Boyd v. Williams
Decision Date | 19 September 1934 |
Docket Number | 667. |
Citation | 175 S.E. 832,207 N.C. 30 |
Parties | BOYD v. WILLIAMS. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Clement, Judge.
Civil action by Beatrice Boyd against C. F. Williams, administrator of the estate of W. V. Boyd, deceased, to recover damages for personal injury. From a judgment of the superior court affirming a judgment of the county court for plaintiff defendant appeals.
Error. The plaintiff is the wife of the deceased, W. V. Boyd, and was injured on March 16, 1934. Certain medical testimony was offered tending to show the extent of the injuries sustained by plaintiff, but the only evidence offered as to what actually occurred was contained in her testimony. She said
While the plaintiff was testifying in her own behalf, she was asked the following questions: (a) (b) (c) (d)
The defendant objected to all the foregoing evidence upon the ground that, as she was suing the estate of her deceased husband for damages, she was an interested witness and disqualified by C. S. § 1795, to testify as to transactions and communications with her husband. The evidence was admitted at the trial in the county court and a verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $5,481. The defendant appealed to the superior court, assigning as error the admission of the testimony of the wife as heretofore indicated. The judge of the superior court overruled the exceptions and affirmed the judgment of the county court. Whereupon the defendant appealed.
Dalton & Pickens, of High Point, for appellant.
Walser & Casey, of High Point, for appellee.
A wife, living with her husband, is riding with him along the highway, in a car owned, controlled, and driven by the husband. The car fails to make a curve, and is apparently wrecked or turned over, killing the husband and seriously injuring the wife. She sues the estate of the deceased husband for damages, and is allowed to testify as to violations of the statute regulating the operation of automobiles, and that she made a statement to her deceased husband at the time "about the rate of speed at which he was driving."
These facts produce two questions of law:
(1) Does C. S. § 1795, apply to actions in tort, or is the statute confined to actions on contract?
(2) Does the testimony of the wife constitute a transaction or a communication with her deceased husband within the contemplation of said statute?
No case has been called to our attention in this jurisdiction deciding the question as to whether C. S. § 1795, applies to tort actions. However, no sound reason occurs to the court for limiting the application of the statute...
To continue reading
Request your trial