Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: No. 17-1064,17-1064
• Citation: 986 F.3d 274
• Parties: William BRACEY, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI; Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania; District Attorney of Dauphin County
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

986 F.3d 274

William BRACEY, Appellant

v.SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI; Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania; District Attorney of Dauphin County

No. 17-1064

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued July 2, 2020

Opinion filed: January 20, 2021

OPINION OF THE COURT

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) strictly regulates a defendant's ability to collaterally attack his final judgment of conviction, including by requiring that he exercise "due diligence" along the way. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), 2244(d)(1)(D), 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), 2255(f)(4). This appeal involves § 2244(d)(1)(D), which requires a defendant attacking his state conviction to petition the federal courts within one year of "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim ... could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

At the heart of this appeal are two questions about that requirement. First, if a defendant reasonably expects that the prosecution has complied with its obligations under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), but later discovers that the prosecution instead withheld material exculpatory evidence in its possession, does the fact that the withheld evidence could have been found in public records mean the defendant has failed to "exercise ... due diligence"? Second, what, if anything, is the relevance of our en banc decision in Dennis v. Sec'y , 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016), which rejected the notion that a defendant has a duty to search public records for undisclosed Brady material because, we held, Brady focuses entirely on the prosecution's affirmative duty of disclosure and permits defendants to expect that government officials will comply with that duty?

Before we can reach those important questions, however, we must first address a threshold issue. This appeal comes to us not from the dismissal of Appellant William Bracey's underlying habeas petition, but from the denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for reconsideration of that dismissal in light of Dennis . So we begin by resolving whether the appeal of a Rule 60(b) ruling of this kind requires a certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), and, if so, whether a COA is justified here. We answer both in the affirmative, reaffirming our case law on the COA requirement in this context and concluding that Bracey has shown he is entitled to one.

Returning, then, to the questions at the core of this case, we hold as follows. Case law from the Supreme Court, this Circuit, and other Courts of Appeals establishes that a due diligence requirement like the one in § 2244(d)(1)(D) demands a highly fact- and context-specific inquiry, one that depends on the characteristics and reasonable expectations of someone in the petitioner's shoes. That is where Dennis comes in. Dennis effected a material change in Circuit law with respect to the reasonable expectations of a Brady claimant: While we had previously suggested that defendants had to search for exculpatory evidence themselves, Dennis made clear that a defendant can reasonably expect—and is entitled to presume—that the government fulfilled its Brady obligations because the prosecution's duty to disclose is absolute and in no way hinges on efforts by the defense. By altering the factual predicate and baseline expectations for Brady claims, Dennis correspondingly changed what § 2244(d)(1)(D) ’s "due diligence" requirement demands of Brady claimants. Yet in denying Bracey's Rule 60(b) motion, the District Court did not recognize the effect Dennis had on the relevant decisional law and did not engage in the multifactor analysis our case law requires. We therefore will vacate and remand to the District Court for an appropriate consideration of Bracey's Rule 60(b) motion.¹

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ²

Bracey was convicted of murder in 1995. The Commonwealth's case relied heavily on the testimony of two cooperators: Thomas Plummer, Jr., who was an alleged eyewitness to the murder, and Sylvester Bell, who claimed Bracey had confessed to him. At trial, the Government also elicited testimony from Plummer and Bell that they had received favorable plea agreements on certain charges in exchange for their testimony. Bracey was sentenced to life in prison, and his subsequent appeal and state habeas petitions were unsuccessful.

In 2010, Bracey learned the Commonwealth had disclosed only some of the cases that were pending against Plummer and Bell.³ As it turned out, just a few months after Bracey was convicted, Plummer pleaded guilty to charges that had not been disclosed to Bracey or the jury. Similarly, the Commonwealth withdrew a "second set of charges" that had been pending against Bell, JA 29, even though, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court found, "[t]he Commonwealth did not advise Bracey or the jury of the existence of [that] second set of charges," JA 30.

Based on this newly discovered information, Bracey petitioned for relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, raising claims under Brady and Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).⁴ The Court of Common Pleas dismissed Bracey's petition as time barred, ruling that the factual basis of the claim could have "been ascertained [earlier] by the exercise of due diligence." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that if Bracey "had exercised due diligence, he ... could have reviewed the dockets and determined the sentences imposed [on Plummer and Bell's other charges] at that time" because "[c]riminal dockets are a matter of public record." JA 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Bracey then filed a federal habeas petition in 2011, again asserting Brady claims based on the allegedly withheld material exculpatory evidence. The District Court dismissed the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). It reasoned that—regardless of the prosecution's "alleged lack of full disclosure, including the specific terms of the plea agreements and possible maximum penalties [for] each of the witnesses," JA 74— § 2244(d)(1)(D) obliges a defendant who is aware of witnesses’ favorable plea agreements to continually seek out "the full extent of those plea agreements," even after the defendant is convicted, JA 75. The District Court concluded that "because the full extent of the plea agreements and the sentences received by the witnesses were a matter of public record," Bracey "could have found the factual predicate of [his Brady ] claim through the exercise of due diligence well before October 2010," id. , meaning that he had filed his petition more than one year after the "factual predicate" for his Brady claim "could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Bracey sought to appeal that ruling in 2012, but in 2013, we denied a COA in view of then-existing case law.

Three years later, another development prompted Bracey to renew his quest for relief: We decided Dennis , 834 F.3d 263. In Dennis , the Commonwealth argued that a defendant's failure to seek out exculpatory materials in the public domain barred him from bringing a Brady claim. See id. at 289. We squarely rejected that argument, holding that a defendant has no burden to "scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material" even if the material part could be found in public records. Id. at 290 (quoting Banks v. Dretke , 540 U.S. 668, 695, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) ). Rather, the prosecution's "duty to disclose under Brady is absolute—it does not depend on defense counsel's actions"—and the defense is "entitled to presume that prosecutors have ‘discharged their official duties.’ " Id. (quoting Banks , 540 U.S. at 696, 124 S.Ct. 1256 ). Thus, "[t]o the extent [our previous case law] ha[d] considered defense counsel's purported obligation to exercise due diligence to excuse the government's non-disclosure of material exculpatory evidence," Dennis definitively "reject[ed] that concept as an unwarranted dilution of Brady ’s clear mandate." Id. at 293.

Bracey promptly moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b),⁵ contending that, in light of Dennis , the District Court had erred in dismissing his petition under § 2244(d)(1)(D). Specifically, he argued that because "there is no due diligence requir[e]ment under Brady for defendants to discover impeachment material and it is stric[t]ly the duty of the prosecutor to provide this information," § 2244(d)(1)(D) likewise does not require petitioners in his position to undertake efforts to find exculpatory material. JA 125–26. Unmoved, the District Court issued a one-page summary denial, ruling—without reference to, much less discussion of, Dennis —that Bracey's motion "raise[d] the same arguments" it had already rejected. JA 7. Bracey then requested a COA, which a motions panel of our Court referred to the merits panel.

II. DISCUSSION ⁶

We certified three questions: (A) whether a COA is required in an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of a federal habeas petition on procedural grounds; (B) if a COA is required, whether one should be granted here; and (C) if a COA is granted, whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Bracey's Rule 60(b) motion without considering Dennis ’s effect on its previous decision dismissing Bracey's habeas petition. We address each in turn.

A. Whether a COA Is Required

The first question could have been framed as whether Morris v. Horn , 187 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 1999), remains good law. AEDPA requires a petitioner to obtain a COA before appealing any "final order" in a federal habeas proceeding challenging a state conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Morris held this requirement also applies to appeals, like this one, from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration of the denial...