Boyle v. Anderson Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 1262, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 29 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-1284-A-381,AFL-CIO,2-1284-A-381 |
| Citation | 497 N.E.2d 1073 |
| Parties | 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3051 Martha Anne BOYLE, Executrix of the Estate of John T. Boyle, Deceased, et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. ANDERSON FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL 1262,, et al., Appellees (Defendants). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Lewis E. Jones, Marion W. Withers, Anderson, Frank E. Spencer, Indianapolis, Ronald K. Fowler, Anderson, for appellants.
Walter F. Lockhart, John C. Ruckelshaus, Indianapolis, for appellees Professional Fire Fighters of Indiana, AFL-CIO, Thomas H. Miller and Brian J. Reed.
William Byer, Anderson, John C. Ruckelshaus, Indianapolis, Thomas A. Woodley, Washington, D.C., Charles F. Braddock, Scott L. Webb, Anderson, Patrick N. Ryan, Marion, for appellees Anderson Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1262, AFL-CIO, an Unincorporated Ass'n and individual defendant Firemen.
John A. Farr, Jr., Ralph E. Sipes, Busby, Austin, Cooper & Farr, Anderson, for appellee City of Anderson.
Thomas A. Woodley, Erick J. Genser, Mulholland & Hickey, Washington, D.C., Jack B. Welchons, Patrick N. Ryan, Ryan & Welchons, Marion, for appellees Intern. Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Jack Gannon and Donald R. Wolf.
This case is a consolidated appeal of four separate actions brought by the plaintiff-appellants, property owners or insurance companies of property owners [hereinafter collectively referred to as Owners], to obtain damages for real and personal property destroyed by fire during a labor strike by the fire fighters of Anderson, Indiana. In each of the four cases, the owners sued each of the defendant-appellees, the City of Anderson (City), 109 striking Anderson Firefighters (Strikers), the Anderson Fire Fighters Association Local 1262 (Local Union), the Professional Fire Fighters Union of Indiana (State Union), and the International Association of Fire Fighters (International Union), with the trial court entering summary judgment in favor of all defendant-appellees. The Owners appeal, contending the trial court's judgment is contrary to law because it rests on the erroneous resolution of questions of first impression in Indiana and because there are genuine issues of material fact.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The facts most favorable to the Owners, the non-moving party, reveal that during the month of August, 1978, the City was engaged in labor negotiations with its fire fighters to arrive at a new agreement to replace the existing labor agreement that was scheduled to expire on December 31, 1978. Apparently, the negotiations deteriorated because on August 26, 1978, the fire fighters commenced an illegal work stoppage. 1 Despite the illegal strike, negotiations continued, and the State and International Unions were invited to assist the Local Union in negotiations even though the State and International Unions were not parties to the collective bargaining agreement between the Local Union and the City. In addition, the State and International Unions apparently played no part in the Local Union's decision to call the strike because the Local Union is a separate, autonomous body from either the State or International Unions and vested with exclusive control over the decision to call a strike. Also, agents of the State and International Unions did not come on the scene until after the strike began.
Nevertheless, there is some disputed evidence that agents of the State and International Unions aided, encouraged, supported, and even directly participated in some aspects of the illegal strike after they arrived on the scene. For example, one State Union representative is alleged to have stated at one negotiating session that he and members of the Local Union had met with members of the fire departments of neighboring communities and that the City should not expect help from these departments in the event of fire. At another negotiating session, a representative from the International Union is reputed to have affirmed the International's support of the illegal strike by pointing out that the International Union maintained a fund with which it could assist the Strikers and pay fines imposed on them.
On the evening of August 29, 1978, James E. Freeman (Freeman), an assistant city attorney assigned to negotiate for the City, received a telephone call from an unidentified party. This party informed Freeman that the City's latest offer had been rejected by the Union and that Freeman had better hope that there were no major fires in the City that evening. Early the next morning, at approximately 4:30 a.m. on August 30, 1978, a fire began in a lounge adjacent to the Owner's property. The City responded to the fire with a few nonstriking fire fighters, the fire chief, five or six probationary firemen, and all the equipment these men could bring. The Strikers also responded to the fire in a variety of ways. At some point, a small group of Strikers entered the burning or threatened buildings to make an inspection. After concluding that there was no risk to human life, the Strikers retreated from the buildings and refused to offer any further assistance. Some Strikers fought with one Anderson fire fighter who was responding to the call. The Strikers physically removed him from the scene and prohibited him from bringing a piece of firefighting equipment to the fire and prevented him from otherwise assisting in the fighting of the fire.
Meanwhile, the nonstriking fire fighters attempted to gain control over the blaze. Unfortunately, in the absence of assistance from the Strikers, the City's available manpower and equipment were insufficient to extinguish or control the spreading fire. Accordingly, the City placed calls for mutual aid to the volunteer fire departments of the surrounding communities of Edgewood, Chesterfield, and Richland Township. Still the Strikers refused to lend a hand. Instead, the Strikers stood around to watch the buildings burn and set up picket lines to keep the units from the surrounding communities from reaching the fire. It was only after units from all three communities had suffered delay that they were allowed to approach the fire. The mutual aid companies were permitted to pass through the picket lines when an unidentified person shouted that the Union man said to let them in. These companies then assisted the nonstriking fire fighters in taking control of the area and combating the fire. Despite the efforts of the nonstriking fire fighters and the mutual aid companies, and as the Strikers watched while maintaining their refusal to assist, the fire ultimately destroyed at least five large commercial buildings covering approximately one-half of a city block.
At some point during the course of the fire, it was discovered that a fire hydrant on one corner of the block threatened by the fire was inoperable. The City had a contract with the Anderson Municipal Water Utility to maintain all City fire hydrants and the City had knowledge of the defective hydrant for some time prior to the fire.
Most of the Owners were prohibited from entering the threatened or burning buildings to retrieve property or from fighting the fire themselves, although some Owners did manage to save some personal property.
Subsequently, on August 31, 1978, the City obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the Strikers from continuing their illegal strike. Thereafter, the Owners initiated their separate actions for damages, all of which ended with the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of all the defendants. Although the trial court accepted as true the facts as we have presented them, it concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact relative to the law of the case and, in essence, determined that the City, the Strikers, and the unions could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for the damages arising out of the fire.
Generally stated, the issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the City could not be held liable for any of the damages arising out of the fire?
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the Strikers could not be held liable for damages?
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the Unions could not be held liable for damages?
ISSUE ONE--Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, the City could not be held liable for any of the damages arising out of the fire?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--The Owners contend that the City can be held liable under a variety of theories: negligence in failing to maintain the fire hydrant, negligence in failing to provide an adequate alternative method of fighting fires in light of the strike, negligence in prohibiting the Owners from entering the burning buildings to retrieve property or to fight the fire by alternative means, negligence in failing to take legal action to end the strike before the fire, and vicarious liability for the acts of the Strikers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The City responds that under the common law it is not liable for failing to maintain the hydrant, that the Indiana Tort Claims Act 2 provides immunity from liability for any negligence in the decisions it made concerning legal action to end the strike and how it would fight the fires in light of the strike, and that it is not liable for the actions of the Strikers under the doctrine of respondeat superior because their refusal to perform their duty and their other overt acts of interference were outside the scope of their employment with the City.
CONCLUSION--The City is not liable for damages under any theory presented by the Owners.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court will apply the same standard used by the trial court in first instance. Lafary v. Lafary (1985), Ind.App., 476 N.E.2d 155. Summary judgment is...
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