Boyle v. Samotin
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC20-1399 |
| Parties | William BOYLE, Petitioner, v. Myles Rubin SAMOTIN, M.D., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
J. Scott Murphy and Landis V. Curry III of Paul Knopf Bigger, PLLC, Winter Park, Florida, for Petitioner
Kirsten K. Ullman, Brian M. Bursa, and Jesse E. LeVine of Ullman Bursa Law, Tampa, Florida, for Respondents
Andrew S. Bolin of Bolin Law Group, Tampa, Florida, for Amici Curiae Florida Hospital Association and Florida Medical Association
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Wilbert R. Vancol of McEwan, Martinez, Dukes & Hall, P.A., Orlando, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association
In this case we consider the statutory presuit notice requirement that section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2018), imposes on a claimant who seeks to file a medical negligence suit. Here the claimant mailed the presuit notice before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, but the defendant did not receive the notice until after the period would have expired absent tolling. The certified conflict issue is whether the applicable limitations period for filing a complaint for medical negligence is tolled under section 766.106(4) upon the claimant's mailing of the presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation, or only upon receipt of the notice by the prospective defendant. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We have for review Boyle v. Samotin , 313 So. 3d 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of Appeal, adhering to its earlier decision in Bove v. Naples HMA, LLC , 196 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), held that a medical negligence complaint is untimely if the presuit notice is not received by the prospective defendant within the applicable limitations period. In other words, the Second District held that the limitations period is not tolled until receipt of the notice. Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 674. In so holding, the Second District certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Zacker v. Croft , 609 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Baxter v. Northrup , 128 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), both of which, in the Second District's view, "resolved the same issue and arrived at the opposite conclusion—that the statute of limitations period is tolled upon mailing of the notice of intent." Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 678.
We agree with Judge Smith's concurring-specially-in-result-only opinion below that the Second District's earlier decision in Bove was wrongly decided and that the relevant statute and rule only require a claimant to timely mail the presuit notice to trigger tolling of the applicable limitations period. This conclusion, as petitioner correctly argues, is consistent with what this Court has previously said in Boyd v. Becker , 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), and Patry v. Capps , 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994). Accordingly, we quash the Second District's decision in Boyle and approve the certified conflict cases of Zacker and Baxter to the extent they are consistent with this opinion.
Prior to commencing an action for medical negligence, a claimant is required to follow certain procedures under section 766.106. Subsection (2)(a) of the statute mandates that "a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical negligence." Subsection (3)(a) then contemplates a "90-day period" in which the prospective defendant shall conduct a presuit investigation "to determine the liability of the defendant." But subsection (3) references two different 90-day periods, one triggered by mailing of the presuit notice, the other by receipt of the notice. Namely, subsection (3)(a) provides in part that "[n]o suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant," whereas subsection (3)(c) provides in part that "[f]ailure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim for purposes of this section." (Emphasis added.)
These differing 90-day periods are relevant here because subsection (4) of the statute contains a tolling provision that generally references "the 90-day period." That subsection, titled "Service of Presuit Notice and Tolling," provides:
The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants . Upon stipulation by the parties, the 90-day period may be extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during any such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.
(Emphasis added.)
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650 applies to the presuit procedures prescribed by section 766.106. Subdivision (b)(1) of the rule provides that "[n]otice of intent to initiate litigation sent by certified mail to and received by any prospective defendant shall operate as notice to the ... prospective defendant receiving the notice." (Emphasis added.) Subdivision (d)(1) of the rule provides that the presuit notice "shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, prior to the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations or statute of repose." Subdivisions (d)(2) and (d)(3) then reference the two different 90-day periods referenced in the statute. Subdivision (d)(2) provides in part that an "action may not be filed against any defendant until 90 days after the notice of intent to initiate litigation was mailed." And subdivision (d)(3) provides in part that "an action must be filed within 60 days or within the remainder of the time of the statute of limitations after the notice of intent to initiate litigation was received, whichever is longer, after the earliest of [certain events]," one of which is "[t]he expiration of 90 days after the date of receipt of the notice of intent to initiate litigation."
The relevant facts outlined by the Second District are straightforward. Just one day before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, petitioner "served a notice of intent for medical negligence, via certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to [respondents] pursuant to section 766.106(2)(a) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.650(b)(1)." Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 675. Respondents, however, did not sign the return receipt until four days after the notice was mailed. Id. Petitioner later filed a medical negligence complaint, and respondents moved for summary judgment on timeliness grounds. Id.
The trial court granted respondents’ motion but did so begrudgingly. The trial court recognized it was bound to follow the Second District's decision in Bove , which held that the applicable limitations period is not tolled until the prospective defendant receives the presuit notice. But the trial court opined that other courts, including the Fifth District in Baxter , correctly concluded that tolling commences when the claimant "serves" or mails the notice.
On appeal, the Second District declined petitioner's invitation to recede from Bove and instead affirmed. Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 674. The Second District felt "constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis to apply Bove " due to Bove's "indistinguishable" facts. Id. at 680. The Second District explained that Bove largely based its decision on rule 1.650, namely the "received by " language in subdivision (b)(1) and the "return receipt requested " requirement in subdivision (d)(1). Id. at 677 (quoting Bove , 196 So. 3d at 414 ). The Second District further explained that Bove was "[g]uided by the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Boyd v. Becker , 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), and Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Coffaro , 829 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2002)," both of which, in the Second District's view, focused on receipt of the notice. Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 678.
After revisiting Bove , the Second District explained that Zacker and Baxter reached a different conclusion than Bove even though they relied on some of the same caselaw and statutory and rule language on which Bove relied. Id. at 678-79. The Second District also noted Judge Makar's concurring opinion in Bay County Board of County Commissioners v. Seeley , 217 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), in which Judge Makar, relying in part on this Court's decision in Patry v. Capps , 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994), opined that Baxter was more persuasive than Bove . Boyle , 313 So. 3d at 679-80. But the Second District panel adhered to Bove , affirmed the judgment below, and certified conflict with Zacker and Baxter . Id. at 680.
In the certified conflict case of Zacker , the Fourth District held in relevant part that a claimant "satisfie[s] the requirements of section 766.106 when they mail[ ] the notice of intent to initiate litigation before the expiration of the statute of limitations." Zacker , 609 So. 2d at 141. For that proposition, the Fourth District relied on its earlier decision in Boyd v. Becker , 603 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), quashed , 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993), which held that "the ninety day tolling of the limitations period occurs from the date the notice of intent was mailed." Zacker , 609 So. 2d at 141 (quoting Boyd , 603 So. 2d at 1373 ).
In the other certified conflict case of Baxter , the Fifth District in relevant part addressed the defendants’ argument that the applicable limitations period had expired because the presuit notice was not received within that period. Baxter , 128 So. 3d at 912. The Fifth District rejected that "receipt" argument, reasoning in part that "the tolling period commences when the notice is served in accordance with ...
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