Finney v. Frevel

• Decision Date: 13 June 1944
• Docket Number: 21.
• Parties: FINNEY v. FREVEL et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

37 A.2d 923

183 Md. 355

FINNEY v. FREVEL et al.

No. 21.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 13, 1944

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; J. Abner Sayler Judge.

Action by Samuel Edgar Finney against Karl L. Frevel and another for personal injuries sustained in automobile collision. The trial judge granted the demurrer prayer of each defendant and from the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

DELAPLAINE and GRASON, JJ., dissenting in part.

Lester H. Crowther and Avrum K. Rifman, both of Baltimore (Herbert B. Fineberg, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

John C Kump, of Baltimore, for appellee Karl Frevel.

Ellis Levin and Roy S. Bond, both of Baltimore, for George Bertram Brock.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, MELVIN, and BAILEY, JJ.

COLLINS Judge.

Samuel Edgar Finney, appellant here, sued Karl L. Frevel and George Bertram Brock, appellees here, jointly in tort for injuries received in an automobile accident in Baltimore City on December 19, 1942. The case was tried in the Superior Court of Baltimore before a jury.

The trial Judge granted the demurrer prayer of each defendant. From the judgment on verdict as a result of the granted prayers, the appellant appeals to this Court.

The plaintiff, testifying, said that he worked in the evenings for the defendant, Bertram Brock, as a musician playing the piano, and Brock provided transportation to take him home after working hours; that on the night of the accident on the way home from work, the station wagon provided by Brock was operated by one William Day. On the front seat with Day was a Mrs. Jackson. On the seat behind the driver was a man, Jones, and beside Jones was Mrs. Beatrice Smith. On the third seat was Bernard Johnson and he, the plaintiff, was seated on the right side of Johnson of the rear seat. The station wagon was proceeding north on Gilmor Street, and when they pulled up to the corner of Baltimore and Gilmor Streets about 2:30 a. m., Day stopped the station wagon and he, the plaintiff, looked both ways and did not see anything--no danger at all. He said that he could see to his right over one-half a block down Baltimore Street; that he did not see anything 'only maybe cars parked so far off you wouldn't pay any attention.' He said that he did not see any danger at all. To the question, 'In other words, whatever car there was on Baltimore Street was so far back from the corner of Gilmor Street that you felt that this car that you were in had ample time to get across the street?' plaintiff answered, 'Yes, sir.' He said that Day, after coming to a dead stop at the intersection, looked and started, not driving fast, across Baltimore Street and had gotten almost across when the station wagon was struck in the rear. He said that the front wheels of the station wagon had passed the curb going north on Gilmor Street. He testified that he did not see anything that Day could have done 'if it was with him like it was with me', because he, the plaintiff, did not see this car until it was hit. He said that he did not see Frevel's car until after the accident. He does not know where Frevel's car came to rest or stopped, but when he got out of the station wagon, he saw some men trying to push the Frevel car back but did not see it move. He further said that the station wagon came to rest after the accident on the west side of Gilmor Street north of Baltimore Street but did not know how far north of Baltimore Street, headed south. It had been completely turned around. He indicated the position on the blackboard, but this does not appear in the record.

Officer Thomas J. Keyes, produced as a witness by the plaintiff, testified that, as a result of a call received at 2:27 a. m., he arrived at the scene of the accident at 2:31 a. m., and the station wagon was against the west curb of Gilmor Street about 75 feet north of Baltimore Street, headed south, and a 1939 Oldsmobile sedan was on the north side of Baltimore Street approximately 100 feet east of the intersection. It appears that the Oldsmobile had been moved before the officer arrived although no evidence was produced to show that it had been moved. The entire front of the Oldsmobile, Frevel's car, was damaged. A large part of the right side of the station wagon in the center to the rear was damaged. The right door was completely off, a portion of the back panel was torn out, and the rear wheel and fender were damaged. The officer further said that he observed some skid-marks 9 feet south of the north curb of Baltimore Street. 'They started thirty-two feet east of the curb-line of Gilmor Street and continued fifteen feet out into the intersection, and then the skid-marks were of a different character; they were very heavy rubber marks of rubber that shirred off with the automobile moving sideways, also deposit of dirt and glass at the end of the skid-marks.' The skid-marks were about 47 feet long. The officer said that both drivers were able to operate an automobile.

The only other witness offered was the doctor who testified to the injuries sustained.

The appellant claims that both drivers were negligent. His own testimony, however, has exonerated Brock's driver from negligence. He says that the driver Minch v. Hilkowitz, 162 Md. 649, 161 A. Gilmor and Baltimore Streets and both he and the driver looked; that the appellant did not see any car coming from his right and the driver then proceeded, not driving fast, across the intersection, and after the front wheels of the station wagon had passed the curb going north on Gilmor Street, evidently the north curb of Baltimore Street, the station wagon was hit in the rear. He further exonerated Brock's driver from negligence when he said that he did not see anything that driver could do. The burden of proof being on the appellant and there being no evidence legally sufficient, that is to say, competent, pertinent and coming from a legal source, to prove negligence on the part of Brock, the trial Court was correct in granting the demurrer prayer of the defendant, Brock. Minch v. Hikowitz, 162 Md. 649, 161 A. 164; Gutheridge v. Gorsuch, 177 Md. 109, 8 A.2d 885.

As to the negligence of Karl L. Frevel, there was no evidence offered that he was either the driver or owner of the car in collision with the station wagon. Ownership and operation of the car, however, are alleged in the declaration to be in Frevel. As the ownership was not denied by him in the next succeeding pleading, for the purpose of this case, ownership is admitted in him. Flack's Code, Article 75, section 28, subsection 109. Ownership being thus established, a prima facie presumption arises that the operator of the vehicle was the servant and agent of the owner. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lord, 159 Md. 518, 526, 151 A. 400; Gutheridge v. Gorsuch, supra, 177 Md. 109, 114, 115, 8 A.2d 885. A reasonable presumption also arises that the servant and agent was acting in the scope of his employment and upon the business of the master and this presumption exists until rebutted. Erdman v. Horkheimer & Co., 169 Md. 204, 181 A. 221; Phipps v. Milligan, 174 Md. 438, 199 A. 498; Gutheridge v. Gorsuch, supra.

The plaintiff, in his contention that there is evidence from which excessive speed on the part of the defendant can be inferred, relies on the cases of Taxicab Co. v. Hamburger, 146 Md. 122, 125 A. 914; Ottenheimer v. Molohan, 146 Md. 175, 177, 126 A. 97; Bozman v. State, 177 Md. 151, 9 A.2d 60. In the case of Taxicab Co. v. Hamburger, supra, there were witnesses who actually saw and testified to the speed of the taxicab. In the case of Ottenheimer v. Molohan, supra, there was testimony that the brakes were in good order and were put on so hard that loud screeching was heard and were applied before or at the moment of the collision, and the car was not stopped for a distance of from 100 to 135 feet. In the case of Bozman v. State, supra, the skid-marks started 15 feet from the point of impact and extended across the road 75 feet to the rear wheels of the defendant's automobile. There was also an eyewitness who testified that the defendant's automobile was going fast, and the defendant admitted that he saw the boy whom he struck at the distance of 75 feet.

Reliance upon testimony alone of marks upon the road, even though clearly shown to be made by the defendant's car, to establish negligence has never been favored by this Court. Shafer v. State, 171 Md. 506, 509, 189 A 273. As to the skid-marks in this case showing excessive speed and that the automobile was not under control, the officer said he saw some skid-marks and glass and dirt. There is no witness who says or attempts to say that these...