Boyd v. Williams
| Decision Date | 23 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19cv1278 (TSE/TCB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Arthur Lewis Boyd, Petitioner, v. Tammy B. Williams, Warden, Respondent |
Arthur Lewis Boyd ("Boyd" or "petitioner"), a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his January 23, 2017 convictions in the Mecklenburg County Circuit Court for possession of a firearm by a violent felon, and attempted possession of a firearm by a violent felon. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, with a supporting brief, and Boyd was notified of the opportunity to file responsive materials pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and he filed a response. [Dkt. Nos. 6-9]. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition. A review of the record in this matter establishes that the respondent's Motion to Dismiss must be granted, and the petition must be dismissed with prejudice.
Boyd is currently confined pursuant to a final order of the Mecklenburg County Circuit Court dated January 23, 2017, convicting him of possession of a firearm by a violent felon, and attempted possession of a firearm by a violent felon. The circuit court sentenced Boyd to serve consecutive five-year sentences in prison on each charge and then suspended the five years in prison on the attempted firearm possession conviction. (Commonwealth v. Boyd, Case Nos. CR16-176-00 and -02).1
Boyd's counsel appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Virginia in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove Boyd had been convicted of a prior violent felony and that the firearm in this case was inoperable. (Boyd v. Commonwealth, Record No. No. 0075-17-2; Resp. Ex. B at 10-11). Boyd filed a supplemental pro se petition for appeal that raised the same sufficiency issues. (Resp. Ex. B at 2). The Court of Appeals denied the petition on November 17, 2017 finding that all issues were not preserved under Rule 5A:18. (Resp. Ex. B at 1-3). The Supreme Court of Virginia refused Boyd's subsequent petition for appeal on December 21, 2018. (Boyd v. Commonwealth, Record No. 180250).
Boyd filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia on January 17, 2019, Boyd v. Williams, Record No. 190131 (hereinafter VSCT at ___). The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the petition on July 22, 2019 finding the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had no merit under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the claims of prosecutorial misconduct were barred under the rule of Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974), and that the claim of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights was conclusory and dismissed the claim under the rule of Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 370-71 (1948). (VSCT at 550).
On September 23, 2019, Boyd filed a § 2254 habeas petition in this Court raising thefollowing claims:
On November 20, 2015, Barry Moore was working at his pawn shop, South Hill Pawn Shop, in Mecklenburg County, Virginia. (Tr. at 15). Moore is also a federally licensed firearms dealer. Boyd came to the store and pawned a shotgun. (Id. at 16-17). The receipt for the pawned firearm was introduced at trial. (Id. at 17). At the time he received the weapon, Moore examined the shotgun and determined it was operable. Moore tested the firing pin bysliding a piece of paper between the chamber and the firing mechanism and pulling the trigger. Moore inspected the paper and found that the firing pin punched a hole in the paper. (Id. at 18). At the time Boyd pawned the shotgun, Moore explained to Boyd that when he came to redeem the pawn ticket Boyd would have to go through the same process as if he were buying a new weapon, which included a background check. Boyd responded that he did not "have a problem with that." (Id. at 16).
On December 1, 2016, Boyd went to the pawn shop to redeem his pawn ticket for the shotgun. (Id. at 18). Boyd completed Section A of the form himself. (Id. at 22). In filing out the form, Boyd initially indicated "yes" in response to the question asking if he had ever been convicted of a felony. (Id. at 23- 24). Moore notified Boyd he could not reclaim the shotgun if had a felony conviction and Boyd changed his answer to the question whether he had ever been convicted of a felony to "no." (Id. at 24). The form Boyd completed was admitted into evidence at trial as Commonwealth's Ex. No. 3. (Id. at 21).
A copy of Boyd's prior convictions in New York for attempted robbery, robbery, and burglary were admitted into evidence as well as Boyd's Virginia convictions for two counts of grand larceny. (Tr. at 37).
Before bringing a federal habeas petition, state prisoners must first exhaust their claims in the appropriate state court. Failure to exhaust all claims requires dismissal of the petition to allow the petitioner first to present his claims to the appropriate state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Granberry v Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987). To comply with the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate reviewprocess." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Thus, Boyd must first have presented the same factual and legal claims raised in his federal action to the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal, or in a state habeas corpus petition. See, e.g., Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995).
Exhaustion is a matter of comity to the state courts, and failure to exhaust requires dismissal from federal court so that Alston may present his claims to the state courts. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134; Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-19 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Generally, a federal habeas petition containing unexhausted claims will be dismissed without prejudice to allow for further state court review. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. If state law, however, would bar further state court review, then federal habeas review of the unexhausted claim is procedurally barred. See Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 935-37 (4th Cir. 1990).
In the present case, respondent admits that all of petitioner's claims are either exhausted because they have been presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia, or exhausted and defaulted because the claim was not presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia and if Boyd attempted to raise the claim now it would be barred as successive or untimely. Claim I(B) is exhausted and defaulted because it was not raised in state habeas. Claims II(A) and II(B) are exhausted because they were raised in the state habeas petition, but each was found barred under the rule of Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) because Boyd had failed to raise the claims on direct appeal. The remainder of Boyd's claims will be reviewed on the merits.
Where a state court has made an express determination of procedural default, the state court's finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness, provided two foundational requirements are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1241 (4thCir. 1988). First, the state court must explicitly rely on the procedural ground to deny petitioner relief. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 259 (1989). Second, the state procedural rule used to default petitioner's claim must be an independent and adequate state ground for denying relief. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260.
Claims II(A) and II(B) were each found by the Supreme Court of Virginia to be barred under the rule of Slayton v. Parrigan. The Fourth Circuit has held consistently that "the procedural default rule set forth in Slayton constitutes an adequate and independent state law ground for decision." Mu'Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997).
In addition, claim I(B), which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion for discovery regarding the operability of the shotgun, is also defaulted because Boyd did not raise it in his state habeas petition and has not otherwise presented it to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Any attempt by Boyd to raise claim I(B) in a second state habeas petition would result in that claim being found procedurally barred as untimely and successive, which renders the claim exhausted and defaulted for purposes of federal review absent cause and prejudice. See Va. Code §§ 8.01-654(A)(2); 8.01-654(B)(2); see Bassett, 915 F.2d at 936-37 (). Virginia's habeas statute of limitations is an independent and adequate state procedural rule that bars federal review. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 321 (2011) (...
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