Boyer v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 125,125
• Citation: 594 A.2d 121,323 Md. 558
• Parties: Andrew C. BOYER et al. v. STATE of Maryland et al
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 558

323 Md. 558

594 A.2d 121

Andrew C. BOYER et al. v. STATE of Maryland et al.

No. 125 Sept. Term, 1989.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 26, 1991.

Dean C. Kremer (Christopher K. Mangold, Koonz, McKenney, & Johnson, all on brief), Landover, for petitioners.

Carmen M. Shepard, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Steven E. Leder, George G. Tankard, Lord & Whip, all on brief), Baltimore, John L. Ridge, Jr. (Montedonico & Mason, Chartered, both on brief), Rockville, for respondents.

Stephen C. Orenstein, Upper Marlboro, amicus curiae, for Maryland Chiefs of Police Ass'n Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and CHASANOW, JJ., and COLE ^* and ADKINS ^**, Associate Judges of the Court of Appeals (retired).

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

This case involves the possible liability of law enforcement officers, the State of Maryland, and Charles County for injuries sustained by motorists struck by a suspected drunk driver who was being pursued by the officers in a high-speed chase.

I.

The case is before us on appeal from orders granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The orders were based on the complaint, the motions, and the responses thereto. The underlying facts for purposes of the trial court's rulings on the summary judgment motions were essentially those alleged by the plaintiffs.

On August 9, 1984, at about 11:30 a.m., Maryland State Police Trooper Robert C. Titus was driving his police car southbound on U.S. Route 301 in Waldorf, Maryland. He observed another vehicle being driven southbound on Route 301 in an unsafe and erratic manner, and Trooper Titus suspected that the driver of the other vehicle was intoxicated. Both the other vehicle and Trooper Titus's police car stopped at a red light. While so stopped, Trooper Titus got out of his car, approached the other vehicle, and instructed the driver, Richard Milton Farrar, to pull over to the shoulder of the road on the other side of the intersection as soon as the light turned green. Trooper Titus then returned to his police car. When the traffic light turned green, Mr. Farrar, instead of pulling over onto the shoulder of the road as he had been instructed, accelerated his vehicle and drove south on Route 301 at a high rate of speed. Trooper Titus immediately began pursuing Mr. Farrar. Deputy sheriffs from the Charles County Sheriff's Office and other Maryland State police officers joined Trooper Titus in the chase of Mr. Farrar.

The plaintiffs claimed that the pursuit of Mr. Farrar continued for approximately seven miles on Route 301 through heavy traffic and numerous intersections at high speeds. The plaintiffs asserted that the police officers chasing Mr. Farrar reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The plaintiffs stated that "[d]espite the presence of numerous other slow moving vehicles on the road, the police officers in question did not break off their pursuit but rather increased their speed and continued the pursuit despite the clear and present danger of so doing." In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Trooper Titus failed to "activate immediately all of the emergency equipment on his police car" and failed to "adhere to the acceptable police procedures and policies in attempting to apprehend defendant Farrar."

The pursuit of Mr. Farrar ended tragically when the suspected drunk driver's vehicle hit the rear of another vehicle at the intersection of U.S. Route 301 and Maryland Route 225 in the town of La Plata. The struck vehicle was occupied by Mary Jackisch Boyer and her husband, Joseph A. Boyer. Mrs. Boyer died at the scene of the accident. Mr. Boyer was hospitalized and died on October 26, 1984, as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.

The plaintiffs in the case, the surviving sons of Mr. and Mrs. Boyer, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County a complaint containing eleven counts, naming the State of Maryland, the County Commissioners of Charles County, Trooper Titus, the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" and Richard Milton Farrar as defendants. ¹ The Circuit Court for Prince George's County determined that venue was improper and transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Charles County.

