Boynton v. Canal Authority
| Decision Date | 24 April 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. V--291,V--291 |
| Citation | 311 So.2d 412 |
| Parties | William J. BOYNTON, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. The CANAL AUTHORITY of the State of Florida, a body corporate under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
L. Ralph Smith, Jr. and W. Taylor Moore, III, of Smith & Moore, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Ralph E. Elliot, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellee.
Appellants here seek reversal of a final judgment entered in an eminent domain proceeding, being the same land and case as that involved in Boynton v. Canal Authority, Fla.App.1st 1972, 265 So.2d 722.
Appellants, who will hereinafter be referred to as the landowners, initially held fee simple title to approximately 632 acres of land, extending northerly from the thread of the Ocklawaha River. In 1965 appellee sought to acquire the fee simple title to 540 acres of that property, located adjacent to and upstream of the Rodman Dam, for the purpose of flooding 520 acres as part of the Rodman Pool (now known as Lake Ocklawaha), the other 20 acres constituting a 300 foot 'collar' of land between the pool and the landowners remaining 92 acres of upland. In that proceeding the trial court declined to allow the Canal Authority to condemn the fee title to the 540 acres, whereupon an Order of Taking was entered on January 3, 1966 vesting in the Canal Authority, instead of the fee simple title, a 'perpetual right and easement.' 1
In 1968 another suit was filed to acquire the fee simple title to the same 540 acres of land, leaving the 92 acres of upland still in the ownership of the landowners. 2
A trial was held in September of 1970 for the purpose of determining the compensation to be awarded to the landowners for the taking of the fee in the 540 acres of land in which the Canal Authority already had an easement interest, including severance damages to the remaining 92 acres of upland. The final judgment entered on the jury verdict was appealed and reversed by this Court. 3
A second trial was held in March of 1973, culminating in a hung jury and a resulting mistrial.
In September of 1973 a third trial was held following which a final judgment was entered on February 21, 1974. It is that final judgment which is here appealed.
Though not presented as a point for resolution on this appeal, virtually all of the problems arising in this case result from an interpretation (or misinterpretation) of the 'perpetual right and easement' condemned and taken by the Canal Authority in the first eminent domain proceeding. That interest taken is described in the final judgment rendered in the first eminent domain proceeding as follows:
'* * * the perpetual right and easement to enter upon, and permanently or intermittently overflow, flood and submerge the lands in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal Project; also, the right to regulate and maintain water levels as may be required for the impoundment and maintenance of Rodman Pool as a part of the navigable waters of the United States; the right to regulate, prohibit and control use and/or removal of water from the right-of-way; the continual right to clear all or any part of the lands of any trees, bushes, debris, or other obstructions or structures and dispose of the materials cleared and to maintain the areas cleared; together with the right to prevent the construction of or maintenance of structures for human habitation; the right to exercise any other right not otherwise enumerated for such other purposes as may be needed in preservation and maintenance of the project; reserving, however, to the Defendant owners all rights normally accruing to riparian owners, including full ingress and egress, subject to the above-described easement and subject further to the rules and regulations of the United States Army Corps of Engineers as applied to other navigable waters.'
It is readily apparent that the interest remaining in the landowners after rendition of the final judgment in the first eminent domain proceeding is determinative of what interest remained for condemnation in the second proceeding. Of even greater significance is the effect, by way of severance damages, of the second taking on the landowners remaining 92 acres.
The legal operation and effect of a judgment must be ascertained by a construction and interpretation of its terms, and this presents a question of law for the Court. 4 If the language used in a judgment is ambiguous then it may be construed, but if the language employed is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction nor interpretation, and the effect thereof must be determined in the light of the literal meaning of the language used. In construing a judgment, however, the adjudication should not extend beyond that which the language used fairly warrants, since the purpose and function of construction is to give effect to that which is already latent in the judgment, and the Court may not by construction add new provisions to a judgment which were omitted or withheld in the first instance. In construing judgments the legal effect, rather than the mere language used, governs. A judgment must be construed in light of the situation of the Court, what was before it, and the accompanying circumstances. In cases of ambiguity or doubt the meaning of the judgment must be determined by that which preceded it and that which it was intended to execute. If a judgment cannot be interpreted from the language in the judgment itself, the entire record may be examined and considered for the purpose of interpreting the judgment and determining its operation and effect. 5 A judgment should be construed with reference to the issues raised in the case and which are intended to be decided, and the scope of the judgment is not to be extended beyond the issues raised in the case, or the state of facts and situation of the parties existing at the time of the action. 6
In construing ambiguous judgments the ordinary rules of evidence apply. The best evidence should be resorted to. Ordinarily the record, including the pleadings and transcript of the proceedings, will be the best evidence. Depending upon the adequacy of the record, circumstances may justify testimony from knowledgeable persons as to the issues raised in the case and the state of facts and situation of the parties existing at the time of the entry of the judgment. Such witnesses may not, of course, be permitted to testify as to what the judge intended the judgment to mean. That is the prerogative of the court.
In the case sub judice the landowners proffered, out of the presence of the jury, certain...
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Singer v. Singer, 93-3253
...court in light of the totality of the circumstances at the time the judgment of dissolution was entered. 2 See Boynton v. Canal Auth., 311 So.2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Where it is not ambiguous, the judgment's wording should be given its ordinary meaning. See Mulhern v. Mulhern, 446 ......