1966
    ...to determine the admissibility of a confession and it is for the jury to determine what weight should be given the confession. Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. 39 (1840); Wooten v. State, 203 Tenn. 473, 314 S.W.2d 1 (1958); Tines v. State, 203 Tenn. 612, 315 S.W.2d 111 (1958); Beaver v. State, supra......
  • State v. Pursley
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1977
    ...a criminal defendant's confession. See Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944); Self v. State, 65 Tenn. 244 (1873); Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. 39 (1840). Under the "orthodox" rule, the admissibility of a confession is not a proper matter for submission to the jury, however, once ad......
  • State v. Lightfoot
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1899
    ... ... Shriedley v ... State, 23 Ohio St. 130. The place in which the section ... is found in the Code is quite significant. If malice is an ... essential ingredient of the offense, it must be charged, and ... the use of the words "willfully and unlawfully" is ... not sufficient. Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. 39, 2 Hum ... 39; Thompson v. State, 51 Miss. 353; State v ... Jackson, 34 N.C. 329; Com. v. Williams, 110 ... Mass. 401; State v. Newby, 64 N.C. 23. The case of ... State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372, is not in conflict with ... this conclusion. The indictment in that case was ... ...
  • Wynn v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 10, 1944
    ...that if the judge allow the jury to determine the preliminary fact, it is error, for which the judgment will be reversed: Boyd v. The State, 2 Humph. These are elementary principles too long established and followed to be now questioned.' (Page 253 of 65 Tenn.). We are aware that in several......
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