Counts I through V of the complaint are survival claims and counts VI through X are wrongful death claims. Count XI contains a demand for punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged in counts I and VI that Trooper Titus was grossly negligent "in failing to arrest defendant Farrar while defendant Farrar was stopped at a red light; ... in pursuing defendant Farrar, a suspected drunk driver, at an excessively high rate of speed through a heavy traffic area; in continuing to recklessly pursue defendant Farrar at extremely high and dangerous rates of speed; in failing to activate immediately all of the emergency equipment on his police car so as to warn other motorists ...; and in ... failing to adhere to the acceptable police procedures and policies...." The plaintiffs also asserted in counts I and VI vicarious liability on the part of the State of Maryland for Trooper Titus's negligence and on the part of the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" and the County Commissioners of Charles County for the asserted "gross negligence" of the Charles County deputy sheriffs involved in the high-speed chase of Mr. Farrar.

The plaintiffs claimed in counts II and VII that the State of Maryland "fail[ed] to exercise due care in selecting, hiring, retaining, training and supervising defendant Titus...." Similarly, counts III, IV, VIII and IX asserted that the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" negligently "hired, retained, trained and supervised the officers and employees of the Charles County Sheriff's Department...." Counts V and X of the complaint alleged that Richard Milton Farrar was negligent for, among other things, failing to obey the speed limit and operating his vehicle while intoxicated.

The principal statutory ground invoked by the plaintiffs for the asserted liability of the State of Maryland was the Maryland Tort Claims Act, which at the time of the accident in this case waived the State's governmental immunity in, inter alia, "[a]n action to recover damages caused by the negligent maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee." Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 5-403(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ² Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that they had complied with the procedural requirements for bringing an action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. In connection with their claim against the State of Maryland, as well as their claims against the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County "Sheriff's Department," the plaintiffs also relied on Code (1977, 1987 Repl. Vol.), § 19-103(c)(1) of the Transportation Article, which provides that the owner of an emergency vehicle is liable, up to certain limits, "for any damages caused by a negligent act or omission of an authorized operator while operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service...." ³ The plaintiffs also sought to impose liability on the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" on the theory that the County Commissioners and a county agency known as the "Sheriff's Department" were the employers of the deputy sheriffs and liable under the principle of respondeat superior.

With regard to their claim against Trooper Titus individually, the plaintiffs relied upon § 21-106 of the Transportation Article of the Code which extends certain privileges to drivers of emergency vehicles but which specifies in subsection (d) that "[t]his section does not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." ⁴ The plaintiffs also invoked § 19- 103(b) of the Transportation Article which provides that the immunity from suit granted by § 19-103 to the operator of an emergency vehicle does not apply where the operator is guilty, inter alia, of "gross negligence." ⁵ In addition, the plaintiffs contended that, under § 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, Trooper Titus had a duty to detain Mr. Farrar when he approached him at the stop light on Route 301, and that Trooper Titus was liable for his alleged breach of that duty. ⁶ Finally, the plaintiffs relied on cases holding that, absent statutory immunity, the driver of an emergency vehicle is "ordinarily" liable for his negligence in the operation of the vehicle. See, e.g., James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 328, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980).

After this case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Charles County, and after answers were filed, two motions for summary judgment were filed, one on behalf of the State of Maryland and Trooper Titus, and the other on behalf of the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County "Sheriff's Department."

The motion for summary judgment on behalf of the State and Trooper Titus, along with the supporting memoranda, was based upon two grounds only: (1) the State and Trooper Titus were entitled to governmental immunity; (2) "the law imposes no tort duty on Trooper Titus (or the State of Maryland) for injuries to the plaintiffs resulting from the acts of Mr. Farrar." (Emphasis in original). In asserting that the State was entitled to governmental immunity, the State defendants pointed to the pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act which waived governmental immunity only for certain types of acts, including the "negligent ... operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee." They argued that the alleged negligence of Trooper Titus in deciding not to detain Mr. Farrar at the stop light, in commencing the high speed chase, and in continuing the high speed chase, did not constitute "negligent ... operation of a motor vehicle." It was claimed that the doctrine of public official immunity was...