Bozman v. State, to Use of Cronhardt

• Decision Date: 01 November 1939
• Docket Number: 18.
• Parties: BOZMAN v. STATE to Use of CRONHARDT.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

9 A.2d 60

177 Md. 151

BOZMAN v. STATE to Use of CRONHARDT.

No. 18.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

November 1, 1939

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; J. Abner Sayler Judge.

Action by the State, to the Use of Myron A. Cronhardt, father of Charles Albert Cronhardt, an infant, deceased, against William E. Bozman, to recover damages for deceased's death. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Walter V. Harrison, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Daniel S. Sullivan, of Baltimore (Irvin S. Friedman, of Baltimore on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL SHEHAN, JOHNSON, and DELAPLAINE, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of a jury in the Superior Court of Baltimore City in a suit brought by the State of Maryland to the use of Myron A. Cronhardt to recover damages for the death of his infant son, who was killed by an automobile driven by William E. Bozman, the appellant.

The accident occurred on May 30, 1938, in broad daylight of a clear afternoon, on Green Spring Avenue in Baltimore County. This highway runs north and south, with a concrete surface 15 feet in width. The automobile was traveling north in a 45-mile speed district, and there was no other traffic at the time. The child, not quite 8 years old, lived on the west side of the road, but was struck on the opposite side of the road in front of his grandmother's home.

The boy's sister, about 10 years old, was an eye-witness of the collision. As she was standing in front of her home, she saw the automobile coming at about the third telephone pole away, when her brother was getting on his bicycle in their grandmother's driveway. She saw him, astride the bicycle with his feet on the ground, looking up and down the road. The front wheel was at the edge of the concrete when the automobile was between the first and second telephone poles (between 168 and 298 feet away). She said that the automobile was going fast, and that no horn was blown. She screamed to her brother, but was unable to attract his attention. She saw the car hit him when his bicycle was entirely on the concrete.

According to witnesses who arrived on the scene, the automobile had swerved and landed near the bank on the west side of the road. The boy and his bicycle were lying a short distance beyond the automobile. Skid marks, starting 15 feet south of the point of impact, extended diagonally across the road 75 feet to the rear wheels of the automobile.

The appellant testified that his machine was a 1938 Chevrolet coupe, that it had been used four months and was in perfect condition, and that its brakes had been tested two days before the accident. He swore that he was driving at a speed of between 35 and 40 miles an hour when he first saw the child at a distance of about 75 feet. He said he jammed on the brakes immediately, pulled to the left, and had almost stopped when he struck the child near the center of the road.

The appellant contends that there was no evidence of negligence on his part, and therefore the trial Court erred in refusing his prayer for a directed verdict. However, in order to justify such an instruction, the evidence must admit of no inference of negligence in the operation of the car. Excessive speed, which may constitute negligence if it contributes to an accident, may be inferred from such testimony as that the brakes were put on too late, or that the car did not stop until it had gone an extraordinary distance after the brakes were applied. The jury is not compelled to believe that the witnesses for either side are accurate in their testimony regarding the speed or the manner of operation of a motor vehicle. Ottenheimer v. Molohan, 146 Md. 175, 126 A. 97. The skidding of an automobile after a collision is also a circumstance of evidential value in reference to the rate of speed or whether the machine was under control. Thus, in a case where a motorist traveling 40 miles an hour saw a pedestrian in front of him, and applied his brakes, causing his machine to skid 50 feet, it was held that the testimony was legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was going at a dangerous and unlawful speed. Ellis v. Sanberg, 41 Cal.App. 506, 182 P. 792; 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law, § 11, page 1738. In view of the evidence as to skid marks extending across the road 75 feet, the admission of the appellant that he saw the boy at a distance of 75 feet, and other testimony in the case, a directed verdict on...