Boynton v. Boynton
| Decision Date | 07 March 1929 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | BERTHA F. BOYNTON, executrix & trustee, v. BERTHA F. BOYNTON, administratrix, & others. |
January 7, 8, 1929.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., CROSBY CARROLL, & SANDERSON, JJ.
Trust, Construction of instrument creating trust, Life estate, Acceleration of estate in remainder by waiver of will by widow, Time of distribution, Class. Devise and Legacy, Gift to class or to individuals, Lapse, Intestacy. Widow, Waiver of will of husband. Will, Waiver of provisions.
A provision in a will of a man who died in 1920 directed a trustee to make certain payments to his wife during her life and to his son during his life and "after the death of my said wife . and my son . . . to divide all the remaining property." The widow waived the provisions of the will. The son died leaving the widow surviving. Held, that, by reason of the widow's waiver, the trust terminated on the death of the testator's son.
A will created a trust of the residue of the testator's estate from which certain amounts were to be paid monthly for life to the testator's widow and a son, and in the event of the son's death leaving issue, "then to such issue for the remainder of the term" of the trust. The trustee also was to pay "to my daughters B and C each one half of the balance of the income remaining after the payments to my said wife and son and in the event of the death of my said wife or of my son, leaving no issue, then his or her share to be equally divided between my said daughters and in case of the death of either of my said daughters during the existence of this trust leaving issue then such issue shall stand in the place of such daughter." There was a further direction "after the death of my said wife . . . and my son . . . to divide all the remaining property between my said daughters B and C but in the event of the death of either or both of my said daughters leaving issue then such issue to take the place of the deceased daughter or daughters and in case both my said daughters die without leaving issue then . . . to divide my property between the children and grandchildren of my sister . . . share alike." The widow survived the testator and waived the provisions of the will. The testator's sister and his daughter C died before him, the daughter unmarried and the sister leaving a grandchild. The son and the daughter B survived the testator. The son died before the widow. Held, that
(1) Under the provisions of the will, all the trust property was to be divided at the death of the son; one payment or distribution at one time was contemplated;
(2) The limitation to the issue of the sister was contingent on the death of both of the testator's daughters without issue in the lifetime of the testator's widow and son or the survivor of them; and, the contingency not having occurred, the grandchild of the sister was entitled to nothing;
(3) The gift to the daughters B and C was to them as individuals and not as a class;
(4) On the death of C during the testator's lifetime, her share lapsed; and as it was a gift of a portion of the residue, an intestacy resulted and her share, both of principal and of income, should be distributed to the testator's heirs at law: B therefore took not only one half of the residue, but her share of the other half which was distributed as intestate property;
(5) Because she waived the provisions of the will, the estate of the window was not entitled to share in the final distribution in the share of C which was distributed as intestate property;
(6) The estate of the son was entitled to share with the daughter B in the half distributed as intestate property, the will not disclosing an intent to limit the son's share to the amount specifically given him by the will.
PETITION, filed in the Probate Court for the county of Middlesex on June 2, 1926, by the executrix of and trustee under the will of Everett E. Tarbell, late of Pepperell, for instructions.
The petition was heard by Harris, J., a stenographer having been appointed under the provisions of G.L.c. 215, Section 18. Material facts are stated in the opinion.
By order of the judge a decree was entered as follows:
The respondents Bertha F. Boynton and Beatrice W. Duffey appealed. P.D. Turner, for the respondent Duffey.
E.W. Baker, (S.M. Salny with him,) for the respondent Bertha F. Boynton, individually and as administratrix.
F.M. Qua, for the respondent Adelaide L. Tarbell.
This is a petition for instructions as to the meaning of certain portions of the will of Everett E. Tarbell. The petitioner is the sole remaining executrix of the will. The respondents are Bertha F. Boynton in her individual capacity as the daughter of the testator, and said Bertha F. Boynton as administratrix of the testator's widow; Beatrice Wallace Duffey, the testator's grandniece; and Adelaide L. Tarbell administratrix of the testator's son, Rudolph E. Tarbell.
The will was executed February 23, 1911. The testator's wife, Lizzie D. Tarbell, was then living, as well as were his two daughters, Bertha F. Boynton and Cecil Tarbell, and one son, Rudolph E. Tarbell. The testator died May 18, 1920. His daughter Cecil died unmarried in April, 1919.
His sister Lydia predeceased him, leaving no children but one grandchild, the respondent Beatrice W. Duffey. The testator's widow survived him. On August 10, 1920, she waived the provisions of the will. She died November 3, 1926. The surviving daughter of the testator, Bertha F. Boynton, is married but has no issue. The testator's son, Rudolph, was married; he died subsequent to his father on October 7, 1922.
The will, after a bequest to Lydia Frazier, the testator's sister, provided that the residue should be held in trust, the trustees to pay to the testator's widow the sum of $150 monthly during her lifetime; to pay to his son, Rudolph, $50 monthly during his lifetime, and in the event of the son's death leaving issue, "then to such issue for the remainder of the term" of the trust. The trustees were then directed as follows:
1. The will provided that on the death of the testator's wife and son the corpus of the estate was to be divided. The language of the will shows this. The testator said "after the death of my said wife . . . and my son . . . to divide all the remaining property." The words "after the death" mean after the death of both the wife and son. Loring v. Coolidge, 99 Mass. 191 . Dole v. Keyes, 143 Mass. 237 , 239. Richardson v. Warfield, 252 Mass. 518 , 521. The petition before us was dated June 2, 1926. Mrs. Tarbell, widow of the testator, was then living; she died November 3, 1926. The Judge of probate decided that by her waiver of the provisions of the will the trust was accelerated and that it ended on the death of the testator's son. This ruling was right. The widow, by renouncing any benefit under the will and electing to take such portion of the estate as she would take if her husband had died intestate, was no longer interested in the trust. The will must be interpreted as if it contained no provision for her, and the trust therefore terminated on the death of the son, Rudolph. Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102 . Shreve v. Shreve, 176 Mass. 456 , 458. Crocker v. Crocker, 230 Mass. 478 , 481. Hesseltine v. Partridge, 236 Mass. 77 , 80. Cases in which it appears that a provision for the wife was for the benefit of a third person are to be distinguished. See Leonard v. Haworth, 171 Mass. 496; Crocker v. Crocker, supra. The purpose of the trust was to secure the monthly payments of...
To continue reading
Request your trial