Bracey v. Luray
Decision Date | 16 September 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 5096.,5096. |
Citation | 138 F.2d 8 |
Parties | BRACEY et al. v. LURAY. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Harry E. Goertz and Joseph Loeffler, both of Baltimore, Md. (Bernard J. Medairy, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellants.
William Saxon, of Baltimore, Md. (Louis Samuels, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellee.
Douglas B. Maggs, Sol., and Bessie Margolin, Asst. Sol., both of Washington, D. C., Beverly R. Worrell, Regional Atty., of Richmond, Va., and Morton Liftin and Frederick U. Reel, Attys., U. S. Department of Labor, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, as amicus curiae.
Before PARKER, SOPER, and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant in actions instituted by workmen to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation, etc., under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,52 Stat. 1069,29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b), and consolidated for trial in the court below.The defense was that defendant was a retailer and not subject to the provisions of the act and that plaintiffs were not engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the act.The court below held that defendant was not a retailer within the meaning of the act but that only 4% of the business done by defendant was "in commerce" within its meaning and that plaintiffs had failed to show what portion of their time was devoted to such business.As to the remainder of defendant's business, the holding was that what was done by plaintiffs was not "in commerce" or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the act.
Defendant is a dealer in scrap iron doing a gross business of from $125,000 to $150,000 per year.His purchases are almost entirely within the state of Maryland and only about 4% of his sales is to purchasers outside the state.Approximately 96% of his sales are to scrap dealers for delivery to shipbuilding plants, where the scrap is fabricated into material used in the manufacture of ships that operate in interstate and foreign commerce.Plaintiffs handle the scrap for defendant, unloading, assorting, cutting, and loading it into railroad cars in the course of defendant's business.The facts as specifically found by the court below, are as follows:
We agree with the court below that the defendant was not a retailer within the meaning of the act.The exact language of the exemption, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (a)(2), is "any employee engaged in any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce".It is elementary in the construction of statutes that words are to be given their "natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning", unless it is clear that some other meaning was intended (59 C.J. 975); and it would never occur to anyone, we think, to classify the business of a junk dealer as a "retail or service establishment."Junk dealers such as defendant buy in small quantities and sell in larger quantities, either to some other dealer or to a manufacturer or importer.A retailer is one who sells in small quantities to the ultimate consumer.37 Words & Phrases, Perm.Ed., p. 502 et seq."Typical retail establishments are grocery stores, drug stores, hardware stores and clothing shops."Fleming v. A. B. Kirschbaum Co., 3 Cir., 124 F.2d 567, 572.The history of the act shows that it was in this sense that retail establishment was used.The exemption was not contained in the bill as originally introduced into Congress.S. 2475, H.R. 7200, 75th Cong. 1st Sess.May 24, 1937.It was added by an amendment, the purpose of which was to make clear that the act would have no application to "retail dry goods, retail butchering, grocers, retail clothing stores, department stores", located near and making occasional sales across state lines.83 Cong.Rec. 7437-7438.Walling v. American Stores Co., 3 Cir., 133 F.2d 840, 843.
We think, however, that the lower court was in error in holding that plaintiffs were not engaged in the production of goods for commerce.They were engaged in handling scrap iron which was intended to be used and was used in the fabrication of ships."Goods" as defined in the statute includes ships "or any part or ingredient thereof".Sec. 203(i).And "handling" is by express terms included in "production".Sec. 203(j).Plaintiffs handled scrap iron, an ingredient which was used in the manufacture of ships, and were therefore engaged in the production of goods within the statutory definition.There can be no question, we think, but that the production of ships to operate in interstate and foreign commerce is a production for commerce, within the meaning of the statute.SeeNewport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 Cir., 101 F.2d 841, 843.
It makes no difference that the scrap iron handled by plaintiffs was sold by defendant to other scrap dealers before coming into the hands of the steel and shipbuilding companies by whom it was fabricated into ships.This was the destination expected and intended by defendant; and "the act extends at least to the employer who expects goods to move in interstate commerce".Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S.Ct. 125, 87 L.Ed. ___;United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 657, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430.It is of no significance that all of...
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