Boyd v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. SC20-108,SC20-108
• Parties: Lucious BOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

324 So.3d 908

Lucious BOYD, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC20-108

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 13, 2021

Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order summarily denying Lucious Boyd's second successive motion to vacate his judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a capital conviction for which a sentence of death was imposed, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Boyd was convicted of first-degree murder, armed kidnapping, and sexual battery for offenses that occurred in 1998. Boyd v. State (Boyd I ), 910 So. 2d 167, 174 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied , 546 U.S. 1179, 126 S.Ct. 1350, 164 L.Ed.2d 63 (2006). He was sentenced to death for the murder, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id . Since then, we have affirmed the denial of Boyd's initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Boyd v. State (Boyd II ), 200 So. 3d 685, 690 (Fla. 2015), denied a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, Boyd v. Jones (Boyd III) , No. SC16-1812, 2017 WL 318931, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2017), and affirmed the summary denial of Boyd's first successive motion for postconviction relief, Boyd v. State (Boyd IV) , 291 So. 3d 900, 901 (Fla. 2020). Boyd now appeals the summary denial of his second successive motion for postconviction relief, in which he asserted a claim of juror misconduct on the part of Tonja Striggles.

According to the allegations of Boyd's motion, Boyd discovered the basis for his present claim at a federal evidentiary hearing on a separate claim of misconduct involving the same juror. At the federal hearing, which was convened to address a claim that juror Striggles failed to reveal the full extent of her criminal history during voir dire,¹ juror Striggles volunteered information about three topics pertinent to the present claim: (1) a familial connection she has to Boyd, (2) pretrial knowledge of the case, and (3) the side effects of medication she was taking at the time of Boyd's trial. Boyd contends that juror Striggles's failure to reveal this information during voir dire amounts to juror misconduct and entitles him to a new trial.

The familial connection at issue is the marriage of juror Striggles's first cousin to Boyd's brother. Juror Striggles's testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing indicates that she learned about this relationship during a break in voir dire when she called her mother and revealed that she was being considered for jury service for a case involving Lucious Boyd. Before the first break, the entire panel had been asked if anyone knew Boyd or recognized his name in connection with a "criminal setting." At that time, juror Striggles said, "I have heard my family talk about it. I don't know if it's the same gentleman, if it was related to the Boyd Funeral Home, but my family has spoken about it." Even though Boyd's family owns the Boyd Funeral Home, there was no request for more information of juror Striggles at that time. She was, however, asked to confirm that what she had heard would not affect her deliberations. Specifically, among other assurances, when asked if what she heard would affect her deliberations, juror Striggles answered, "No, because I don't know."

As revealed at the federal evidentiary hearing, during the phone call to her mother—which, again, would have occurred after the questioning just discussed—juror Striggles asked her mother if she knew Boyd. In response, juror Striggles's mother mentioned Boyd's father's name, told juror Striggles that Boyd's brother was married to juror Striggles's cousin, and advised her that she could not participate in the case because of that family relationship. Juror Striggles claimed at the federal evidentiary hearing to have raised an issue about her familial connection to Boyd during voir dire, such that everyone in the courtroom should have heard it. However, this claim is inconsistent with the voir dire transcript.

As for juror Striggles's pretrial knowledge of the case, she revealed at the federal evidentiary hearing that the victim's body was found near her home, that her neighbors had discussed the case, and that her family was in the habit of talking about the Boyd family all the time and still does so. In reference to those discussions, juror Striggles explained at the federal evidentiary hearing that when she called her mother, she said, "[G]uess what, you know the body they found in Oakland Park, that's the same person. It's Lucious Boyd ...." Nevertheless, juror Striggles also testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that she does not "know the Boyds that well" and that her family primarily "deal[s] with" another family in the funeral business. Juror Striggles further testified that she did not know anything about the case except what was presented in the courtroom, that she was not trying to get on the jury, and that she did not "go in trying to convict" Boyd, as she did not know him. She felt that she was fair as a juror and based her verdict on the facts presented at trial, and nothing else.

Regarding the medication she was taking during voir dire and the trial, juror Striggles said that it made her feel lethargic and unable to focus well. She testified that she had struggled to stay awake and felt "stoned."

Based on the new information received from juror Striggles, in combination with other matters that Boyd argued had a bearing on whether the omissions directly at issue show juror misconduct, Boyd requested a new trial or an evidentiary hearing. The additional matters Boyd argued should be considered included the following: juror Striggles's failure to reveal the full extent of her criminal history; an allegation that surfaced during Boyd's penalty phase that certain unnamed jurors were discussing the case and Boyd's personal history in the restroom of the courthouse;² and an allegation, rooted in Boyd's initial postconviction record and explored at the federal evidentiary hearing, that juror Striggles was untruthful during voir dire about her residential history. Boyd explained that the purpose of the evidentiary hearing would be to take the testimony of trial counsel.

After receiving a response to Boyd's motion from the State, the postconviction court summarily denied the motion without explaining its ruling.

II. ANALYSIS

Boyd raises two issues. First, he contends that the postconviction court's failure to hold a case management hearing, known as a Huff³ hearing, was error itself, particularly when paired with the lack of explanation for the denial of relief. Second, Boyd argues that the denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing was error. The State disagrees with both arguments and contends that Boyd's substantive claim is procedurally barred at least in part.

A. Failure to Hold a Huff Hearing

In Huff v. State , 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993), we held that, in proceedings on an initial postconviction motion in a case where the death penalty has been imposed, the postconviction court must hold a hearing where legal argument can be presented before ruling on the motion. We have since explained that this requirement applies only to initial, not successive, postconviction motions, even though the better practice is to hold such a hearing on any postconviction motion in a case involving the death penalty. Taylor v. State , 260 So. 3d 151, 157 (Fla. 2018) (discussing Groover v. State , 703 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1997) ). Further, we have held that any error in failing to hold a Huff hearing on a successive postconviction motion is harmless if the motion is legally insufficient to warrant either relief or an evidentiary hearing. Id . at 157-58. What this means practically is that the postconviction court's failure to hold a Huff hearing on Boyd's motion is not reversible error in itself. See id . Thus, whether Boyd is entitled to relief depends on whether his motion was sufficient to require either an evidentiary hearing or a new trial. See id . As explained below, Boyd's motion did not require either.

B. Decision to Summarily Deny the Motion

We review the summary denial of a postconviction motion de novo. Tompkins v. State , 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008). Such a denial is permitted "[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief." Id . at 1080-81 (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B) ). To determine if this standard is met, this Court must "accept the defendant's allegations as true to the extent that they are not conclusively refuted by the record." Id . at 1081 (citing Rolling v. State , 944 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2006) ).

1. Procedural Bar

This Court recently considered the procedural and substantive standards applicable to a postconviction claim of juror misconduct in Martin v. State , No. SC18-896, 322 So.3d 35 (Fla. May 6, 2021). The procedural requirements outlined in Martin are satisfied in this case for the portions of Boyd's claim that are based on information first discovered at the federal evidentiary hearing, as Boyd discovered that information within the year preceding the filing of his motion. Martin, at 33–34 (citing Diaz v. State , 132 So. 3d 93, 104-05 (Fla. 2013), and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A) ). However, the State argues, and we agree, that Boyd's claim is procedurally barred to the extent it...