Boyer v. Pool
Decision Date | 06 April 1955 |
Docket Number | No. A-4762,A-4762 |
Citation | 280 S.W.2d 564,154 Tex. 586 |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Parties | Bertie M. BOYER et al., Petitioners, v. J. C. POOL et al., Respondents. |
Bryan, Maxwell, Bryan & Wilson (Stansell Bryan), Waco, P. M. Rice, Hamilton, L. Brann, Lubbock, for petitioners.
Abney, Hammett & Lynch (J. V. Hammett), Lampasas, Truman E. Roberts, Hico, H. W. Allen, Hamilton, for respondents.
This is a contest to the probating of a will upon grounds of undue influence.
The contestants secured a jury finding that the execution of the will had resulted from the exercise of undue influence. The trial court disregarded this verdict and entered judgment sustaining the probate, because, in its opinion, there was no evidence of undue influence. This judgment has been reversed and rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals. 268 S.W.2d 223.
The only question presented is whether there is any evidence of undue influence. The test of undue influence is whether such control was exercised over the mind of the testator as to overcome his free agency and free will and to substitute the will of another so as to cause the testator to do what he would not otherwise have done but for such control. Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138; Curry v. Curry, Tex., 270 S.W.2d 208.
The Court of Civil Appeals gives a fair summary of the testimony. This establishes in substance that the testator was eighty nine years old when he executed the will and subsequently died at the age of ninety three years; that there was friction, jealousy, and bad feeling between his daughters and the widow of a deceased son; that his daughters gave considerable thought and attention to the question of whether his son (deceased father of contestants) owed a debt to the testator which should be taken into consideration by the testator in drawing his will; that they discussed this question among themselves and with him at various times; and that there was general rivalry and jealousy between the daughters and their sister-in-law, the wife of the deceased son of the testator. There is testimony that the testator told his grandchildren (contestants) that he would provide for them while the will does not do that. The contestants established a confidential relationship, the opportunity, and a motive for undue influence and that during his last years the testator was virtually dependent upon his daughters, two of the principal beneficiaries. There is proof that the daughters made a daily charge for nursing their brother during his last illness, which indicates a grasping attitude by the daughters and a harsh and unnatural family relationship. Proof of this type simply sets the stage. Contestants must go forward and prove in some fashion that the will as written resulted from the daughters substituting their mind and will for that of the testator. Here the will and the circumstances raise suspicion, but it does not supply proof of the vital facts of undue influence-the substitution of a plan of testamentary disposition by another as the will of the testator.
The proof fails to show the circumstances under which the will was executed other than as set out by the Court of Civil Appeals from whose opinion we quote as follows (268 S.W.2d 228):
One factor to be considered is that the will was executed in a public place (court house) with no one present who is alleged to have used undue influence at that time. In Besteiro v. Besteiro, Tex.Com.App., 65 S.W.2d 759, 761, this Court said:
See also Cameron v. Houston Land & Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 1948, 175 S.W.2d 468, error ref. w. o. m., and Naihaus v. Feigon, Tex.Civ.App., 1951, 244 S.W.2d 325, n. r. e.
In fact it is not shown that any of the children had any knowledge that the will was being executed until afterwards. There is no evidence of the direct intervention of the will and mind of the daughters or of the dominance of the free will of the testator in the preparation and execution of the will so as to bring this case within Long v. Long, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034. The fact that the testator in his will adopted the daughter's version of the debt question does not prove that he did not do so of his own free will. There is no proof raising a fact issue that the testator did not make a free decision. Proof that the daughters were favored and that the contestants got nothing under the will is not proof that the daughters did in fact substitute their mind and will for the mind and will of the testator. Since witnesses were available to establish the facts surrounding the preparation and planning of the will, we must hold that the contestants have failed to prove their case. Proof of the planning and preparation of the will, where the witnesses are available, is the heart of an undue influence case.
Respondents urge the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, Tex.Civ.App., 1940, 141 S.W.2d 1035, error ref., in which the facts were very like the case at bar and in which a jury verdict of undue influence was sustained. The factual situations in undue influence cases are never the same. The distinction between proving undue influence by circumstantial evidence and merely raising a 'bare suspicion' as in Burgess v. Sylvester, 143 Tex. 25, 182 S.W.2d 358, is not one which can be defined with certain limits, for the problem is essentially one of degree.
In the case of Barksdale v. Dobbins, supra, there was evidence that the testator was mentally feeble and that his mental condition had deteriorated with age. In the case at bar there is no such testimony. A number of witnesses testified that testator was active and spry, drove his car under a limited driver's license, and in general took care of his own business. The only testimony which we can find in the record which might be contended as suggesting mental weakness was that of a neighbor, Gordon Nettleton, who had known testator a long time. It is:
But when this testimony is fairly examined in its context it will not make a fact issue of mental weakness.
Two medical witnesses testified for the proponents. The contestants offered no medical evidence of the testator's mental strength and condition. Dr. H. R. Nassour, Jr., testified that he was the physician and surgeon who had treated the testator for about four years before his last illness and through and including his last illness. He testified that his death was due to a general weakness brought on by a chronic kidney condition and hardening of the arteries, that hardening of the arteries generally sets in at the age of forty and continues progressively until death in most people and affects people differently. He testified as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gray's Estate, In re
...opinion was written the case of Boyer v. Pool has appeared, and we now cite it as further authority for the above matters. Boyer v. Pool, Tex.Sup., 280 S.W.2d 564. Finding no reversible error, appellants' points are all overruled and the case is ...
-
Edwards v. Williams, 3240
...defendant but would have required it. Arlington Heights Appliance Co. v. Gordon, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 337, 339. In Boyer v. Pool, 154 Tex. 586, 280 S.W.2d 564, 565, there is a comparable fact situation. A will contestant obtained a jury finding that the will was the result of the exerci......
-
In re Estate of Luce
...which is merely suspicious defies articulation; it essentially is a matter of degree. Yost, 534 S.W.3d at 525 (citing Boyer v. Pool, 280 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1955)). If the circumstances are equally consistent with undue influence and its absence, then undue influence is not proved. Rother......
-
Woods' Estate
...the mind of the testator At the time of the execution of the instrument see Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.1966); Boyer v. Pool, 154 Tex. 586, 280 S.W.2d 564 (1955); Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138 (1914); and Burgess v. Sylvester, 177 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Civ.App.1944), aff......