Bracken v. Cnty. of Allegheny

• Decision Date: 21 November 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-171
• Parties: Charles Bracken, William Deforte, William Jackson, and Patrick Jennings, Plaintiffs, v. The County of Allegheny, William P. Mullen as Sheriff of Allegheny County, the Allegheny County Sherriff's Office, Chelsa Wagner as Allegheny County Controller, the Allegheny County Controller's Office, Allegheny County District Attorney John Fitzgerald (In His Official Capacity and as an Individual), and Allegheny County District Attorney Inspector Darrel Parker (In His Official Capacity and as an Individual, Jointly and Severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Charles Bracken, William Deforte,William Jackson, and Patrick Jennings, Plaintiffs, v. The County of Allegheny, William P. Mullen asSheriff of Allegheny County, theAllegheny County Sherriff's Office, Chelsa Wagner asAllegheny County Controller, the Allegheny County Controller's Office,Allegheny County District Attorney John Fitzgerald(In His Official Capacity and asan Individual), and Allegheny County District Attorney Inspector Darrel Parker(In His Official Capacity and asan Individual, Jointly and Severally, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-171

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 21, 2017

United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy

OPINION

Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge¹

I. Introduction

Four² current and/or former Pennsylvania constables initiated this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and Pennsylvania law against seven Allegheny County entities and officials: Allegheny County; the Allegheny County Sheriff's Office; Allegheny County SheriffWilliam P. Mullen ("Sheriff Mullen"); Allegheny County Assistant District Attorney John Fitzgerald ("ADA Fitzgerald"); Allegheny County District Attorney Inspector Darryl Parker ("Inspector Parker"); the Allegheny County Controller's Office; and Allegheny County Controller Chelsa Wagner ("Controller Wagner"). Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") on March 1, 2017 (ECF No. 64), followed by a corrected version on March 3, 2017, the operative pleading (ECF No. 66). There are currently four pending motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 69, 72, 74, and 76). The parties have submitted briefs and documents in connection with these pending motions, (ECF Nos. 70, 73, 75, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86), all of which have been reviewed by the Court.

By way of further background, we note the following procedural history. On February 7, 2017 we granted four motions to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and found it unclear "how many and what types of claims Plaintiffs are attempting to assert under the Fourth and Fourteen Amendments." (ECF No. 61 at 5.) We noted, for example, "the disjointed way in which Plaintiffs organized Count I of their amended complaint," which conflated a number of legal theories. (ECF No. 61 at 6.) Plaintiffs failed to articulate whether they were asserting violations of procedural or substantive due process. (ECF No. 61 at 6). The Court permitted Plaintiffs to amend, instructing:

Because this is a civil rights case, the Court is required to extend Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their deficient pleading, irrespective of whether they have requested to do so and irrespective of whether they are counseled, unless it would be futile or inequitable. Although it is unlikely that many of the deficiencies in the amended complaint can be cured, the Court finds that under the circumstances Plaintiffs should be afforded the chance to amend their pleading. When filing the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs must adhere to the following directives that another member of this Court recently gave to pro se plaintiffs:

Plaintiffs must indicate in separate Counts each constitutional right violated or state tort committed, indicating the specific Defendant(s) against whom that claim is asserted, and referencing in separately numbered paragraphs under eachcount, any factual statements showing that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. Plaintiff must also include in each Count the specific relief sought against the Defendant(s) named in that Count.

Moreover, the Court will not consider any arguments made by Plaintiffs in briefs in opposition about legal theories or allegations that have not been pled in accordance with the directives in the preceding sentence. In responding to the second amended complaint, Defendants may reassert any applicable arguments that they have raised in connection with the pending motions.

(ECF No. 61 at 13) (citations omitted).

On February 21, 2017 Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 21). On February 22, 2017, we sua sponte struck Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, in part because "Plaintiffs once again confusingly set forth multiple legal theories in a single count." (ECF No. 63 at 2.) Although we granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint consistent with our directives, we warned that Plaintiffs "will not be given another chance to file an amended pleading." (ECF No. 63 at 3.)

Upon review of the Third Amended Complaint and these filings, the Court agrees with Defendants that the TAC lacks facial plausibility and will dismiss it with prejudice for failure to state a claim

II. Legal Standard

"Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss will be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 88 (3d Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume theirveracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted unless the plaintiff's factual allegations are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not 'shown' -- 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A pleading may not be amended by a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss. Zimmerman, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988).

Plaintiffs have attached two documents to the TAC, and Defendants have attached numerous documents to their briefs in support of their motions to dismiss. "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). Further, "[i]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss." Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal marks and citation omitted); see also Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007).

Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). "Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility." Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. Factual Background

The TAC consists of 247 paragraphs and spans over thirty-eight pages. In it Plaintiffs allege as follows. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs Charles Bracken ("Constable Bracken"), William DeForte ("Constable DeForte"), William Jackson ("Constable Jackson"), and Patrick Jennings ("Constable Jennings") are current or former elected constables in Pennsylvania. TAC at ¶¶ 9-12. Broadly speaking, the Plaintiffs allege that in Allegheny County there has been a long history of employees of the Sheriff's Office harboring animosity toward the constables. Said animosity was based, in part, on members of the Sheriff's Office wanting the exclusive rights to collect fees associated with serving Allegheny County Family Division bench warrants. Motivated to achieve these exclusive rights at the expense of the constables in Allegheny County, various officials of the Sheriff's Office influenced ADA Fitzgerald and Inspector Parker to arbitrarily single out a select group of politically unpopular constables, including the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' complaint covers a period of time beginning in 1993. Plaintiffs describe a series of alleged meetings involving payment of constable fees for serving bench warrants issued by the judges of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Family Division ("Family Division"). TAC ¶ at 16-28. Plaintiffs specifically reference a meeting in 1994 attended by then Common Pleas Judge [David] Cercone, Bernard Regan, Manager of Constable Services, Mike Souk,President of the Allegheny County Constable's Association (Constable's Association), and two constables, Kenneth Knedro and (Plaintiff herein) Deputy Constable William DeForte. TAC at ¶ 22. At the meeting, Plaintiffs allege it was agreed that service of bench warrants would include "fingerprinting, overseeing transport to and from courts and warrant costs for every extra warrant the person being served had at the time of service by constables." TAC at ¶ 23. This procedure allegedly continued until 2006 when another meeting occurred to discuss and implement a procedure for executing Allegheny County...