Boyd v. State
| Decision Date | 22 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 55444,55444 |
| Citation | 146 Ga.App. 359,246 S.E.2d 396 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BOYD v. The STATE. |
Mary M. Young, Albany, for appellant.
D. E. Turk, Dist. Atty., Gary C. Christy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
A special agent with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, working through an informant, purchased some marijuana from Boyd. The agent, by hearsay testimony, injected Boyd's character into issue on two occasions. Boyd's motion for a mistrial was denied. We reverse.
There are only two enumerations of error that have merit.
1. The first deals with the court's refusal to compel the agent to reveal the informant's name. In cases such as this it is usually within the discretion of the trial judge to allow or deny such revelation. Bell v. State, 141 Ga.App. 277(3), 233 S.E.2d 253 (1977).
2. After the state's witness, the GBI agent referred to above, stated that he had a conversation with the defendant, Bernice Boyd, the district attorney asked: "Bernice Boyd on that occasion could you tell us what that was?" The witness replied: "I received a telephone call from my informant which stated he had set up a deal with a known narcotics dealer" (meaning the defendant). The statement was objected to as hearsay and admitted for the limited purpose of explaining the witness' conduct in going to the cafe. The judge then instructed the district attorney to proceed, saying, "All right, Mr. Turk." Without waiting for the next question, the agent then interjected, "Okay, I received a telephone call from the informant he had stated he had set up a deal with a known narcotic dealer who would sell me . . ." This time opposing counsel moved for a mistrial.
This case presents a clear example of a law enforcement officer violating two statutes by injecting hearsay testimony and placing the defendant's character into evidence.
It may well be argued that peace officers are not always well acquainted with our rules of evidence and that statements such as the one here are merely inadvertent. But if we refuse to reverse this judgment, then we provide no incentive to district attorneys and solicitors to counsel their witnesses, especially law enforcement officers, to avoid extraneous and inadmissible outbursts. It is high time that this court go on record as opposing without reservation such conduct by law enforcement officers. When a person becomes a GBI agent he has been through some of the best training offered, and he knows that you cannot legally place the defendant's character into issue or give hearsay testimony. The state's main witness and prosecutor in this case, a GBI agent, on two different occasions voluntarily testified to matters that placed defendant's character in issue. The statements also intimated that the defendant was or had been guilty of other crimes of the same nature. To worsen an already bad situation, neither of the statements was responsive to the question asked. This proves he knew what he was doing, as he knew he was not answering a very simple question put to him by the district attorney. If he did not have evidence enough to convict the defendant without indulging in such inadmissible, voluntary, unresponsive statements, then he should never have prosecuted. This court must let it be known that it will not place its stamp of approval on such shenanigans. Either try the defendant according to the law or not at all.
Felton v. State, 93 Ga.App. 48(1), 90 S.E.2d 607 (1955), is all the authority needed to reverse. After the two statements by the agent the court made a valiant attempt to retrieve the situation, cautioning the jury to disabuse their minds of any statement made to the witness by another. However, all of us know that when the GBI agent placed the defendant's character in evidence (and by hearsay at that) there was no way on earth for the jurors to disabuse their minds of any statement repeated to them by him.
The Supreme Court in the case of Newton Bros. v. Shank, 240 Ga. 471, 241 S.E.2d 231 (1978), zeroed in on this...
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Felker v. State
...a law enforcement officer, his statement was as a matter of law so prejudicial that a mistrial was required, citing Boyd v. State, 146 Ga.App. 359(2), 246 S.E.2d 396 (1976). However, in Sabel v. State, supra, this court rejected the notion that Boyd establishes such a per se Moreover, in vi......
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Prater v. State
...(testimony implying that defendant had confessed); and numerous other cases cited therein. Our recent decision in Boyd v. State, 146 Ga.App. 359, 246 S.E.2d 396 (1978), is distinguishable. There, the prejudicial, unresponsive remark came from a police officer who was presumed to have known ......
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Henderson v. State
...privilege against disclosure. [Cit.] The question of disclosure is a matter of discretion with the trial judge (see Boyd v. State, [146 Ga.App. 359, 246 S.E.2d 396 (1978) ] ), which in this case was not abused." Bennett v. State, 153 Ga.App. 21, 27, 264 S.E.2d 516 3. Thirdly, Henderson cont......
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...and entering in the drug transaction with them. Code § 38-302; Burrell v. State, 140 Ga.App. 900, 902, 232 S.E.2d 172. In Boyd v. State, 146 Ga.App. 359, 246 S.E.2d 396, a statement concerning information from an informant was held to be character impeachment because the witness related tha......